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Abstract 
 
In 2013, the US Supreme Court declared isolated gene sequences as ‘products of nature’ 
and hence, unpatentable subject matter.  Paradoxically, the European Patent Office 
(EPO), relying on the EU Biotech Directive 98/44/EC, does not perceive a problem with 
patents on isolated human genetic sequences. However, the EPO excludes human 
embryonic stem cells (hESCs) from being patentable subject matter on the grounds of 
morality and ordre public.  
The controversy arises from an understanding that gene patents create a de facto tragedy 
of the anti-commons. This, in turn, is based on a wider belief that the current statutory 
regime governing the patent protection of human genetic materials creates expansive 
property rights, without a proper consideration of the public interest.  
This thesis tests this proposition by examining and revealing the contextual genesis of 
these bifurcated reactions by the United States and European jurists. First, it reframes 
the historical evolution of patented inventions within the biotechnology sector. By 
adopting the concept of patents as a social contract between the inventor and society, 
the research reasserts the fundamental aspects of patent law. Second, the subsequent 
chapters employ this primary premise in order to map out the theoretical arguments for 
propertizing genetic materials. Finally, the thesis investigates the possibility of policy 
guidelines by gathering an empirical dataset through questionnaires and interviews 
directed at key stakeholders.  
This work maintains that the current statutory regimes in Europe and the US governing 
the patent protection of human genetic materials can create acceptable property rights. 
But this is only possible if the regime adopts a purpose-bound approach for human 
genetic materials. Such an enhanced status quo approach, as adopted in some European 
jurisdictions, would entail the consideration of public interest values, as articulated 
through the empirical research, and which has been set out as a draft manifesto.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to start by recognizing my two supervisors, Uma Suthersanen and Duncan 
Matthews for their constructive guidance throughout this period. 
It is also important for me to acknowledge that this thesis would not have been possible 
without the support of the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at Queen Mary, 
University of London for awarding me the Queen Mary Studentship. 
I am also grateful to the many participants who agreed to donate their time and 
generously shared their insight and experience. 
A tremendous ‘thank you’ to those who have been unwavering with their kindness and 
support: Marc Mimler, Ana Betancourt, Stelios Alexandridis, Mary Gani and the 
Matthews Family: William, Emma, Sarah and Andrew. 
 
Finally, to my family: this is for you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Cases 
 
Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. 573 U.S._2014 
 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 1011 
 
Amgen Inc. v. Chughai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 12000 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
 
Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 
 
Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 SCR 265. 
 
Association for Molecular Pathology et al v. United States Patent and Trademark Office 
et al (2010) 
 
Association for Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and Trademark Office et al. 
2010-1406. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Decided August 16, 
2012. 
 
Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. 569 U.S. 12-
398 (2013) 
 
Aventis Pharma Inc v Apotex Inc, 2006 FCA 64 
 
Ball v. Crompton Corset Co. (1887), 13 S.C.R. 469 
 
Baker Petrolite Corp. v. Canwell Enviro-Industries Ltd. (2002), 17 C.P.R. (4th) 478   
 
Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002).   
 
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C. Mass. 1817) 
 
Beecham Canada Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co., (1982) 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) 
 
Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet Oy (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 
 
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw v. David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office 561 
U.S. 593 (2010) 
 
BGH Decision of 27 November 2012, case no.: X ZR 58/07 
 
Biogen v. Medeva, October 31, 1996, [1997] RPC 1 (House of Lords). 
 
Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) 
 
Canadian General Electric Co. v. Fada Radio Ltd., [1930] A.C. 97 
 
Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. Gypsum, Lime and Alabastine Canada Ltd, [1931] Ex. 
C.R. 180. 
 
6 
 
Consolboard Inc v MacMillan Bloedel (Sask) Ltd, [1981] 1 SCR 504. 
 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908). 
 
Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Diehr, et al. 450 U.S. 175 
(1981) 
 
DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664 (1931) 
 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
 
Eli Lilly & Company v Human Genome Sciences Inc [2008] EWHC 1903 (Pat), 
 
Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Limited, 2010 FCA 197, [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349 
 
Eli Lilly and Company v. Teva Canada Limited, 2011 FCA 220 
 
Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 
77 (Fed.Cir.1988) 
 
Ex Parte Latimer, March 12, 1889, C.D., 46 O.G. 1638, United States Patent Office, 
“Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents and the United States Courts in Patent 
Cases.” 1889 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,1890) Pp.123-127. 
 
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. WARF. USPTO Board of Appeal and 
Interferences, (Appeal 2010-001854) Available at: 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/WARFDecision042910.pdf. Accessed 
May 24, 2012. 
 
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
 
Generics (UK) Limited and others (Appellants) v H Lundbeck A/S (Respondents) [2009] 
UKHL 12 
 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) F.C.T.D. April 21, 1998. 
 
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002]4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 
76 
 
HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] E.P.O.R. 388 
Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly and Company [2011] UKSC 51 
 
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. V. Commissioner of Patents (1986), 9 C.P.R. (3d) 
289 (F.C.A.). 
 
In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
 
7 
 
In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
In re Duel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 
In Re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
 
In re Marden 47 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) 
 
In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh) No. 2013-1407 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2014) 
 
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 USPQ2d 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
 
In re Williams 80 U.S.P.Q. 150 (C.C.P.A. 1958) 
 
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred  Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)                                                      
 
Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46 (21 October 2004) 
 
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
 
Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
 
Mayo Collaborative Services, DBA Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc. 566 , 132 S.Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012) 
 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) 
 
Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 ER 201. 
 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 
 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (California 1990). 
 
Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
 
Parke-Davis and Co. v. H.K. Mulford and Co., 189 Fed. 95 (SDNY 1911) affirmed, 196 
Fed. 496 (2
nd
 Cir.1912). 
 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 491 
 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623 
 
President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Commissioner of Patents, 1998.  
 
President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (C.A.) 
[2000] 4 F.C. 528 
 
Re Application of Abitibi Co. (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 8 
 
Re Application for Patent of Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd, (1986) 11 C.P.R. (3d) 311 
 
Re Motorola (1998), 86 C.P.R. (3d) 71, 76 (Patent Appeal Board) 
8 
 
Reeves Brothers Inc. v. Toronto Quilting & Embroidery Ltd. (1978), 43 C.P.R. (2d) 145. 
at 187 (FCTD). 
 
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 
Scripps Clinic and Res. Found. V. Genentech, Inc.; 666 F.Supp.1379, 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d1481,1488 (N.D.Cal.1987) 
 
Scripps Clinic and Res. Found. V. Genentech, Inc; 724 F. Supp. 690, 694 
(N.D.Cal.1989) 
 
Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Commissioner of Patents [1974] S.C.R. 111 
 
T 0019/90(Onco-mouse) of 3 October 1990 
 
T 666/05. Decision of the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office.  
November 13, 2008 
 
T1213/05-3.3.04, Decision of the Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office. 
September 27, 2007 
 
T 80/05-3.3.04. Decision of the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office. November 19 2008. 
 
2 U.S.P.Q., 1427 [Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences 1987] 
 
University of Utah Research Foundation et al. vs. Ambry Genetics Corporation. United 
States District Court of Utah, Case No.2:13-CV-00640-RJS. March 10, 2014. 
 
Windsurfing International Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] RPC 59 
(CA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Glossary 
 
This glossary provides the most recent definitions and is intended to provide a reference 
point for readers who may not be familiar with the following scientific terms.
1
   
 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
The genetic material of most living organisms, which is a major constituent of the 
chromosomes within the cell nucleus and plays a central role in the determination of 
hereditary characteristics by controlling protein synthesis in cells. It is also found in 
chloroplasts and mitochondria. DNA is a nucleic acid composed of two chains of 
nucleotides in which the sugar is deoxyribose and the bases are adenine, cytosine, 
guanine, and thymine. The two chains are wound round each other and linked together 
by hydrogen bonds between specific complementary bases to form a spiral ladder-
shaped molecule (double helix). When the cell divides, its DNA also replicates in such a 
way that each of the two daughter molecules is identical to the parent molecule. 
Ribonucleic acid (RNA) 
A complex organic compound (a nucleic acid) in living cells that is concerned with 
protein synthesis. In some viruses, RNA is also the hereditary material. Most RNA is 
synthesized in the nucleus and then distributed to various parts of the cytoplasm. An 
RNA molecule consists of a long chain of nucleotides in which the sugar is ribose and 
the bases are adenine, cytosine, guanine, and uracil. RNA can associate with proteins to 
form complexes called ribonucleoproteins. 
Messenger RNA (mRNA) 
A type of RNA that carries the information of the genetic code transcribed from DNA to 
specialized sites within the cell (known as ribosomes), where the information is 
translated into protein composition. 
Transfer RNA (tRNA, soluble RNA, sRNA) 
A type of RNA that is involved in the assembly of amino acids in a protein chain being 
synthesized at a ribosome. Each tRNA is specific for an amino acid and bears a triplet 
of bases complementary with a triplet on mRNA. 
Complementary DNA (cDNA) 
A form of DNA prepared in the laboratory using messenger RNA (mRNA) as template, 
i.e. the reverse of the usual process of transcription in cells; the synthesis is catalysed by 
reverse transcriptase. cDNA thus has a base sequence that is complementary to that of 
                                               
1 The definitions in the glossary are provided by two dictionaries: (1) King, R., P. Mulligan and W. 
Stansfield. A Dictionary of Genetics (8 ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; and (2) Martin, E. & 
R. Hine. A Dictionary of Biology (6 ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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the mRNA template; unlike genomic DNA, it contains no noncoding sequences 
(introns). cDNA is used in gene cloning for the expression of eukaryote genes in 
prokaryote host cells, or as a gene probe to locate particular base sequences in genomic 
DNA. cDNA molecules are inserted into plasmid or phage vectors to create cDNA 
libraries of expressed genes. 
Gene 
The definition of a gene has changed as advances in genetic analysis and technology 
have enhanced our understanding of its structure, function, transcription, and genomic 
organization. In the classical literature a gene is defined as a hereditary unit that 
occupies a specific position (locus) on a chromosome; a unit that has a phenotypic 
effect; a unit that can mutate to various allelic forms and that recombines with other 
such units in a genetic cross. With the elucidation of the molecular nature of DNA and 
information gained through the use of molecular biology and sequencing technologies 
(in the mid to late 1900s), the gene came to be viewed as a hereditary unit composed of 
nucleotide sequences (including 5′ and 3′ untranslated sequences and introns) that are 
required for the production of functional protein or RNA product(s). When a function 
(or phenotype) is unknown, a gene can be identified based on sequence characteristics, 
transcription, or homology to a known gene. More recently, the use of novel 
experimental and computational tools have uncovered extensive and overlapping 
networks of transcription (including noncoding RNA transcription) in humans and other 
organisms that pose challenges to defining a gene. For example, a gene can overlap 
another such that the same DNA sequence codes for two different products in different 
reading frames or on opposite strands; a noncoding RNA can be transcribed from the 
intron of, or antisense to a protein-coding gene; a gene can have multiple transcription 
start sites; and a gene can have distant regulatory regions or those it shares with other 
genes. Taking such findings into account, the following may be added to the evolving 
definition of a gene: genomic sequences that are required, in sequential or overlapping 
combinations, to produce one or more functional RNA or protein product(s) that 
contribute to a particular phenotype. 
Gene probe (DNA probe) 
A single-stranded DNA or RNA fragment used in genetic engineering to search for a 
particular gene or other DNA sequence. The probe has a base sequence complementary 
to the target sequence and will thus attach to it by base pairing. By labelling the probe 
with a radioactive isotope or fluorescent label it can be identified on subsequent 
separation and purification. Probes of varying lengths, up to about 100 nucleotides, can 
be constructed in the laboratory. They are used in the Southern blotting technique to 
identify particular DNA fragments, for instance in conjunction with restriction mapping 
to diagnose gene abnormalities or to map certain sequences. 
Intron (intervening sequence) 
A nucleotide sequence in a gene that does not code for the gene product. Introns, which 
occur principally in eukaryotes, are transcribed into messenger RNA (mRNA) but are 
11 
 
subsequently removed from the transcript before translation. In certain cases, removal 
of the introns is an autocatalytic process – self-splicing – whereby the RNA itself has 
the properties of an enzyme. Self-splicing occurs in primary transcripts of some single-
celled organisms, such as Tetrahymena, as well as chloroplasts, mitochondria, and some 
viruses. However, splicing of primary transcripts produced in the nucleus generally 
requires the participation of a spliceosome, a complex of proteins and RNAs. The 
function of introns is still subject to lively debate. They may simply be sequences of 
selfish DNA, able to move between different loci within the genome with no benefit to 
the host. On the other hand, introns may act as ‘spacers’ for exons and facilitate 
alternative splicing to create distinct mRNAs from the same gene. Moreover, they could 
enable exon shuffling – recombination or rearrangement of exons encoding functional 
domains of proteins – which permits rapid evolution of proteins with novel 
permutations of functional groups. Introns have also been found in certain 
archaebacteria and cyanobacteria and in some viruses. 
Exon 
A portion of a split gene that is included in the transcript of a gene and survives 
processing of the RNA in the cell nucleus to become part of a spliced messenger of a 
structural RNA in the cell cytoplasm. Exons generally occupy three distinct regions of 
genes that encode proteins. The first, which is not translated into protein, signals the 
beginning of RNA transcription and contains sequences that direct the mRNA to the 
ribosomes for protein synthesis. The exons in the second region contain the information 
that is translated into the amino acid sequence of the protein. Exons in the third region 
are transcribed into the part of the mRNA that contains the signals for the termination of 
translation and for the addition of a polyadenylate tail. 
Embryo 
A rudimentary animal or plant in the earliest stages of development, produced by 
zygotic cleavages and dependent upon nutrients stored within the membranes that 
enclose it (e.g., those covering an egg or a seed). In humans, embryonic development 
begins with the first zygotic division and lasts until approximately the eighth week of 
gestation, when an embryo becomes a fetus. Early development in viviparous animals is 
sometimes divided into two distinct stages, pre-embryonic and embryonic, which are 
separated by the commencement of organ differentiation or by implantation. In humans, 
the cell mass resulting from zygotic cell divisions up to about the fourteenth day of 
gestation is called a pre-embryo, although the use of this term is controversial. The 
moral status of a human embryo is a major issue area, particularly in embryonic stem 
cell research and in in vitro fertilization, where surplus embryos may have to be 
destroyed. 
Blastocyst 
The mammalian embryo at the time of its implantation into the uterine wall. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Background to the research 
Patents have been in existence since the 1400s and their acceptance has been 
largely unquestioned other than in the field of modern biotechnology.
2
 However, the 
issue of patentable subject matter has become a dilemma with the advance of genetic 
engineering. Queries on what comprises patentable subject matter generate a significant 
degree of ambiguity for inventors and would-be inventors of original and innovative 
products and processes. It would appear that in some areas of biotechnology research, 
the degree of patent protection is doubtful. One primary area of concern is how the law 
should address patenting human genetic materials. In particular, whether patents should 
be granted for DNA sequences and inventions derived from human embryonic stem 
cells (hESCs).  
 The patent system was primarily developed to accommodate mostly mechanical 
inventions and their needs during the age of industrialization.
3
 Life sciences on the other 
hand, are inherently different.
4
  It can be argued that inserting life science inventions 
into the traditional patent system that was created for an entirely different type of 
invention raises concerns about the appropriateness of the protective mechanism.
5
  
However, this thesis argues that the patent system is, in fact, appropriate in granting 
                                               
2 Venetian Statute of 1474 and 1623 English Statute of Monopolies. Bently, L. & M. Kretschmer (eds.) 
Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets, Venice (1474), Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900). 
www.copyrighthistory.org  Accessed September 29, 2013.  English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 
Jac. 1, c. 3, The Original Source of the Anglo-American Patent Law. 
3 “[N]ew technologies and business practices challenge the traditional paradigm of patent protection 
developed during the industrial revolution. Biotechnology…affects the functioning of the patent system 
as a regulatory institution.” Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. Declaration on Patent 
Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS. 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/patentdeclaration.cfm.  Accessed on April 15, 2014 at 2. For more 
information on how biotechnology and software claims have challenged the boundaries of patent law, see: 
Burk, D. “Patent Law’s Problem Children: Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context” in 
Patent Law in Global Perspective R. Okediji and M. Bagley (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.187-212, 2014.  
4 Lemley, M. & D. Burk. “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” in Virginia Law Review. Vol. 89, 2003 at 1581. 
5 Van Overwalle, G. “Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and European 
Approaches,” in IDEA-Journal of Law and Technology. pp. 143-194, 1999. 
17 
 
protection for biotechnology inventions because it catalyses innovation and the 
dissemination of knowledge into the public sphere.  
In some circumstances, biotechnology encompasses naturally occurring 
organisms, which if left to their own devices, can naturally develop without human 
intervention. Research in this area has the ability to benefit humans, animals, food 
security, and the environment. However, biotechnology also has the capacity to bring 
negative effects to the same areas as well, which will in turn generate large socio-eco-
political transformations. Ethical, legal and social issues coupled with apprehension of 
the control of the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries raises an essential question: 
Should it be possible to patent a material that already exists in nature?  
In the 1970s, developments in the biotechnological field challenged the patent 
system, which traditionally granted patents on mechanical inventions. Most 
international patent regimes were developed with this view in mind, and were not 
structured with the inclusion of living organisms.  In recent years, there has emerged a 
conservative stance towards patenting life from those in the legal field. Eligibility issues 
arose, prompting patent office examiners and the judiciary to decide what subject matter 
qualified for patent protection, and what fell outside the realm of patentable subject 
matter.  
Despite the existence of patent office guidelines regarding biotechnological 
inventions, issues and debates continue to persist, which raises the question: are they the 
same as other mechanical inventions?
6
 One of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate 
                                               
6 Biotechnology and its relationship with the law has been a controversial topic both in the public sphere 
and in academia.  John Sulston, a Nobel laureate for his work in genetics and noted contributor in the 
Human Genome Project advocates keeping information accessible for future research and development. 
Sulston, J. & G. Ferry. The Common Thread: Science, Politics, Ethics and the Human Genome. Great 
Britain: Bantam Press, 2003.p 108: “It is still permissible to patent a gene sequence as long as you can 
show how it might be used to diagnose diseases, for example. In the end the issues are being decided not 
on principled grounds, but according to which side has the most money to spend on lawyers. One of the 
aims of the Human Genome Project has been to ‘raise the bar’ by making as much genome information as 
possible universally available in the public domain and therefore unpatentable.” 
18 
 
that although the nature of biotechnological creations is different from that of 
mechanical ones, they should continue to be accommodated in the patent system.  
The protection of products created from biotechnology is a question of intense 
debate because it challenges traditional property law ideologies.
7
  One concern is that 
granting a patent for human genes permits the possession of human genetic 
information.
8
 Gene patents are granted on the basis of purification and isolation 
techniques which are considered to qualify as ‘inventions’ and justify patent protection 
upon satisfying other patent requirements including utility, non-obviousness and 
industrial applicability. However, some commentators have argued that isolating and 
purifying a gene is not as important as the information a gene carries.
9
 There are two 
prevalent views on isolated genes. First, there is the argument that genetic information 
remains unaltered after the isolation and purification process and as a result, gene 
patents actually protect discoveries, which contradicts the patent system. Conversely, 
the opposing view maintains that a genetic change has been made once a gene has been 
isolated and purified and thus, is different from its naturally occurring counterpart. It 
appears the gene patent debate ultimately depends on whether human genetic 
information can be owned and if it can, how the law should construct the qualifications 
for this ownership. 
                                               
7 Nwabueze, R. Biotechnology and the Challenge of Property: Property Rights in Dead Bodies, Body 
Parts, and Genetic Information. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2007.  Nwabueze claims 
biotechnology inventions challenges traditional patent law, as demonstrated by questions over whether 
human body parts, cell lines and human genes are patentable subject matter and should be categorized as 
‘property.’ 
8 Ontario Report to Premiers, Genetics, Testing and Gene Patenting: Charting New Territory in 
Healthcare. (Toronto: Ontario Government, 2002).  
9 World Health Organization, Genomics and World Health (Geneva: WHO, 2002) at 136: 
It is argued that a normal or abnormal gene sequence is, in effect, naturally occurring 
information which cannot therefore be patentable. The counter-argument which has been widely 
used by patent lawyers, that DNA sequence identification is a form of purification ‘outside the 
body,’ and therefore analogous to the purification of naturally occurring pharmacological agents, 
is specious; the DNA molecule is not, in this context, important as a substance and its value 
resides in its information content. 
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Below four initial topics are considered. First, a brief summary will be provided 
of the significance and scope of the thesis. This will be followed with the hypothesis 
and research questions. Then the research methodology will be discussed. Finally, this 
chapter will end with a brief summary of the contents of the remaining five chapters of 
the thesis.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1.2. Significance and scope of this study 
The current discussion over the propertization of human genetic materials 
advances two mutually exclusive outcomes: (i) one in which  the special nature of 
genetic material means that the existing intellectual property regime is an unsuitable 
protection mechanism, and as a result, all human genetic materials should be excluded 
from patent protection and be placed in the public domain and (ii) maintenance of the 
current status quo, in which any kind of human genetic material is eligible for patent 
protection. From these two opposing positions, it is generally believed that only one can 
exist,
10
 and until recently, it seems that all human genetic material was considered 
patentable subject material, bar human embryos in Europe on the basis of morality and 
ordre public considerations.  
The significance and originality of this research lies in integrating the normative 
and empirical scholarship in relation to isolated genes and inventions derived from 
human embryonic stem cells in order to create policy recommendations in the United 
States (US) and Europe.
11
 The discussion over the protection of human genetic 
inventions has become a subject of fierce debate among various groups in society, who 
possess markedly different stances on an appropriate system of intellectual property 
right (IPR) protection (if at all) for genetic inventions. Over the years, the focus has 
                                               
10 Aoki, K. “Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public 
Domain Parts 1&2” in Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts. Vol. 18, pp.1-69, 1993-1994. “How do 
we decide to treat ideas, inventions and information issues under either an open access policy or, 
alternatively, a proprietary system?” at 10. 
11 “Europe” refers throughout this thesis to the Contracting States of the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents, opened for signature October 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268. The European Patent Convention 
[hereinafter EPC] was signed on October 5, 1973 and entered into force October 7, 1977. 
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been on the substantive requirements, resulting in decreasing attention regarding the 
question of eligibility pertaining to the patenting of modern biotechnology. In bypassing 
the question of eligibility, two divergent approaches to patenting biotechnology have 
emerged. Firstly, the US has continued to rely on the biology-chemistry analogy in 
deciding on questions related to biotech patents. This can be demonstrated in the 
substantive requirements of patentability, particularly regarding the concepts of 
inventiveness and enablement.
12
 There is a different approach in Europe, where the 
focus is not on eligibility in regards to biotech subject matter per se, but on the 
patentability requirements.  
As biotechnology has progressed, objections have been raised from religious and 
public interest groups grounded in moral and ethical arguments.
13
 However, these 
concerns have less to do with patent law than with drawing the proper ethical 
boundaries on scientific advancement. In some instances, the courts, legislators and 
patent offices have attempted to address some of the issues.
14
 Some legislators have 
developed legal instruments to provide some answers, such as the Directive 98/44/EC 
for Biotechnological Inventions (Directive 98/44/EC). Although there are ethical and 
moral questions involved in the production of naturally occurring entities, they require 
further political and social dialogue and it is up to other organizations like the 
legislature exclusively assigned to address such issues.
15
  
It is important to note the limitations of this study, which does not attempt to 
attend to all issues relating to patents and human genetic materials, of which there are 
many. The study is limited to an examination of isolated genetic sequences and hESCs. 
                                               
12 See In re Duel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995), In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993), Amgen Inc. v. 
Chughai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 12000 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991)  
13 For a discussion on the effects of patents on the related aspects of ethics and justice, see: Evangelischen 
Kirche in Deutschland (EKD). The Earth is the Lord’s and all That is in It: Biopatents and Food Security 
from a Christian Perspective. April 2013. www.ekd.de. Accessed April 30, 2013. 
14 E.g., see Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
15 The moral considerations add a further dimension to the complex subject, which are beyond the 
parameters of this thesis, but the main policy issues will be addressed briefly in the thesis. 
21 
 
It should be noted that there are several other issues related to the discussion of IPRs for 
biotechnology patents in industrialized countries. As the research will demonstrate, one 
of the by-products of this thesis is some consideration of morality and ethics. In view of 
the broad nature of these topics and the need to discuss a number of themes in depth, the 
thesis does not discuss the morality and ethics of patenting human genetic materials 
unless they inform public policy.
16
 
1.3. Hypothesis and research questions 
This thesis sets out to test the proposition that the current statutory regime 
governing the patent protection of human genetic materials creates property rights 
without consideration of the public interest. In order to examine this hypothesis, this 
thesis evaluates the key question:   
Does the recognition of genetic sequences as property serve the public interest? 
In answering this primary question, the following secondary questions are 
addressed: 
(i) Whether gene patents create a de facto tragedy of the anti-commons? 
(ii) Can a temporary exclusive right over human genetic materials be 
justified? 
  
(iii) How have Europe and the US addressed human genetic materials in 
determining patent eligibility and the scope of protection? 
 
(iv) Do the current statutory regimes in Europe and the US need to be 
amended in the name of the public interest with regards to human genetic 
inventions?  
 
1.4. Methodology 
 
The methodology adopted for this research employs both theoretical and 
empirical data. First, the theoretical framework of the study involves an analysis of 
relevant legislation, statutes, case law and academic legal literature. Specifically, the 
study involves an extensive literature review on the legal development of patenting 
                                               
16 Ethics is touched upon in 4.4.3 (i.e. the proper scope of Article 53(a) EPC), but an in depth discussion 
is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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human biological materials and underlying policy rationale, as well as considering 
several key aspects of international agreements such as the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(WTO/TRIPS)
17
 and the Directive 98/44/EC.
18
 The research also involves data from 
NGO reports, governmental reports and print sources. 
To obtain a greater comprehensive landscape of the complexities and contended 
underlying problems of applying patent protection for human genetic materials and 
produce a solution, this thesis employs an empirically-based data set to assess the legal 
issues. One of the qualitative research techniques employed includes a comparative 
analyses of relevant case law in Europe and the US to identify the differing substantive 
legal principles/solutions adopted by the three jurisdictions that provide for the same 
legal problem.
19
 Moreover, a comparative legal analysis is employed to raise awareness 
of foreign laws, jurisprudence and scholarly views to provide the necessary perspective 
of significant legal norms and legal settings which occurs external to respective national 
systems.
20
  The data set also consists of interviews with key stakeholders including 
research entities, intellectual property lawyers, academics, the judiciary, biotechnology 
companies, religious figures, and key individuals from civil society who were able to 
provide comment on the range of issues.
21
  
                                               
17 The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. 
18 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions 
Official Journal L 213 , 30/07/1998 P. 0013 - 0021 
19 These two jurisdictions were chosen on the basis that they are biotechnology-rich and embody most of 
the relevant case law. “Experience shows that this is best done if the author first lays out the essentials of 
the relevant foreign law, country by country, and then uses this material as basis for critical comparison, 
ending up with the conclusion about the proper policy for the law to adopt which may involve a 
reinterpretation of his own system.” Zweigert, K. and H. Kötz. An Introduction to Comparative Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992 at 6. 
20 Calboli, I. “The Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in Intellectual Property Law: From Good to 
Great?” in Dinwoodie, G. Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2013 at 28. The author maintains that intellectual property scholars who do not engage in a minimal level 
of comparative analysis will likely neglect significant insights and alternative perspectives.  
21 In qualitative samples, there is a point of diminishing return in that more data does not necessarily 
mean more information. Ritchie, J. et al. Qualitative Research Practice. 2nd edition. Los Angeles, Sage 
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After receiving the ethics approval from Queen Mary University of London to 
conduct interviews, a preliminary list of the names of potential participants was made. 
This list included representatives who possessed knowledge of the issues surrounding 
patenting isolated genes and hESCs, such as scholars who have written extensively in 
the subject area, speakers at conferences who have presented on the topic,
22
 and 
experienced practitioners working with patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
fields. The participants were invited to take part in interviews via email.  
In order to undertake the initial interviews, preliminary contact was made with 
the stakeholders and formal letters were presented for signatures of consent, along with 
a copy of the questionnaire about the relevant case study and the list of questions to be 
asked at the interview. Using two separate case studies and interviews as data sources, 
the study explores the different dimensions of argument of the stakeholders’ approach 
towards either patenting genes or hESCs. The interviews took place in London, Munich, 
Edinburgh and Geneva between February and June 2012. In addition, 11 of the 37 
interviews took place via email as a face-to-face meeting was not feasible.
23
 The 
interviewees were divided into three groups: (i) inventors, investors and the 
scientific/research community; (ii) legal actors and (iii) civil society. 
In the legal sector, 30 representatives were asked to be interviewed and 20 
agreed to participate, while 13 declined. 10 of the participants were from the United 
Kingdom, 4 of them were with patent attorneys, 1 with an experienced solicitor, 2 with 
barristers, 1 with a retired senior judge and 2 with law professors. 3 interviews took 
place in Germany composed of 2 experienced lawyers and 1 judge from the European 
Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeal. 3 interviews took place with international 
                                                                                                                                         
Publications Inc., 2014. “There is therefore a point of diminishing return where increasing the sample size 
no longer contributes new evidence.” P.117. 
22 For instance, after attending the panel discussion which took place at the University College London’s 
Law Faculty entitled “Brüstle v Greenpeace: Has the European Court seriously damaged stem cell 
research?” February 1, 2012 the three panelists were invited to take part in the study: Dr. Justin Turner, 
Professor Pete Coffey, and Professor Jo Wolff. All three individuals accepted the invitation.  
23 Interviews are on file with the author and bound by confidential terms. 
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policy makers in Geneva from WIPO and the WTO. From the United States, 3 
interviews took place with experienced patent attorneys and solicitors. Finally, 1 law 
professor from the Netherlands also participated.  
From the biotechnology and research sector, 30 individuals were invited for an 
interview, but only 7 accepted. These participants were all based in the UK. This 
included 1 interview with a large pharmaceutical company and 1 interview with a 
biotechnology firm, both of which are particularly engaged with the patenting isolated 
genes and hESCs discussion. 5 interviews were with scientists from research institutes. 
From the civil society sector, 30 representatives were invited for an interview and 10 
agreed to participate in the study. 2 interviews were conducted in Germany with 
representatives from 2 different NGOs. In the UK, 6 interviews took place with 3 
professors with expertise in law and ethics, 2 council members from the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, and a director of an ethics consultancy firm. 2 interviews took 
place in Geneva with representatives from 2 separate NGOs. 
There were a total of 37 interviews, 20 from the legal community, 7 from the 
biotech and research community, and 10 from civil society.
24
 The interviewees who 
agreed to participate had the option of speaking under the condition of anonymity or be 
attributed.  Whilst efforts to ensure that a balanced number of representatives from all 
three of these groups took place, it is important to note that many more representatives 
from the legal sector positively agreed to an interview than from the biotechnology and 
civil society sector. The reason for the prominence of the legal sector in terms of the 
number of interviewees is that invitees from this sector of society tended to reply more 
positively and quickly to the invitation than invitees in the other two sectors. 
90 invitations were sent out via email to individuals requesting their 
participation in this study, but as there were only 37 acceptances, this means that 53 
                                               
24 See Annex V for a table of interviewed stakeholders. 
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individuals declined the invitation to be interviewed. The most common explanation 
provided was that an individual was too busy and did not have time to spare for an 
interview. In addition, whilst some individuals expressed interest in participating, they 
explained that they were in positions of power which did not permit them to express 
their personal opinions on the issues at hand. For example, one judge tentatively agreed 
in preliminary email exchanges to an interview, but regrettably declined in the end 
explaining that he was unable to obtain approval from his chambers. 
It is also worth noting the limits of the methodology. It is acknowledged that 
there are many stakeholders throughout the developed world including Canada,
25
 
Australia
26
 and Japan.
27
 However, due to the necessity of undertaking empirical 
research within the jurisdictions featured in the study within a reasonable time frame, 
the study is expressly limited to the jurisdictions of Europe and the US.
28
 Furthermore, 
given the diversity of views on the issue of patents and human genetic materials, the 
qualitative study cannot claim to construct a definitive declaration on the topic. There 
are significantly more legal stakeholders represented in the study compared to industry 
stakeholders. It is arguable that only those scientists and researchers who had an interest 
in patent law would have been willing to take time out to complete the questionnaire or 
agree to an interview. 
Moreover, there were significantly less US participants than UK and EU 
participants. Unfortunately, due to time and financial restrictions, it was not possible to 
travel to the US. It was suggested to the list of US individuals that a Skype interview 
                                               
25 Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee. Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues: 
Report to the Government of Canada Biotechnology Ministerial Coordinating Committee. June 2002. 
www.publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/C2-598-2001-2E.pdf. Accessed May 27, 2012. 
26 Australia Government. Genes and Ingenuity Report: Gene Patenting and Human Health. Australia Law 
Reform Commission. Report 99, June 2004. 
27 Penner‐Hahn, J. & J. Shaver. "Does international research and development increase patent output? An 
analysis of Japanese pharmaceutical firms" in Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 26, no. 2, pp.121-140, 
2005. 
28 “Here sober self-restraint is in order, not so much because it is hard to take account of everything as 
because experience shows that as soon as one tries to cover a wide range of legal systems, the law of 
diminishing returns operates.” Zweigert, K. and H. Kötz at 39-40. 
26 
 
could take place. While some participants agreed to a Skype interview, many 
individuals in the US declined. In contrast, most of the interviews conducted in the UK 
and Europe involved a personal visit to the participant’s choice of venue, which usually 
involved his or her place of work. This may account for why there were more positive 
responses from the European stakeholders than from the US.  
The inventors, investors, scientific/research community and the legal 
stakeholders were asked questions regarding the US Federal Circuit decision in 
Association for Molecular Pathology vs. United States Patent and Trademark Office et 
al. 
29
 (see Annex I). The questionnaire consisted of: 
 A general set of introductory questions regarding patents 
 Technical questions pertaining to isolated genes 
 Questions on their view on the impact of gene patents on innovation 
The civil society interviewees were given a separate questionnaire in response to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decision in Oliver Brüstle v 
Greenpeace e.V
30
 (see Annex II). The questionnaire consisted of: 
 A set of introductory questions pertaining to their views on the 
patentability of inventions derived from human embryonic stem cells  
 Questions requesting their views on patenting genetic information and 
genetically modified organisms
31
 
  Policy-decision making questions  
 
                                               
29 Association for Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and Trademark Office et al. 2010-1406. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Decided August 16, 2012. 
30 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
31 The questionnaire for the civil society stakeholders featured questions pertaining to genetically 
modified organisms, but this was deemed to be beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis proceeds by way of five steps to sustain the hypothesis, which 
correspond with the five main chapters.  
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 provides the context to the thesis by focusing on the relationship 
between patents and biotechnology inventions. It analyses the development of 
biotechnology and noteworthy inventions in the field. This is followed by an 
introductory explanation of the relevant science followed by a discussion of the anti-
commons theory, its main tenets, implications on innovation in respect to gene-related 
research tools, and some practical limitations of the theory.  
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 explores the concept of patents as a social contract between the 
inventor and society. In particular, it emphasizes the social function of intellectual 
property and how on balance, the temporary propertization of genetic resources is 
socially beneficial to the public. It also considers the nature of patent protection and 
argues that it forms an essential part of societal infrastructure that underpins research 
and development. Theoretical arguments are examined for patenting genetic materials 
by analysing the concept of property and the relevant justification theories of granting 
patents. It also places the current debate about the appropriate scope of protection within 
a broader discussion of how innovation can promote societal good. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 undertakes a comparative legal analysis of the current status of 
isolated DNA sequences and human embryonic stem cell patents in Europe and the US 
as reflected in case law. The main part of this chapter focus on the legal development of 
doctrines used to differentiate between a ‘discovery’ and an ‘invention,’ particular that 
of the ‘product of nature’ doctrine in the US and the meaning of ‘technical effect’ in 
28 
 
Europe. The chapter also undertakes a comparative analysis of how Europe and the US 
have addressed Myriad Genetics’ BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents in the context of patent 
eligibility vs. patentability requirements. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical data gathered from stakeholder interviews to 
gather a practical perspective on whether the current status quo in patenting human 
genetic materials is satisfactory and if not, what can be done to maintain the social 
contract.  
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis delivers a draft manifesto of policy recommendations 
that are applicable to Europe and the US. The policy recommendations entail the 
consideration of public interest values as articulated through the empirical research.   
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Chapter 2: Patent Protection of Biotechnology Inventions 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
In recent years, the argument that patents act as incentives to stimulate 
innovation in biotechnology has been criticized. In particular, there is the notion that 
gene patents create a de facto tragedy of the anti-commons. This, in turn, is based on a 
wider belief that the current statutory regime governing the patent protection of human 
genetic materials creates expansive property rights, 
“[B]asic genetic information in the human genome is simultaneously so commonplace and 
extraordinarily important that the question of patentability is just that, an open and unanswered 
policy question which should not be automatically answered by recourse to the doctrinal structures of 
patent law (which contain a strong bias in favor of rewarding entrepreneurial inventors with 
exclusive rights)…The idea of inventorship needs to be re-examined through a much more 
‘informationally-egalitarian’ lens.”32 
 
How biotechnology research should be protected is a major concern due to its 
increasing economic value
33
 and the extent to which biological materials should be 
protected by the patent system raises ethical, legal, religious and policy questions.
34
 In 
Europe, patents for monoclonal antibodies, cells lines, isolated genes and human 
embryonic stem cells have been challenged in court and encounter tremendous 
opposition from society.
35
 
                                               
32 Aoki, K. “Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public 
Domain- Part II” in Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts. Vol. 18, Issues 3 & 4, 1993-1994 at 234. 
33 OECD. Future Prospects for Industrial Biotechnology. OECD Publishing, (2011). The European 
Commission maintains biotechnology significantly contributes to the modernization of European 
industry. “Its broad range of high-tech applications is increasingly playing a role in enhancing our 
competitiveness, raising economic growth and improving the welfare of European citizens.” European 
Commission. The Contribution of Biotechnology to Europe’s Industry Sectors. May 2, 2013. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/biotechnology/what-is-biotechnology/contribution/. Accessed June 
14, 2013. 
34 See for example, the Canadian Supreme Court decision invalidating Harvard College’s oncomouse 
patent, declaring ‘higher life’ organisms ineligible subject matter for patent protection. Harvard College 
v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 
35 In 2011, the CJEU proclaimed that all inventions where the use of human embryos which involves their 
destruction at some point in the past cannot be patentable on the basis of immorality in Oliver Brüstle v 
Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. “Accordingly, even inventions using ‘off 
the shelf’ stem cells derived, at some point, from the destruction of a human embryo, are unpatentable. 
The chilling effect of this decision on stem cell research remains to be seen, but is likely to be 
significant.” Jacob, R., D. Alexander and M Fisher. Guidebook to Intellectual Property-6th edition. 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2013 at 37. 
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One of the most challenging dilemmas facing the proprietors and would be 
inventors of biological inventions is the incapacity of the law to react quickly enough to 
match the stride of technological developments.
36
 The capacity to secure a property 
interest for an invention and to safeguard the claimed expertise is recognized as offering 
an important incentive for the private sector to invest time and financial resources to 
perform the necessary research and development and bring the product or process to 
market. Lacking this power to prevent third parties from appropriating the products of 
the previous research and development (R&D), numerous new endeavours which could 
spearhead other significant products would not be commenced.
37
   
This chapter of the theses explores the development of biotechnology. It then 
briefly discusses the scientific background of DNA, RNA, cDNA, and how genes are 
both chemicals and carriers of information. The chapter then explores the theory of the 
anti-commons, its main assertions, potential implications on the biotechnology field, 
and practical limitations of the theory.  
                                               
36 The field of biotechnology has expanded and developed at a swift rate, where a combination of 
technologies including genetics, microbiology, engineering, biochemistry and bioinformatics has 
emerged. Through the creation of new living organisms, biotechnology can have a significant impact on 
numerous fields including the pharmaceutical industry, agriculture, the environment, and the food and 
beverage industry. In 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration allowed the first human biological 
drug ATryn, which was created from a goat. The drug was developed from goat’s milk, and acts as an 
anticoagulant, which reduces the likelihood of blood clots. Modified animals are also suitable for research 
on genes linked to diseases. There are also a number of proteins that have come on the market in the last 
30 years, one of which is insulin. These are called biopharmaceuticals (protein-based drugs) and are 
manufactured by genetic engineering processes, inserting the gene into bacteria, which mass produces the 
protein for which it codes. Biotechnology also has an extraordinarily powerful market. The amount of 
money spent on investment in biotechnology research and development (R&D) by the corporate sector 
within a jurisdiction is a reflection of its research emphasis on biotechnology. The United States is the 
highest-spending country on biotechnology BERD (business enterprise research and development), 
totalling USD 22 030 million in PPP (purchasing power parity), accounting for 7.6% of the total US 
BERD. Comparatively, some European countries spent more in BERD than the US. For instance, Ireland 
spent the most as a percentage at 15.1%, and Switzerland and Belgium tied for second place at 12.6%. 
OECD. OECD Fact book 2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. OECD Publishing. 
2011 at 184-185. 
37 Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-218, January 1984) at 383. 
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2.2. What is biotechnology? 
Biotechnology is one of the fastest growing technical disciplines even though it 
is the youngest of the sciences.
38
 It is an amalgamation of a number of fields in the 
broader subject of biology and is known as a revolutionary science because of the rapid 
pace of information gain which surpasses human ability to keep up with the 
understanding of functional products and processes in society.
39
 In 1919, Károly Ereky, 
a Hungarian engineer first used the term
40
 to express the industrial production of pigs, 
whereby sugar beets were fed to the pigs as an affordable major source of nutrients. 
Ereky then applied the term to other industrial fields where raw materials combined 
with the use of organisms are used to create commercial products.
41
 
There are various definitions of “biotechnology” today. Robert Bud42 maintains 
that the best-known definition today is that of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which defines biotechnology as: 
The application of science and technology to living organisms, as well as parts, products and 
models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the production of knowledge, goods 
and services.43 
                                               
38  Between 2006-2010, the number of worldwide biotechnology patent applications experienced a growth 
rate of 3%. In 2010, 36,362 patent applications were filed. World Intellectual Property Organization. 
World Intellectual Property Indicators, 2012 Edition. WIPO Economics & Statistics Series. Section A: 
Patents, Utility Models and Microorganisms at 72. http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/wipi/. Accessed July 
24, 2013. 
39 Shmaefsky, B. Biotechnology 101. London: Greenwood Press, 200 at 1. 
40 Ereky, K. Biotechnologie der fleisch, fett und milcherzeugung im landwirtschaft- lichen grossbetriebe 
Biotechnology of Meat, Fat and Milk Production in an Agricultural Large-Scale Farm (English 
translation) Berlin, 1919. 
41 Fiechter, A. (Ed.) History of Modern Biotechnology I.  Berlin, Springer, 2000 at 153. 
42 Bud, R. The Uses of Life: A History of Biotechnology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 
on the OECD’s definition of biotechnology at 1: “This may be all-encompassing, yet despite many 
attempts at refinement, all such short expressions inadequate.” 
43 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides two definitions of 
biotechnology: a single definition and a list-based definition. The OECD’s single definition of 
biotechnology is deliberately broad, encompassing all aspects of modern biotechnology which also 
includes traditional activities. The OECD’s list-based definition includes a catalogue of biotechnology 
techniques that functions as an interpretive guide to the single definition which includes: DNA/RNA, 
proteins and other molecules, cell and tissue culture and engineering, process biotechnology techniques, 
gene and RNA vectors, bioinformatics and nanotechnology  The list-based definition of biotechnology 
techniques include: 
DNA/RNA: Genomics, pharmacogenomics, gene probes, genetic engineering, DNA/RNA 
sequencing/synthesis/amplification, gene expression profiling, and use of antisense technology. 
Proteins and other molecules: Sequencing/synthesis/engineering of proteins and peptides (including large 
molecule hormones); improved delivery methods for large molecule drugs; proteomics, protein isolation 
and purification, signalling, identification of cell receptors. 
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Other definitions include: 
 
“The exploitation of biological processes for industrial and other purposes, especially the genetic 
manipulation of microorganisms for the production of antibiotics, hormones, etc.”44  
 
“Any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives 
thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.45  
 The use of living things to make products.”46 
 
“The use of living organisms or parts of living organisms to provide new methods of production 
and the making of new products.”47 
 
“Any technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, 
to improve plants or animals, or develop micro-organisms for specific purposes.”48 
 
“The application of molecular and cellular processes to solve problems, conduct research, and 
create goods and services.”49 
 
There seems to be a shared feature with all the definitions, and that is the idea of 
applying scientific or technical knowledge to living material to create a new product. 
Therefore, one could define biotechnology as the application of a technical process to 
living matter to provide a new method or to make a new product. This definition is the 
one that will be used in the thesis.  
2.2.1. Development of Biotechnology 
During the ancient and classical biotechnology period, traditional methods 
such as fermentation and the domestication of plants and animals emerged.
50
 
                                                                                                                                         
Cell and tissue culture and engineering: Cell/tissue culture, tissue engineering (including tissue scaffolds 
and biomedical engineering), cellular fusion, vaccine/immune stimulants, embryo manipulation. 
Process biotechnology techniques: Fermentation using bioreactors, bioprocessing, bioleaching, 
biopulping, biobleaching, biodesulphurisation, bioremediation, biofiltration and phytoremediation. 
Gene and RNA vectors: Gene therapy, viral vectors. 
Bioinformatics: Construction of databases on genomes, protein sequences; modelling complex biological 
processes, including systems biology. 
Nanobiotechnology: Applies the tools and processes of nano/microfabrication to build devices for 
studying biosystems and applications in drug delivery, diagnostics etc. 
OECD. “Biotechnology” in OECD Fact book 2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
OECD Publishing. 2011. 
44 Stevenson, A. (Ed.). "Biotechnology." Oxford Dictionary of English. www.oxfordreference.com. 
Accessed July 9, 2013. 
45 United Nations. Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) Article 2, p 3. 
www.cbd.int/convention/articles.shtml?a=cbd-02 . Accessed July 9, 2013. 
46 The American Association for the Advancement of Science. 
http://ehrweb.aaas.org/ehr/books/glossary.html#biotechnology. Accessed July 22, 2013. 
47Health Canada. Biotechnology.www.hc-sc.gc.ca. Accessed July 22, 2013. 
48 Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-218, January 1984) at 33. 
49 The U.S. Commerce Department, A Survey of the Use of Biotechnology in U.S. Industry. November 
2003 at 3. http://www.bis.doc.gov/. Accessed July 22, 2013. 
33 
 
“Modern biotechnology” refers to newer developments arising from biotechnology 
like genetic engineering.
51
 There appears to be a common denominator amongst the 
various periods of biotechnology, which is the use of living or biological material to 
create new products. The earliest forms of biotechnology involved using 
microorganisms to make food like cheese and yoghurt, and alcoholic beverages like 
beer and wine through the process of fermentation.  Before modern genetic 
engineering emerged, biological matter and processes were already recognized as 
patentable in the 19
th
 century. The first patent for a living organism was granted on 
November 8, 1843 in Finland for a new method for producing yeast cultures.
52
 Thirty 
years later, Louis Pasteur’s isolated yeast was granted US Patent No. 141,072. The 
claim included a “[y]east, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of 
manufacture.”53 Pasteur’s yeast brought biotechnology into the sphere of patenting. It 
was also the first patent on a microorganism. It would take over a hundred years for 
the second microorganism to be awarded a U.S. patent, due to the prominence of the 
‘product of nature’ doctrine as determined in 1889 in Ex Parte Latimer.54 
2.2.2. Biotechnology today 
The term “biotechnology” is used interchangeably with “modern 
biotechnology,” specifically pertaining to: genetics, vaccines and antibiotics, 
recombinant DNA, transgenics, the Human Genome Project, cloning and monoclonal 
antibodies. In the last fifty years, there have been many strides in the field of 
biotechnology, from James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of the DNA 
                                                                                                                                         
50 For a brief introduction of the history of biotechnology, see Ashish, S. et al. “Biotechnology in the 
Realm of History,” in Journal of Pharmacy &Bioallied Sciences. Vol. 3, Iss.3, pp. 321–323. Jul-Sep 2011 
and Bud, R. The Uses of Life: A History of Biotechnology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993. 
51 Canadian Food Inspection Agency. http://www.inspection.gc.ca. Accessed July 22, 2013. 
52 Wilkinson, S. Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the Human Body Trade. London: Routledge, 
2003 at 192. 
53US Patent 141,072, claim 2 (July 22, 1873) 
54 Refer to section 4.3.3 for further discussion on 23 Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123. 
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structure in 1953,
55
 Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer’s discovery of recombinant 
DNA in 1973,
56
 sheep cloning,
57
 to discovering genes related to breast cancer.
58
 Most 
notably, genetic engineering comes to mind, which encompasses changing the 
genetic code of cells by purposely altering individual genes through insertion or 
removal activities.
59
 These techniques allow scientists to create organisms which are 
specifically designed with unique genes and physical traits, like the production of 
human insulin by Genentech in 1978.
60
 The following illustrates some key inventions 
in modern biotechnology. 
A. Cloning of genetically engineered molecules 
When Herb Boyer and Stanley Cohen developed the recombinant DNA 
technique in 1973, it paved the way for scientists to alter the genetic makeup of animals 
and humans in the lab.
61
 Their technique allowed foreign genes to be inserted into 
microorganisms, creating new organisms with unique genes. Patents for Boyer and 
Cohen’s method of gene cloning and expression were granted to Stanford University.  62 
Cohen and Boyer’s invention formed a foundational tool for genetic engineering but 
became a topic of public debate in the 1970s as recombinant DNA stirred up 
controversy amongst many groups. One of the main criticisms was that genetic 
                                               
55 Pray, L. “Discovery of DNA structure and function: Watson and Crick” in Nature Education. Vol. 1, 
Iss. 1, 2008.  
56 Russo, E. “Special Report: The Birth of Biotechnology” in Nature. Volume 421. pp. 456-457, January 
2003. 
57 Park, A. “The Perils of Cloning” in Time Magazine. July 5, 2006.  www.time.com. Accessed July 23, 
2013. 
58Angier, N. “Fierce Competition Marked Fervid Race for Cancer Gene” in New York Times. September 
20, 1994.  www.nytimes.com. Accessed July 23, 2013. 
59 Karp, L. Genetic Engineering: Threat or Promise? Chicago: Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1976. 
60 Goeddel, D. et al. "Expression in Escherichia coli of chemically synthesized genes for human insulin" 
in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 106-110, January 1979. 
61 Hughes, S. Genentech: The Beginnings of Biotech. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
62 Prior to the expiration of the patents in 1997, Stanford granted 468 licenses to use the technique for 
commercial purposes. These licenses generated more than US$255 million in licensing revenues for the 
university and led to the development of over 2400 commercial products with cumulative sales above $25 
billion. See Feldman,  M., A. Colaianni and C. Liu. “Lessons from the Commercialization of the Cohen-
Boyer Patents: The Stanford University Licensing Program” in Intellectual Property Management in 
Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices. A. Krattiger et al (eds.) MIHR: 
Oxford, U.K., and PIPRA: Davis, U.S.A. 2007. Available online at www.ipHandbook.org. Accessed 
March 21, 2014. 
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engineers could speed up evolution and alter the makeup of humanity.
63
 However, the 
debate was metaphorically decided in 1980 with the US Supreme Court ruling in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
64
 which opened the floodgates to patenting living organisms 
by holding an oil-eating bacterium as patentable subject matter.
65
 The decision paved 
the road for the Cohen-Boyer patent which claimed a fundamental research technique 
with a tremendous capacity to develop into a platform technology that effectively 
developed a new standard in biotechnology. 
B. Chakrabarty’s oil-eating bacterium 
The US Supreme Court was faced with the question of granting patents on living 
matter in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and ultimately held that patentable subject matter 
includes “anything under the sun that is made by man.”66 But the Court added that this 
statement did not include every type of discovery, which included “the laws of nature, 
physical phenomena and abstract ideas.”67 The decision essentially reversed an 
extended custom of legal decisions in holding products of nature ineligible subject 
matter for patent protection and had a large impact on patent policy and thought around 
the world.
68
 As a result, the patenting in all areas of technology increased, including the 
patentability of products created from recombinant DNA: “By virtually every 
measurable factor, the biotechnology industry has literally exploded in the 25 years 
since Chakrabarty.”69 Even though Chakrabarty had not used recombinant DNA 
techniques in making his bacteria, some scientists who created hybrids from 
recombinant DNA techniques had applied for patents before a decision on Chakrabarty 
                                               
63 Hughes, S. Genentech: The Beginnings of Biotech. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
64 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Drahos, P. “Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality,” in E.I.P.R. Iss. 9, 1999 at 442. 
69 Robinson, D. and N. Medlock “Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A Retrospective on 25 Years of Biotech 
Patents” in Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal. Vol. 17, No. 10, October 2005 at 13. 
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had been made.
70
 Companies and research programs working with recombinant DNA 
were looking towards the outcome in Chakrabarty, which would set the precedent for 
the patentability of their own work.  “[T]he patentability of living organisms-spoke 
directly to the rapidly increasing stake in biotechnology patents.”71 With the advent of 
recombinant DNA, scientists began to manipulate living organisms, and the patent 
system responded by granting patents.
 72
    
C. The Harvard oncomouse 
In 1984, Harvard University filed a patent application on behalf of Philip Leder 
of Harvard University, and Timothy A. Stewart of Genentech, the inventors of the 
oncomouse.
73
 DuPont owned the patent rights until recently as the US patent expired in 
2005. In 1988, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted 
Harvard the patent.
74
  The patent claim included: 
                                               
70 Wilson, J. “Patenting Organisms: Intellectual Property Law Meets Biology,” in Who Owns Life? D. 
Magnus, A. Caplan & G. McGee (eds.). New York: Prometheus Books, 2002 at 25. 
71 Kevles, D. “Of Mice & Money: The Story of the World’s First Animal Patent” in Daedalus. Spring 
2002 at 80. 
72 Data assembled by the Biotechnology Industry Organization showed that in 1989, the USPTO granted 
2,160 biotechnology patents compared to the significant rise to 7,763 in 2002. “Biotechnology Industry 
Facts.” June 9, 2005 available at www.bio.org/speeches.pubs/er/statistics.asp. Accessed November 3, 
2013. 
73 The oncomouse is a genetically modified mouse that carries an activated ‘oncogene’ and had the 
potential to be useful for testing new drugs for cancer research.  Mice have very short life spans, and 
contain many of the same genes as humans.  Leder and Stewart inserted the oncogene sequence into a 
fertilized mouse egg, and then implanted the mouse egg into a female mouse. Once the gene was 
activated, the mouse’s vulnerability to cancer in the mammary glands increased. The offspring carrying 
the oncogene sequence would then be susceptible to developing cancer. See Crespi, S. “Biotechnology 
Patenting: The Wicked Animal Must Defend Itself,” in European Intellectual Property Review. Vol. 17, 
Iss.9, pp. 431-441. 1995 and Kevles, D. “Of Mice & Money: The Story of the World’s First Animal 
Patent” in Daedalus, pp. 78-88, Spring 2002. Schneider, K. “Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A World First” 
in New York Times. April 13, 1988. 
74 A year before the oncomouse was granted a patent in the US, it had already been established that a 
living animal was patentable subject matter. ‘Manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ were expanded to 
include ‘higher life forms.’ In 1987, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences renounced a US patent 
policy, maintaining that multicellular organisms were eligible for patenting in Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 
2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed.Cir.1988). In this case, a patent 
application was filed for an improved version of the Pacific oyster that made it more edible. Although the 
claim failed on meeting the ‘obviousness’ requirement, the case established the principle that patents 
could be granted for living animals. See generally: Rimmer, M. Intellectual Property and Biotechnology. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008 at 84-86.  After Ex parte Allen, USPTO Commissioner Donald Quigg 
issued a notice reversing the office’s prior policy of rejecting patent applications claiming animals: “The 
Patent and Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring on-human multicellular living 
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101.” Quigg 
D., (USPTO), Statement, Policy Statement on Patentability of Animals, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 
(April 7, 1987).  
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A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a 
recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said 
animal, at an embryonic stage.75 
 
 The US patent claim filed by Harvard was exceptionally broad, claiming a ‘non-
human mammal,’ although it narrowed down its claims to that of a ‘mouse’ or ‘rodent’ 
in its final two claims.
76
 In other words, the patent could cover other mammals even 
though Leder and Stewart only showed the patent office that it worked in a mouse. 
Because of the way the claims were written, it could cover the whole class of Mammalia 
except humans. 
 In addition, Harvard claimed the ancestors of the animal at the embryonic stage, 
which meant that the patent would not only cover the first generation of oncomice, but 
each successive generation of mice, which carried the oncogene up until the date of 
patent expiry. In life patenting, the crucial concern is that rights can be extended to 
products of self-reproducing things, which can be covered by reach-through claims.
77
 
One should note that there is no mention of human beings in the claim, 
reflecting the attitude towards patenting human beings and the moral ramifications of 
altering the human genome. However, moral concerns regarding human patents were 
addressed in Ex Parte Allen.
78
 In this case, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences overturned another policy by stating that multicellular organisms were 
eligible for patentability. Aside from being the first animal patent, the patentability of 
the oncomouse invention is interesting as it was assessed by three biotechnology rich 
nations, who differed in their interpretation of the oncomouse but ultimately granted 
Harvard a patent for its invention. 
                                               
75 See U.S. Patent No. 4, 736, 866, 1089 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 703 (April 12, 1988), claim 1. 
76 Ibid, Claim 11: The mammal of claim 1, said mammal being a rodent. 
            Claim 12: The mammal of claim 11, said rodent being a mouse. 
77 Dutfield, G. and U. Suthersanen. Global Intellectual Property Law. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2008 at 307. 
78 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), aff’d, 846 F.2d 77 
(Fed.Cir.1988) 
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In 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court addressed whether the words 
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ within the framework of the Patent Act 
included higher life forms. The court maintained that although the Patent Act does not 
explicitly refer to the patentability of life forms, the status quo in the country was that 
lower life forms were patentable and higher life forms were not. In addition, the court 
rejected the claim that a higher life form met the requirements of ‘manufacture’ and 
‘composition of matter.’ “The best reading of the words of the Act supports the 
conclusion that higher life forms are not patentable.”79 
The majority differentiated between a microorganism and higher life forms. It 
reasoned that bacteria have been used in industrial processes for a long time, and 
possess uniform properties that make them more straightforward to characterize as 
chemicals. However, this is not the case with higher life forms like animals. In addition, 
the majority highlighted the fact that until there is clear guidance from the legislature to 
indicate that Parliament intended an expansive interpretation of the term ‘manufacture,’ 
and ‘composition of matter,’ the Courts must make decisions by the ordinary meaning 
of ‘invention.’80  
The dissent held that Harvard should be granted a patent for the oncomouse 
because the inventors had attained a substantial achievement by transforming every 
single cell in the mouse’s body.81 Furthermore, they held that a line should not be drawn 
between a single cellular life form and a higher life form, stressing that it was illogical 
to grant patents for genes and germ cells, but not the mouse that develops from those 
cells.
82
 Finally, the dissent highlighted the importance of the harmonization of patent 
                                               
79Harvard College v. Canada [2002] at 122. 
80 Ibid at 106. 
81 Dissenting Justice Binnie wrote: “I believe that the extraordinary scientific achievement of altering 
every single cell in the body of an animal which does not in this altered form exist in nature, by human 
modification of “the genetic material of which it is composed”, is an inventive “composition of matter” 
within the meaning of s. 2 of the Patent Act.” Ibid at 62. 
82 Many scientists and academics adopt this position. Graham Dutfield maintains “the legal line 
drawn…between lower and higher life forms is a dubious one. No legal distinction is scientifically 
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law with respect to living organisms. By not allowing patents for higher life forms, it 
directly goes against what is accepted in the U.S. and other biotechnology-rich 
countries, which may have an effect on attracting investment.
83
 In effect, Canada 
adopted a more conservative approach than the US, granting only a patent for the 
process of creating the oncomouse.
84
 However, this decision by the Canadian Supreme 
Court was essentially overturned in a case following soon after in Monsanto Canada 
Inc. v. Schmeiser,
85
 which seemed to offset for the earlier, apparently wrong turn the 
courts took in the oncomouse case.
86
  
The oncomouse patent application was the first case the EPO managed in 
regards to the patentability of animals. The EPO was initially hesitant in granting a 
patent for a living organism, but eventually adopted a similar approach to the US at the 
appeal level. The European Patent Office Technical Board of Appeal asked the 
examiners of the patent to reconsider the case after the examiners rejected Harvard’s 
claim.
87
 The EPO approach to patenting considers moral and ethical considerations in 
deciding what is eligible for a patent: namely, under Article 53 of the EPC which 
excludes two types of inventions from patentability: 
(a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre public" or 
                                                                                                                                         
trustworthy. If higher life forms are unpatentable, the same should probably go for lower ones.” (Dutfield, 
Graham, “Who Invents Life: Intelligent Designers, Blind Watchmakers, or Genetic Engineers?” in 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice. Vol. 5.No. 7, 2010 at 539-540) 
83 Ibid at 59. 
84 Canadian patent 1341442 was granted for the method of creating the oncomouse, although the 
Canadian Supreme Court held that the oncomouse was not patentable as it was a higher life form. The 
patent claimed:  
“A method of testing a material suspected of being a carcinogen, comprising: exposing a transgenic non-
human mammal to said material and detecting neoplasms as an indication of carcinogenicity; said 
transgenic non-human mammal being a transgenic non-human mammal whose germ cells and somatic 
cells contain an activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said 
mammal, at an embryonic stage.” 
85 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 
86 “While Harvard Onco-Mouse appeared to alienate the country’s biotechnology sector, the subsequent 
Schmeiser case cemented the country’s place in the league of biotechnology nations.” Onwuekwe, 155-
156. 
87 At the patent examination level, the EPO found that the oncomouse did not violate Article 53(a), but 
failed to satisfy Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention because the oncomouse was a new 
variety of animal, a product of natural biological processes, and therefore was ineligible for a patent. 
Harvard appealed the decision, arguing that the oncomouse was a not a new variety of animal, but an 
entirely new type of animal. Like Chakrabarty, Harvard maintained the oncomouse did not arise from 
natural biological processes, but was made by man. See T 0019/90(Onco-mouse) of 3 October 1990. 
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morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited 
by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States;   
 
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof 88 
 
The EPO maintained that the oncomouse did not violate Article 53(b), but had to 
be assessed under Article 53(a) because of morality and ordre public considerations.
89
 
In assessing the ordre public or morality exception, the EPO developed a morality 
balancing test which involved weighing the potential benefits (anticipated medical 
benefits to mankind) of a claimed invention against its costs (suffering of the 
oncomouse). Other factors that could be considered in the test include potential 
environmental risks. Harvard responded that the mice would ultimately benefit 
humanity in the fight against cancer. Since mice were prone to picking up cancer, only a 
few of them would be required to suffer. The benefit to human beings outweighed the 
suffering of a few mice. In response to the environmental concerns, they reasoned that 
the mice posed only a small risk to the normal mouse population as the oncomice were 
held safely in the laboratory.
90
 The EPO decided that the benefit of the oncomice for 
cancer research was likely to be substantial and offset the moral matters about the 
suffering brought to the affected mice.
 91
  
The same practical line to the morality question was utilized by the EPO in the 
Upjohn case, but with different result. The Upjohn pharmaceutical company created a 
transgenic mouse in which a gene was inserted into its genome so that the mouse would 
lose its hair. The purpose of inserting this ‘bald’ gene was to use it as a tester for 
                                               
88 For a discussion on TRIPS flexibilities for plants, plant varieties and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants, see: WIPO Secretariat. CDIP/13/10. Patent-Related Flexibilities in the 
Multilateral Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels-
Part III. March 27, 2014. 
89 Kevles, D. A History of Patenting Life in the United States with Comparative Attention to Europe and 
Canada: A Report to the European Group on Ethics in New Science and Technology. January 12, 2002. 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/docs/publications/study_kevles_en.pdf. Accessed June 8, 
2013 at 59. 
90 European Patent Application No. 863044907, President and Fellows of Harvard College, Response to 
the Official Letter of 11th December 1990 
91 In 1991, the European Patent Office ruled that Harvard would be granted a patent on the oncomouse. 
European Patent Office, Press Release 3/92, European Patent for Harvard’s Transgenic Mouse 
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products to cure human baldness. The EPO evaluated the benefits (useful in research to 
treat hair loss) and the harm (suffered by the bald mice) and concluded that the harm to 
the mouse was not outweighed by the benefit to human beings. As such, the commercial 
exploitation of the invention was declared contrary to morality and the transgenic 
mouse was not patentable.
92
 
D. Pluripotent Embryonic Stem Cells 
The WARF patents, commonly known as US Patent No. 5,843,780
93
, US Patent 
No. 6,200,806
94
 and US Patent No. 7,029,913
95
 are directed to pluripotent primate 
embryonic stem cells, which also encompass hESCs. The patent claims covered the 
methods for obtaining stem cells from fertilized embryos and the embryonic stem cells 
themselves. WARF had an active licensing program in place based on these three 
patents, requiring all researchers working with hESCs in the US to pay a license fee. 
However, WARF came under extensive criticism from the stem cell community for its 
insistence on license terms that many claimed were sufficiently onerous and slowed the 
progress of embryonic stem cell research.
96
  In response, WARF established a reduced 
royalty rate for non-profit organizations and offered licensee scientists training in 
embryonic stem cell work.  Even so, a number of organizations are choosing to conduct 
their embryonic stem cell research programs outside the US, a decision attributed by 
some to a desire to avoid the reach of the WARF patents.  
The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights challenged WARF’s ‘913 
patent on the grounds of lacking novelty and nonobviousness in 2006 by filing a 
Request for Inter Parties Reexamination. In 2010, the USPTO Board of Appeal and 
                                               
92 R v. Leland Stanford/ Modified Animal Opposition Division. 16 August 2001 [2002] EPOR 16. 
93 Filed January 18, 1996, issued December 1, 1998 claiming a purified preparation of primate embryonic 
stem cells.  
94 Filed June 26, 1998, issued March 13, 2001, claiming primate embryonic stem cells.  
95 Filed October 19, 2001, issued April 18, 2006, claiming a culture of human embryonic stem cells for 
use as tools in the treatment and prevention of nervous system, blood and developmental disorders. 
96 “[T[he so-called WARF patent on primate embryonic stem cells issued in the US virtually wreaked 
havoc in the biotechnology research community and in the related industry.” Plomer, A and P. 
Torremans. Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European Law and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009 at 388. 
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Interferences (BPAI) decided that the WARF’913 patent which claimed pluripotent 
hESCs on the basis that it was obvious in light of the prior art.
97
 
E. Dolly the Sheep 
In the 1980s and 1990s, genetic engineering techniques became increasingly 
advanced and genes began being inserted in plants and animals. One such technique was 
used in the cloning of Dolly the sheep. In 1996, Ian Wilmut and Keith Campbell 
successfully took a cell from a mature sheep, removed its nucleus and inserted it into an 
embryo with its nucleus removed.
98
  US biotech company Geron Bio-Med acquired the 
first UK patent rights for cloning, covering the nuclear transfer technology that was 
used to create Dolly. Geron Bio-Med was also granted a UK patent for compositions of 
matter, claiming non-human animal embryos and cloned non-human animals produced 
from nuclear transfer. UK patent No. 2318578 claimed methods of nuclear transfer in 
which the nucleus of a quiescent donor cell was transferred to a recipient cell.
99
  
2.2.3. International instruments 
The international legal framework on the issue under examination is constituted 
mainly by the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome,
100
 the Convention on 
Biological Diversity
101
 and TRIPS.
102
 
                                               
97 Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. WARF. USPTO Board of Appeal and Interferences, 
(Appeal 2010-001854) Available at: 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/WARFDecision042910.pdf. Accessed May 24, 2012 at 36-
38.  The prior art included a patent granted to an Australian inventor Robert Williams, who was granted 
US Patent No. 5,166,065 which was issued in November 1992 and would have anticipated the WARF 
patents. Rimmer, M. Intellectual Property and Biotechnology. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008 at 261. 
98 Krauthammer, C. “A Special Report on Cloning” in Time. March 10, 2007. Print. 
99 The claim was broad, covering occurrences where somatic cells were used as the nuclear donor. The 
patent claimed methods of producing animal cells by nuclear transfer and methods of producing cloned 
animals. The patent also covered both human and non-human cell lines produced from the technology. 
Mayor, S. “First UK patents for cloning issued to creators of Dolly the sheep” in BMJ. Vol. 320, January 
29, 2000 at 270. 
100 The Declaration was adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at its twenty-ninth session on11 November 1997 and endorsed by 
General Assembly resolution 53/152 of 9 December 1998. 
101 The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development and entered into force in 1993. 
102 The TRIPS agreement came into effect on January 1st, 1995 and is a comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property administered by the World Trade Organization. 
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A. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
claims the human genome belongs to the “heritage of humanity”103 and its natural state 
“shall not give rise to financial gains.”104 Moreover, any financial benefits which do 
arise from research involving the human genome should be “shared with society as a 
whole and the international community.”105 At first glance, these articles suggest that 
patenting of the human genome is forbidden since the essence of the patent system is 
linked with commercialization. Conversely, the patenting of the human genome is 
challenged by the business and technological sector, and there has been no approved 
international policy in response.
106
 
B. Convention on Biological Diversity 
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity, states have sovereignty 
over their genetic resources, which entitle them to determine how genetic resources are 
accessed and utilized.
107
 National legislation indicates whether human genetic materials 
are patentable subject matter, and what is required to shift a genetic source from being a 
discovery into one that is considered an invention. In fact, there is a divergence even 
amongst the most technology advanced jurisdictions: the Europe and the US have 
different positions on the patent eligibility of human genetic materials, which illustrate 
the controversy which persists. It is therefore up to states to determine how this social 
contract between society and biotechnology is arranged. 
                                               
103Article 1, UNESCO 1997. For more on the human genome as common heritage, see Ossario, P. “The 
Human Genome as Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal Nonsense?” in Genetics and Group 
Rights. Pp. 425-439, Fall 2007.  
104 Ibid, Article 4. 
105Article 15 of Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNESCO, 2005. 
106 Rhodes, C. Governance of Genetic Resources: A Guide to Navigating the Complex Global Landscape. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013 at 88. 
107 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Article 15. 
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C. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
Under TRIPS, patents shall be made available for inventions in all fields of 
technology, which is known as the doctrine of non-discrimination and is codified in 
Article 27(1): 
[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application. (...) patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as 
to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced. 
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not provide for a definition of an ‘invention’ and 
has left it to its Member States to determine what is patentable. Conversely, this 
discretionary space is limited by the doctrine of non-discrimination which means 
Member States cannot exclude a field of technology.
108
 In the context of this thesis, this 
means that the TRIPS Agreement advocates for a technology-neutral patenting 
approach. However, this has to be balanced against certain established doctrines in 
Member States’ patent jurisprudence, such as Europe’s distinction between a patentable 
invention and a non-patentable discovery
109
 and the US ‘product of nature’ principle 
which distinguishes patentable and non-patentable subject matter.
110
 This balancing 
between principles is a necessary and beneficial aspect to the social contract, because 
the patent system alone is a social contract which reflects broader contracts between the 
government and society.  
                                               
108 However, WTO Member States may exclude inventions from patent protection in Article 27.3(b), 
which refers to the exclusion of plants and animals from patentability and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants and animals. Article 27.3(b) of TRIPS states: 
“Members may also exclude from patentability: (b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by a combination thereof.”  
Therefore, the provision distinguishes between the level of protection afforded to microorganisms to that 
of plants and animals. Currently, Member States must provide patent protection for: (i) microorganisms 
and (ii) non-biological and microbiological processes used in the production of plants and animals. This 
means that the doctrine of non-discrimination cannot be used to sustain a technology that would 
invalidate Article 27.3(b). 
109 See 4.4.1 for a discussion on Article 52(2) EPC. 
110 See 4.3.3 for a discussion on the product of nature doctrine in the US. 
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2.3. DNA and genes 
One of the most controversial areas in patent law and policy is that of DNA 
sequences and genes. In the 1980s and 1990s, several branches of the US federal 
government promoted patenting, particularly of genes.
111
 As of 2010, there have been 
approximately 40,000 US patents granted related to 2,000 human genes.
112
 These 
patents include isolated genes, methods of using the isolated genes and methods of 
diagnosis.
113
 There is the argument that the USPTO and Federal Circuit have 
surrendered too much terrain to the wellbeing of the biotechnology industry. In an 
endeavour to support this industrial field, a collection of peculiar and startling decisions 
have been rendered.
114
  
Since many terms have been used in discussion pertaining to the patenting of 
human DNA, genes and genetic information, it will be useful for the purposes of this 
thesis to first develop a basic understanding of the science. This will lay the foundation 
for further discussion in how the idea of propriety and the common development of 
scientific understanding may come into conflict. 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a chemical molecule made up of four 
complementary nucleic acid base pairs: adenine (A) with thymine (T), and cytosine (C) 
with guanine (G).
115
 The physical structure of DNA is a double-stranded helix 
composed of the four complementary base pairs and the entire sequence is a code for 
genetic information.
116
 The human genome consists of a sequence of these four bases 
                                               
111 Rai notes that the implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 by Congress strongly favoured 
patenting in universities. See Rai, A. “Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science,” in Northwestern University Law Review. Vol. 94, No.1, 1999 at 94-108. 
112 Jensen, K. and F. Murray. “Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,” in Science. Vol. 
310 no. 5746, pp. 239-240. October 14, 2005. 
113Ibid. 
114 Jackson, M. “How Gene Patents are Challenging Intellectual Property Law: The History of the CCR5 
Gene Patent” in Perspectives on Science. Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 2014. Jackson argues that the USPTO 
erroneously granted a patent on the CCR5 gene, even though the patent holder incorrectly claimed the 
sequence in the specification and did not know the most important characteristic of the gene product.  
115 Lodish, H. et al. Molecular Cell Biology, 7th edition. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2012 at 
8. 
116 Ibid. 
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which carries information and determines the function of an organism. Only some parts 
of the human genome possess functional roles; these “useful” regions are known as 
genes.
117
 
 
 
 
 
Source from: Martin, E. & R. Hine. A Dictionary of Biology (6th edition). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199204625.001.0001/acref_9780199204625_g
raphic_042-full.jpg. Accessed January 4, 2014. 
 
 
 
                                               
117 Ibid, 1. 
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A gene is a “locatable region of genomic sequence, corresponding to a unit of 
inheritance, which is associated with regulatory regions, transcribed regions and/or 
other functional sequence regions.”118 A gene is composed of many DNA base pairs, 
ranging from 1000 to thousands, depending on the length of the gene.
119
 There is no 
consensus amongst the scientific community as to how many genes human beings 
possess. The numbers range from between 13,000-23,000
120
 to 30,000 genes.
121
 Other 
coding parts of DNA include single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and expressed 
sequence tags (ESTs). A SNP consists of an area on the genome where humans display 
genetic disparity.
122
 An EST is a small fragment of a gene which acts as a marker for a 
gene.
123
 
Genes provide an instructional template for the manufacture of proteins.
124
 
Accordingly, the manner in which proteins are created is called gene expression.
125
 
Most genes contain two sections: (i) the coding region which identifies the amino acid 
sequence of a protein and (ii) the regulatory region which fixes particular proteins and 
controls when and in which cells the protein is made.
126
 During the first step of gene 
expression, transcription, the DNA strand unzips into two separate strands in the regions 
which code for the protein to be made. An enzyme called RNA polymerase copies the 
coding region of DNA into a single strand known as ribonucleic acid (RNA). The RNA 
nucleotides are then matched up with the template strand of DNA, and RNA 
polymerase catalyzes the combination of nucleotides into an RNA chain. The result is a 
strand of RNA complementary to a strand of DNA, where uracil replaces thymine. This 
                                               
118 Pearson, H. "Genetics: What is a Gene?" in Nature. Vol. 441. 2006 at 401. 
119 Supra note 115, Lodish at 208. 
120 Ibid, 9. 
121 National Institutes of Health. National Human Genome Research Institute.www.genome.gov. 
Accessed June 27, 2013. 
122 Supra note 115, Lodish at 8. 
123 Human Genome Organisation. HUGO Intellectual Property Statement on Patenting of DNA 
Sequences. May 1997. http://www.hugo-international.org/img/ip_sequencedata_1997.pdf.  Accessed 
November 14, 2013. 
 124 Supra note 115, Lodish at 1. 
125 Ibid, 279. 
126 Ibid, 9. 
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RNA chain is processed into messenger RNA (mRNA) which leaves the nucleus for the 
cytoplasm.
127
 In the cytoplasm, the mRNA fastens to the cellular ribosomes and the next 
step of gene synthesis begins. The ribosomes decode mRNA to create an amino acid 
chain which then folds into a protein with the assistance of transfer RNA.
128
 
 
 
 
Source from: Martin, E. & R. Hine. A Dictionary of Biology (6th edition). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199204625.001.0001/acref_9780199204625_g
raphic_118-full.jpg. Accessed January 4, 2014. 
 
                                               
127 Ibid, 9. 
128 Ibid, 116. 
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2.3.1. The DNA/cDNA distinction 
The emergence of automated sequencing technologies which allow for the 
speedy detection of nucleotide sequences has contributed to tremendous progress in the 
identification of the coding regions of human genomes.
129
 This means that the synthesis 
of DNA has become a routine production. A vital technique for discovering coding 
regions is to synthesis complementary DNA (cDNA). The difference between naturally 
occurring DNA and cDNA is that cDNA does not contain introns. cDNA can be 
synthesized using reverse transcriptase, which enables for transcription to happen in 
reverse.
130
 The product is a single strand of cDNA which encompasses only the coding 
area as mRNA does not contain any introns. As a result, cDNA can be valuable in 
identifying genes.
131
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to identify the similarities and 
differences between genomic DNA and cDNA. Genomic DNA exists within the body, 
whilst cDNA is created outside the body. In addition, the exact nucleotide sequence of 
cDNA does not exist naturally within the human body. Yet, genomic DNA possesses 
both exons and introns, the coding and non-coding sequences. But the sequence of the 
first single strand of cDNA is complementary to the mRNA, whilst the second strand of 
cDNA possesses the precise mRNA sequence.
132
 
Patent claims to genetic sequences usually entail a claim to the sequence that is 
in its isolated and or purified form. The query is whether these claiming methods 
provide sufficiency to differentiate the claimed sequences from their naturally occurring 
equivalents. 
                                               
129 Hunkapiller, T., R. Kaiser, B. Koop and L. Hood. “Large-scale and automated DNA sequence 
determination” in Science. Vol.254 no. 5028, pp. 59-67, October 4, 1991. 
130 Supra note 115, Lodish at 186-188. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
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2.3.2 Chemical-analogy metaphor 
The analogy between genes and chemical compounds was advantageous because 
patent law had reached a point at which isolated and purified naturally occurring 
chemicals could be patented.
133
 It advocated a view where DNA is no more than a 
chemical and DNA sequences should be claimed in the same way as a recently typified 
chemical can be claimed for known and new uses.
134
 
One important patent in the US was for adrenaline, a naturally occurring 
hormone. It was granted in 1906 and challenged and upheld in Parke-Davis v. Mulford 
(“Parke-Davis”).135 Judge Learned Hand maintained that purified adrenaline was more 
useful than its naturally occurring counterpart: “it became for every practical purpose a 
new thing commercially and therapeutically.”136 When patent claims for DNA 
sequences began, the isolation and purification principle was well already deep-rooted 
in chemical patents and carried over into DNA patents, which led to the assumption that 
DNA is eligible for patent protection provided it is isolated and purified from its natural 
chemical state.
137
 Regarding DNA sequences as chemical combinations can give rise to 
an absolute right, meaning that the patent holder can exclude any third party commercial 
use of the patented product even if the use has not been disclosed in the original patent 
claim.
138
 This means if a patent applicant claims a gene as a product, the patent scope is 
extremely broad and covers all and any future commercial uses of a gene. Therefore, it 
is due to the reduction of a gene to a chemical entity that DNA sequences entered the 
                                               
133 See Conley, J. & R. Makowski. “Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a 
Barrier to Biotechnology Patents,” in Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society. Vol.85, 
pp.301-334, 2004; Demaine, Linda and Aaron Fellmeth. “Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and 
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent” in Stanford Law Review. Vol.55, 2002 
and Calvert, J. and P-B. Joly. “How Did the Gene Become a Chemical Compound? The Ontology of the 
Gene and the Patenting of DNA” in Social Science Information. Vol. 50, Iss.2, pp. 1-21. 2011. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Parke-Davis and Co. v. H.K. Mulford and Co., 189 Fed. 95 (SDNY 1911) affirmed, 196 Fed. 496 (2nd 
Cir.1912). 
136 Ibid, 1092. 
137 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski. 
138 See Beier, F-K, R. Crespi & J. Straus. Biotechnology and Patent Protection: An International Review. 
Paris: OECD, 1985. 
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realm of patentable subject matter and no longer deemed a ‘product of nature,’ provided 
they are isolated and purified and meet the other patentability requirements.  
However, not everyone accepts this view of DNA as merely a chemical.
139
 In the 
last decade, there has been great debate over how to define the gene. For instance, 
Graham Dutfield maintains that this analogy is misleading and that language used by 
scientists and lawyers to structure their patent claims encouraged the expansion of 
patent law. He notes that a metaphor like “life is largely chemical” is deceptive in 
persuading judges to think that things are inventions when in fact, they are merely 
discoveries.
140
 
Even the esteemed Joseph Straus who previously endorsed the “gene as a 
chemical” metaphor has altered his argument: 
Any simple equation of a gene sequence (identical to the natural one) with (absolutely) new 
synthetic molecules, or ‘ordinary’ chemical substances found in nature, disregards the, by now, 
known and substantial differences between these categories of products. In view of the 
consensus concerning the present state of technology, the technical problem (object) solved by 
such an invention cannot be seen in isolation or chemical synthesis or a new chemical compound 
of a more closely defined structure, but only in conjunction with the discovery of one or several 
functions of a product that exist in nature and whose discovery and structure clarification are not 
based on any inventive activity. Under such circumstances limiting the scope of protection to the 
function(s) disclosed seems necessary. 141 
 
Straus indicates that the scientific fact that most genes have more than one 
function has a significant effect on gene patents because new functions can be 
discovered which were not previously known when the patent for the gene was granted. 
Despite the fact that questions about the nature of the gene and its understanding 
in patent law have been raised, in practise, genes continued to be treated as merely 
chemical compounds, which can be considered the basis for why there are now 
                                               
139 Human Genome Organisation. HUGO Intellectual Property Committee Statement on Patenting of 
DNA Sequences in Particular Response to the European Biotechnology Directive. April 2000. 
www.hugo-international.org/img/ip_dna_2000.pdf.  Accessed November 14, 2013. 
140 Dutfield, G. “‘The Genetic Code is 3.6 Billion Years Old: It’s Time for a Rewrite’ Questioning the 
Metaphors and Analogies of Synthetic Biology and Life Science Patenting” in A. Lever (ed.) New 
Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. At 
page 4, Dutfield claims there are limitations to metaphors and analogies used by scientists, particularly in 
the field of synthetic biology, a new branch of biology that has created minimal genomes, standardized 
parts, devices and systems, and metabolic engineering. 
141 Straus, J. “An Updating Concerning the Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Including the Scope 
of Patent Genes-An Academic Point of View” in Official Journal of the European Patent Office Special 
Issue, 2003 at 186. 
52 
 
problems pertaining to gene patents. A 2003 report for the French Prime Minister 
questions the notion that genes are merely chemical compounds, holding them to be 
centres of information and ‘essential facilities’ economically speaking: 
For the economist, it constitutes then a fundamental/essential infrastructure-essential, as it is 
fundamental to pursue activities social essential (here affecting health) whose access is refused 
by whom control it; it is a kind of abuse of dominant position particularly damaging/harmful.142 
 
Another figure advancing the notion that genes are essential facilities is Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz: 
Regarding such elements, which incidentally are discovered and not invented…from the 
viewpoint of economic efficiency, it might be necessary to reduce a patent’s breadth further, 
even below what might seem the inventor’s marginal contribution in expanding the frontier of 
knowledge. In antitrust terms, these elements are ‘essential facilities’. In addition, there is an 
argument that today the process of isolating, sequencing and characterizing has become almost 
routinized, with costs contained. Perhaps not even the ‘obviousness’ criterion is satisfied.
143
 
 
The dominant assumption that a gene is merely a chemical compound was a 
solution to the problem of patenting naturally occurring entities by applying the dogma 
of isolation and purification which were applied to patents on chemicals. Another 
consequence of this chemical analogy is that the conception of genes became a non-
issue in the context of patents, and there was no major dispute for gene patents until the 
last decade. In the past, genes were not treated as chemical compounds.
144
 US case law 
illustrates the flawed acceptance of the viewpoint that the difference between the 
naturally occurring and the artificial is clear and distinct. In contrast, Europe took a 
legislative decision and implemented Directive 98/44/EC, acknowledging that the 
variable outlook of human genes was trounced by a discrepancy made between the gene 
per se (which naturally exists in the human body) and the gene as an invention (when it 
is isolated and purified and commercially useful to the market). However, in a recent 
                                               
142 Henry, C., M. Trommetter and L. Tubiana. “Innovations et droits de propriété intellectuelle: quels 
enjeux pour les biotechnologies.” Rapport du Conseil d’Analyse Economique. Paris: La Documentation 
Français, 2003 at 61. 
143Henry, C. & J. Stiglitz. Intellectual Property, Dissemination of Innovation and Sustainable 
Development” in Global Policy. Volume 3, Iss.3, October 2010 at 241. 
144 See Calvert, J. & P-B. Joly. “How Did the Gene Become a Chemical Compound? The Ontology of the 
Gene and the Patenting of DNA” in Social Science Information. Vol. 50, Iss.2, pp. 1-21, 2011. Calvert 
and Joly explain that the earliest gene patents in the USPTO are patents for Mendelian genes: patent 
claims for genes which were defined by their phenotype rather than in molecular terms.  
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decision in June 2013, the US Supreme Court challenged this conception of genes, 
maintaining that the value of Myriad’ claims was directed to the information contained 
within the claimed nucleotides rather than the chemical composition itself.  
Prior to 2013, the USPTO treated DNA sequences similarly to other isolated and 
purified chemical compounds, like hormones.
145
 The USPTO made the artificial 
distinction between isolated and purified DNA sequences which are patent eligible, and 
naturally occurring DNA sequences (non-isolated and non-purified) which are not 
patent eligible. This is because one of the principles of patent law is that products of 
nature cannot be patented, and it is assumed that an isolated and purified DNA sequence 
is a product of human ingenuity.  Patents on genes and DNA sequences were first 
granted in the 1980s. The first patents for DNA sequences claimed in US patent 
application were in 1978.
146
 The early gene patents usually comprised an isolated DNA 
sequence which coded for a specific protein. By the end of the year, 25,000 DNA-based 
patents had been issued in the US.
147
 The companies with the highest number of 
applications for human gene sequence patents were Genset, Ribozyme, Genetics 
Institute, Genzyme, Hyseq, and Human Genome Sciences.
148
 But in the 1990s, the 
sequencing of DNA became a standard and routine practice, and leading scientists 
began to challenge gene patent applications at the USPTO, claiming that DNA 
sequences were being claimed whose sole function was as a molecular probe in 
identifying the location of certain genes, and whose function was classified 
speculatively through a search in a DNA database.
149
 “HUGO [Human Genome 
Organisation] does not oppose patenting of useful benefits derived from genetic 
                                               
145 Dutfield, G. “Patents on Steroids: What Hormones tell us about the Evolution of Patent Law and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry” in Intellectual Property Law Journal. Vol. 23, pp. 249-66. 2011. 
146 Dutfield, G. Intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science Industries: Past, Present and Future 2nd 
edition. London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2009 at 194. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149Human Genome Organisation. HUGO Intellectual Property Statement on Patenting of DNA 
Sequences. May 1997. http://www.hugo-international.org/img/ip_sequencedata_1997.pdf. Accessed 
November 14, 2013. 
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information, but does explicitly oppose the patenting of short sequences from randomly 
isolated portions of genes encoding proteins of uncertain functions.”150 As a response to 
these criticisms, the USPTO and EPO issued patent examination guidelines pertaining 
specifically to gene related inventions. The USPTO issued Revised Guidelines which 
stated that ‘utility’ attributed to a DNA patent had to be “specific, substantial and 
credible”.151 It is noted that one way of meeting this requirement is to disclose the 
function for the claimed gene.
152
 
2.3.3. DNA sequences: information content within the chemical compound 
 “[H]ow can genomic information be owned, when genomic information exists 
in every gene of every chromosome of every cell of every human being?”153 
The information/chemical debate is one that persists for patents directed at any 
DNA sequence. This is because the value of DNA lies in the genetic information rather 
than the molecular structure. It is no longer suitable to use the “DNA as a chemical”154 
analogy because over time, it has been found that DNA sequences are encoded with 
new information. Most genes encode for more than one function and the genetic 
sequence itself can operate in several variations. “The DNA sequences identified by 
high-throughput sequencing look less like new chemical entities than they do like new 
scientific information...the chemical analogy is of little value as a strategic guide to 
exploiting this information as intellectual property.”155 Thus, a DNA sequence is no 
longer just a chemical sequence of As, Ts, Gs, and Cs, but also the information it yields. 
                                               
150 Ibid. 
151 United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Utility Examination Guidelines” in Federal Register. Vol. 
66, No.4, Friday, January 5, 2001. Pp.1092-1099. 
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This means that the human genome is not merely a chemical compound, but 
information.
156
  
Human genes - quintessential products of nature – are useful because they convey vital 
information. The human genome’s ability to be our instruction book on life distinguishes human 
DNA from all other chemicals covered by patent laws.157 
 
Therefore, the dual nature of DNA as both a chemical substance and information 
carrier differentiates it from other chemical compounds like hormones.
158
  
 As discussed in the above section, one of the main issues directed at gene 
patents is whether the focus should be on the structural (or chemical) difference 
between the isolated genes and their naturally occurring counterparts. Until AMP v. 
Myriad, US patent attorneys have succeeded in convincing the patent offices and courts 
that the chemical structure of genes is the key focus of the patentable subject matter 
inquiry. Three particular words: ‘isolated,’ ‘purified’ and or ‘synthesized’ are believed 
to somehow render genes patentable subject matter.
159
 The argument is that claims of 
isolated DNA or synthesized cDNA are not products of nature or discoveries because 
RNA, rather than DNA, is the chemical which undergoes splicing, when the introns are 
removed.
160
 This means that although one of the cDNA strands will contain the same 
information as the mature RNA from which it was derived, it is chemically different. 
And the other cDNA strand, although chemically the same as the naturally occurring 
DNA, does not include the introns.
161
 
Meanwhile, the Opposition Division of the EPO in Howard Florey v. Relaxin 
held that DNA is not life, but a chemical: 
Finally, the allegation that human life is being patented is unfounded. It is worth pointing out 
that DNA is not "life", but a chemical substance which carries genetic information and can be 
                                               
156 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The Ethics of Patenting DNA. London: Nuffield Council, 2002 at 
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used as an intermediate in the production of proteins which may be medically useful. The 
patenting of a single human gene has nothing to do with the patenting of human life. Even if 
every gene in the human genome were cloned (and possibly patented), it would be impossible to 
reconstitute a human being from the sum of its genes.162  
 
In the case, the EPO allowed a patent for the genetic engineering of DNA from a 
pregnant woman’s body to create human H-2 relaxin. The patent was opposed on 
morality grounds, that it involved patenting human life. However, the court held that 
extracted DNA that was treated does not constitute life, but rather holds genetic 
information that can be useful in creating proteins. Directive 98/44/EC has increased the 
threshold requirements for gene patents where it is now required for the patent applicant 
to include two things in the written description: (i) a particular function and (ii) specific 
industrial applicability.
163
 The purpose is to minimize speculative and broad patents 
from being granted.
164
  
Moreover, genes are complex, as they may have several biological pathways. 
Treating a gene solely as a chemical entity in the patent framework fails to take into 
account the complexity of biological materials.  
“Everything holds information in a way. It may mean that perhaps the basis for the inventive 
step analysis is different. It may mean that you need to claim things functionally. But I don’t see 
that just because something has an information rich quality that you should have some sort of 
miraculous effect in and of itself. The early days of DNA patenting, like EPO, or the HGS type 
of patenting, people are not actually concerned with protecting the DNA itself even though they 
claim the DNA. They claim the DNA because of the information inherent to those claims as a 
way of seeking to monopolize the proteins to which those sequences code it. Thus, you have 
DNA claims in the EPO patent, DNA claims in the HGS patent. But the interest was not in the 
DNA, the interest was that it was a good way of claiming the protein itself, or claiming the 
protein when produced by recombinant DNA technologies. Because the protein itself was 
already isolated and thus lacked novelty.”
165
 
Despite some chemical divergences, the thing that is patented is the information 
it contains. While the patent claims a chemical, the thing that is of value is the 
information rather than the chemical formula. Moreover, the patented isolated DNA and 
RNA “contains exactly the same genetic information as its natural counterpart. It can do 
                                               
162 HOWARD FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] E.P.O.R. 388 at 400.  
163 See Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of Directive 98/44/EC 
164 For instance, the US National Health Institute attempted to patent expressed sequence tags (ESTS), 
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165 Interview with Trevor Cook, April 20, 2012. 
57 
 
precisely the same work as a naturally occurring gene-protein synthesis - and it employs 
precisely the same processes to do it, whether in the body or in the laboratory.”166 As a 
result, the claimed ‘invention’ is merely something that does the work of a naturally 
occurring gene, albeit without the non-coding regions. The non-coding introns do not do 
any of the functional work. Therefore, in assessing the relevant differences between 
naturally occurring DNA sequences and the isolated claimed sequences, the chemical 
differences may not be as significant as the informational character of the claimed 
sequences, which is identical to that of its naturally occurring counterpart. “Critically, it 
is these informational functional properties that are the whole reason for seeking DNA 
patents.”167 Thus, it can be argued that the differences between isolated sequences and 
their naturally occurring counterparts are not substantial enough to remove them from 
the “product of nature” or “discovery” category.168  
2.3.4. Purpose bound protection 
One central area of conflict is when an inventor attempts to claim all the 
potential uses of a gene on the basis of a limited understanding of the gene’s function. 
DNA sequencing at the present time yields information, but it is unclear whether the 
information has a concrete value because the resultant biological functions of the 
sequence are not yet understood.
169
 Moreover, newly found human genomic 
information is valuable both to businesses and the scientific community, which raises 
issues of whether it should be protected.
170
 
Because genetic information itself is both valuable as basic scientific research and is also 
potentially patentable, human genomic research presents the question of whether newly 
discovered scientific information will be treated as widely available and free-flowing, or as a 
‘propertized’ scarce product.
171
  
                                               
166 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 394. 
167 Ibid, 395. 
168 See 4.3.3. for a discussion on the product of nature doctrine in the US. 
169 Eisenberg, R. “Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences” in 
Emory Law Journal .Vol. 49, 2000 at 788. 
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One major concern for product-based patents for DNA sequences is that it 
encompasses all uses/applications of the claimed product, regardless of whether those 
applications were claimed in the original application.  This would mean that if someone 
else finds another use or application of the claimed DNA sequence, a license would be 
necessary to not infringe the original product patent on the sequence. For instance, in 
1995, Human Genome Sciences (HGS) applied and was granted a patent for a gene that 
produced a receptor protein  called CCR5. At that time, HGS did not realize that the 
receptor is the point of contact of the AIDS virus and identified only one function in the 
patent application for the CCR5 receptor. Even though the patent application did not 
state a connection between the gene and HIV, it claimed rights to the gene under the 
umbrella of AIDS research. HGS’s attorney maintained, “Whoever is first to patent a 
DNA sequence -for any use - can lock up subsequent uses.”172 This incident gave rise to 
concerns about whether the patent owner may aggressively assert patent rights and 
block future research.
173
 
There has been considerable opposition to these types of product-based DNA 
sequence patents, mainly because it can block further research from taking place, as 
competitors are not able to invent around the sequence. In response to arguments that 
product patent protection of DNA sequences is detrimental, Germany and France have 
chosen to implement “purpose-bound” protection for human DNA sequences, where a 
specific use must be stated in the patent application.
174
 Indeed, advocates of this 
position could emphasize some coherent scientific and economic reasons.  
2.4. DNA and the public domain 
 There are three main arguments for keeping the human genome in the public 
domain. First, the conception that information in the human genome is a common 
                                               
172 Marshall, E. “HIV Experts vs. Sequencers in Patent Race,” in Science. Vol. 275. 28.2. 1997 at 1263. 
173 For a discussion on HGS’s patent on the CCR5 receptor, see: McGloughlin, M. The Evolution of 
Biotechnology: From Natufians to Nanotechnology. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010 at 104-105. 
174 See §1a (4) of the German Patent Act and Article L. 613-2-1 (Loi no 2004-800 du 6 août 2004, art. 17) 
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59 
 
resource owned by all of humanity is an argument against the patenting of human 
genetic material. Second, granting patents for DNA sequences can inhibit downstream 
research.
175
 And third, the fact that genes are complex and needs to be better understood 
and patenting genes will slow down man’s understanding of the human genome.176  
2.4.1. Common heritage of mankind 
The argument that genes are the common heritage of mankind is rooted in the 
argument that there are resources which are owned and shared in common 
internationally and should be used only for the common benefit of all. “Are we to 
commodify such information and turn unowned but abundant genetic information into 
something scarce, in the name of encouraging inventive subjects to go out and 
transform more such ‘raw materials’ into proprietary objects?”177 This position suggests 
alternatives to such ownership of genetic information. 
 According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992),
178
 genetic 
resources fall under state sovereignty which means states are entitled to regulate their 
access and use.
179
 Under the res nullious approach, objects remain in the commons until 
they are appropriated by someone.
180
  Consequently, one can argue that the human body 
is a part of the commons, but states have the authority to carve out a small area of 
property rights for those who invent something using the commons because it benefits 
society. For instance, Merges argues that human genetic information is not ‘raw 
material,’ but an “unowned biological ‘fact’ to be ‘transformed’ into an inventor’s 
property”.181 Moreover, he notes that open access is not the single goal of IP law, 
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maintaining that new material is constantly being created which is why there is a lesser 
need to conserve what already exists: 
In a dynamic context where new material is constantly being added, maintaining access to the 
largest possible set of works (via an expansive legal public domain) is only one aspect of policy. 
Encouraging the next round of new additions is even more important.182 
 
It is worth noting here that members of the biotech industry and some select 
research institutes advance pro-patent arguments, maintaining that human biological 
materials should be treated like any other invention and that a “no patents” approach 
would seriously harm the industry.
183
  Specifically, biotech industry members are in 
favour of a sturdy and effective IP regiment to provide future investors with the 
confidence necessary to invest in life science innovations.
184
  Echoing this sentiment, 
Professor Sir Leszek Borysiewicz, the vice-chancellor of Cambridge, has deemed patent 
protection so absolutely essential to the continued development of science that he 
asserted the Cambridge laboratories will bypass the European Court of Justice ruling 
that banned embryonic stem cells from being patentable subject matter. 
I believe embryonic stem cells have to be the way forward. We do have a problem in the 
European area, but I've been very clear, both to ministers and others about how Cambridge is 
                                               
182 Ibid, 301. 
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industry deems that these proposed amendments in intellectual property protection would provide 
investors with the assurance required for investment in research and development in biotech inventions in 
Canada. See: Plecash, C. “Canada’s Life Sciences Industry Split on Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement” 
in The Hill Times. September 10, 2012. 
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going to tackle that. We will continue to do a lot of research here, we will engage with whatever 
development we can locally and further forward, but the university itself will look at ways of 
ensuring that patenting can actually occur, and, if necessary, be run through the US, and, if 
necessary, the Indian sub-continent.
185
 
Borysiewicz’s stance emphasizes the importance of patent protection for 
embryonic stem cell research and the necessary means the university will undergo to 
ensure that the research will continue by means of looking to patent protection outside 
Europe. 
2.4.2. Impediment to downstream innovation 
The second argument for keeping human DNA in the public domain is that DNA 
sequences influences the development of drugs and vaccines that are largely reliant on 
protein technologies. The fact that many different patent owners own different gene 
sequences can give rise to the threat of royalty stacking, which can impede research and 
development. There is the view that patents can impede commercialization because 
patent holders can opt to restrict their rights, which could result in diminishing further 
innovations.
186
 Nuno Carvalho maintains: “Genes and their functions are scientific 
facts, not inventions. The patent system was not devised to permit gains from revealing 
and understanding those facts. To do so otherwise is to distort the patent system and 
diminish its value as a social and economic tool.”187 Once a patent is granted, the patent 
holder has the ability to permit others to use, develop or commercialize the invention 
through a license, where the licensee gives the patent holder a fee or a percentage of the 
royalties. But if a patent holder adopts a restrictive attitude, it can result in greater 
transaction costs and restrain the transfer of patented goods onto the market as 
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researchers need to obtain many licenses from patent holders before a product can be 
developed.
188
 
DNA sequencing is the first step in providing an information source for future 
breakthroughs. This is because patent claims for information depart from the traditional 
theories of the patent system, which is based on disclosing information to the public in 
return for exclusive rights. Since patents to DNA sequences could potentially restrict 
mere analysis of the information as described in the patent disclosure, it could hamper 
access to the disclosed information once the patent has been granted.  
2.4.3. Genes are complex biological phenomena 
Despite the completion of the Human Genome Project, there are still many 
questions about how genes function.  James Watson, co-founder of DNA, maintains: 
To this day, we continue to learn how human genes function. We estimate that humans have 
approximately 21,000 genes. We have yet to fully understand the functions of all human genes, 
but this lack of understanding is further reason that scientists should be permitted to experiment 
on human genes free from any threat of patent infringement.
189
 
 
 Relatively simple life forms like bacteria have genes that are much closer 
together. On the other hand, human beings have long regions where nothing seems to be 
happening. Today, scientists do not refer to these regions as ‘junk DNA’ anymore; 
rather they are believed to be the key to human complexity.  In other words, scientists 
still understand a lot less than they thought they did. They are still unable to explain 
how genes function and the way they interact with one another. It is inadequate to 
divide the genome into little blocks, because genes work together. Patenting assumes 
that each particular gene performs a certain function. However, this is not the case. 
                                               
188 See Merges, R. & J. Duffy. Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials, 5th Ed. Lexis Nexis, 2011. 
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Genes actually work together in a harmonious system, and granting patents because 
someone discovers a function in a gene is erroneous, since a gene may have more than 
one function. Granting a patent for a gene in which only one function has been declared 
but covers all future yet-to-be discovered functions is unsuitable. 
2.5. The tragedy of the “anticommons”  
One major contention against the patenting of human biological materials is 
problems associated from patent holders hampering the flow of information, such as 
difficulties stemming from licensing of patented inventions that could obstruct further 
innovation in medicines and would result in an “anticommons.”190 An anticommons 
arises when too many patents are granted which exclude the use of an product or 
process.
191
  
In 1998, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg wrote an article asking whether 
patent protection could discourage biomedical research.
192
 They explored the double-
edged sword of patent protection. On the one, they could facilitate incentives by 
securing protection through a patent right, whilst simultaneously creating an enormous 
thicket and act as a barrier to innovation. As a result, a user needs access to multiple 
patented inputs to create a single useful product. Heller and Eisenberg used the term 
“tragedy of the anticommons” to describe the underuse of scarce resources as a result of 
too many rights holders in one area:  
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a user 
needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream patent 
allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the 
cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical innovation.193 
                                               
190 See Heller, M. “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” 
in Harvard Law Review. Vol. 111, 1998 at 670-672. 
191 Ibid. Employing the example of empty Moscow storefronts, Michael Heller explains how multiple 
property rights over a scarce resource can lead to the underuse of a product.  
192 Heller, M. & R. Eisenberg. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
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The problem of the anticommons has been applied to the biotechnology 
sector.
194
 Innovation in the field of biotechnology is cumulative and built on existing 
knowledge. As a result, patent rights can hinder development rather than encouraging 
it.
195
 The grant of patent rights entitles the right holder to exclude others from the 
commercial use of the patented invention. This contains an intrinsic dilemma. Can 
patents be granted for inventions that are so rudimentary and central to future 
developments that patenting them will excessively encumber subsequent inventors?  
If too many patent owners block one another from accessing the technical and scientific 
information in biological products to develop further innovative products, a biological 
anticommons could arise due to the existence of a simultaneous fragmented system of 
intellectual property rights.
196
   
2.5.1. Patent thickets  
In the field of biotechnology, where research is cumulative and is based on 
previous work, the common complaint is that the growing number of overlapping 
patents can lead to the development of a ‘patent thicket,’ which economist Carl Shapiro 
defines as: 
[A]dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way 
through in order to actually commercialize new technology. With cumulative innovation and 
multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not 
encouraging, innovation.
197
 
 
In other words, a patent thicket is a illustrative term which refers to the obstacles 
researchers may encounter when attempting to innovate in a field of technology that is 
inundated with overlapping upstream patent rights that are held by several competing 
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entities.
198
 It is maintained that a thicket can arise due to an increase in the number of 
patents filed and increased technological complexity and interdependence.
199
 To 
navigate through this thicket of patents, one needs to pay license fees, which could 
make it costly to conduct research and may delay further innovation. However, one 
possible interpretation is that the patent thicket issue is merely an a natural effect and 
price of the patent system, and will be a persisting problem.
200
 
2.5.2. Biotechnology Research Tools 
The problems associated with a patent thicket with respect to human genetic 
materials is that a proliferation of patent rights could slow down or hinder the 
development of essential health processes and products.  
[T]here is concern that the extent of patent protection of biological research tools may be such as 
to impede biotechnological progress. For example, the existence of separate patents on gene 
fragments may make the transaction costs of assembling genetic material needed for research 
very high.
201
  
 
Patents on genes could claim research tools, which are essential materials used 
by researchers in the laboratory to further develop new products.
202
 They are often 
referred to as ‘upstream’ products because they involve primary-stage inventions that 
are exercised to develop final products.
 203
 Correspondingly, final end products are 
referred to as ‘downstream’ inventions because they are developed based on the use of 
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upstream research tools.
204
 The issue of ‘upstream’ patenting is particularly substantial 
in the context of biotechnology because they become ‘blocking patents.’205  
 “Blocking patents” refer to a situation where an upstream patent can affect 
future downstream inventions. In the United States, there is no legal obligation for a 
patent holder to grant a license. If a company owns an upstream patent, it can stifle 
downstream inventions by refusing to license. Companies who possess upstream patents 
may only grant licenses if they can obtain a share of the profits from future downstream 
inventions.
206
 An accumulation of fragmented patent rights requires high transaction 
costs in obtaining permission from the various patent owners before wider development 
can be completed.
207
 For instance, the University of Washington developed 
corresponding gene sequencing methods for detecting inherited mutations in ovarian 
and breast cancer genes. Rather than using the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the test used 
multiple genes to detect cancer risk.
 208
 It is suggested that gene patents can hinder 
innovation in genetic technologies that require the evaluation of multiple genes.   
In this respect, if each gene is patented by a different company, and if any one of the 
patent holders refuses to license his or her property right, then the cost of a project could 
rise significantly  as the ‘holdout’ may request a bribe that is near to the cost of the 
project.
209
 Therefore, too many obstructive patents result could result in a loss of 
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welfare, as the entire value of the resources under patents would diminish as industrious 
possibilities for research could not be continued by would-be innovators.
210
 
2.5.3. Impact on sequential innovation 
Some scholars have suggested that the solution to preventing an anticommons 
from development is to grant fewer patents to DNA sequences.
211
 There is the 
possibility that an anticommons can be prevented by precluding DNA patents given if 
the cost of DNA sequencing is low, and provided that non-proprietary incentives are 
abundant.
212
 This line or argument now seems to apply to isolated gene sequences in the 
US.
213
  
However, there are already thousands of patents on DNA sequences.
214
 In 
addition to patents covering DNA, genes and fragments of genes, patents have also been 
granted for the methods of sequencing and other various research tools. The issue 
centres on the quantity of rights with various owners that must be combined. For 
instance, if a company wants to develop a therapeutic protein that requires several gene 
fragments, that company will be required to obtain licenses on all the patented gene 
fragments to avoid patent infringement. If each gene fragment is owned by different 
owners, then the transaction costs will be very high before an organization can acquire 
the right to create the product. Heller and Eisenberg maintain that issuing patents on 
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gene fragments “makes little sense,”215 because many genes are required to make a 
therapeutic protein or a genetic diagnostic test.  
A proliferation of patents on individual fragments held by different owners seems inevitably to 
require costly future transactions to bundle licenses together before a firm can have an effective 
right to develop these products.
216
 
 
The problem could be intensified with reach through license agreements 
(RTLA), which gives the patent owner of the patented invention rights to subsequent 
downstream discoveries through royalties in exclusive or non-exclusive licenses. 
“RTLAs may lead to an anti-commons as upstream owners stack over-lapping and 
inconsistent claims on potential downstream products.”217 This may create complex 
obstacles when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful 
product. For example, if an company wants to develop a genetic testing kit for 
hereditary colon cancer, it could run into licensing issues.
218
 
2.5.4. Is there an anti-commons in biotechnology? 
Despite the argument that patent protection creates a vast thicket and could lead 
to an anticommons, there are several limitations to the argument when it is applied to 
the patent system. First, patent rights are intangible in nature, which differ from 
traditional tangible property rights.
219
 An inherent part of the anti-commons line of 
reasoning is that like land scarcity, there is a scarcity to the biological commons.
220
 On 
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the contrary, the intangible commons is very different from physical land in that it does 
not depreciate with multiple usage. What is unique to genetic research is that there are 
various pathways with multiple starting points that can lead to the development of an 
innovative product or process.
221
 
In addition, patent rights are temporal.
222
 The very concept of the anti-commons 
exists as a reactionary entity to the problems arising from when ownership is accepted 
to be absolute.
223
 It is submitted that a property right resulting from a patent grant is 
temporary and not absolute: 
Even the full-blooded owner in theory does not have absolute rights over a resource…the range 
of excludability that an owner may have can be limited: the range of excludability that an owner 
may have others in the governance of a particular resource may vary.224 
 
Thus, due to the temporal nature of patents, patent holders are restricted in 
exercising their exclusionary rights for twenty years, and the negative effects that can 
arise from an anti-commons will fade.  
Third, patents do not necessarily mean that resources are under exploited. Patent 
owners have the option to both use their invention and exclude others from the usage of 
the invention. What is clear is that the patent holder intends to make money from the 
utilization of the invention.
225
 Since the patent is temporal, it becomes a ‘wasting’ asset 
because the holder faces the possibility of new and old patents during the duration of the 
right, and new techniques that fall into the public domain will erode their dominance.
226
 
Therefore, if patent holders do not exercise their inventions or license them to other 
parties, they will miss out on income opportunities. 
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Moreover, patents can help facilitate further investment and development into 
biotechnology sectors that are uncertain and risky, and thus, costly. As such, the 
exclusive rights granted to patent owners have a positive effect in that it directs 
resources into areas of industry that may otherwise not be developed.
227
 
Fifth, there is a lack of empirical evidence over the probable negative effects 
connected with patent thickets. Rather, a US study which consisted of a survey of 70 
attorneys, scientists and managers in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries 
over whether there was a patent blockade revealed that almost none of the participants 
believed the current patent regime posed unbeatable impediments that prevented the 
effective use of research tools.
228
 Similarly, a study conducted by the UK’s Intellectual 
Property Office revealed that the thicket problem does not deter innovation, particularly 
for small companies.
229
 Finally, a 2013 study conducted by the EPO’s Economic and 
Scientific Advisory Board concluded that a patent thicket is not a problem in itself, but 
maintains that procedures to improve patent quality can assist in reducing the intricacy 
of the system and address patent thickets indirectly.
230
 
Although this thesis does not deny the existence of the theoretical problem of the 
anti-commons in biotechnology, it suggests that it can be overcome in practice. In fact, 
the data gathered from interview participants from the biotechnology/research sector 
                                               
227 Mireles, M. “An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the 
Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation,” in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Vol. 38, 
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228 Walsh, P. et al. “Effects of Research Tool Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation” in 
Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy. Cohen, W. and S. Merill (eds.) Washington: National 
Academies Press, 2002 at 285. 
229 The UK IPO emphasized that even a finding of a barrier to entry created by patent thickets is not proof 
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Study of Patent Thickets. July 30, 2013. www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-thickets.pdf. Accessed November 
19, 2013 at 60.  
230 European Patent Office Economic and Scientific Advisory Board. Report of Workshop on Patent 
Thickets. March 2013. Available at:  
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suggests that they have not encountered any ‘patent thickets’, and, when necessary, 
license with other parties.
231
 Moreover, there has been a lack of empirical data for the 
assertion that a patent blockade governs patent innovation.
232
 Nevertheless, there has 
been a persistent call for the diminishing of patent protection for biotechnology 
inventions. In the UK, for instance, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics considered 
whether granting patents for DNA sequences achieved the patent system’s goal of 
stimulating innovation for the public good and rewarded innovators for useful new 
inventions and ultimately maintained that patents should be the exception and not the 
norm.
233
 In Germany, the Protestant Church of Germany denounced patents on DNA 
sequences and genes as they already exist in nature and are not inventions.
 234
 In the US, 
a 2006 study by the National Research Council (NRC) acknowledged the possibility of 
an anticommons pertaining to biotechnology patents, and advocated that the standard 
for patenting should be strengthened.
235
  
2.5.5. Practical realities 
One explanation for the lack of empirical evidence of an anti-commons problem 
is because of the competitors’ willingness to reasonably license with one another. For 
instance, Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen’s recombinant DNA invention gave rise to 
genetic engineering in the 1970s. Their patented invention of DNA cloning techniques 
enabled genes to be relocated amongst different biological species.  
One of the very broadest patents in genetic engineering was one of the first ones. It more or less 
covered the principle of genetic engineering, and they got a very broad claim in the States.  And 
                                               
231 See Chapter 5 for stakeholder interviewee responses. 
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everybody became very agitated about this as you might reasonably expect, but they made a 
license available for $10,000, which is not nothing. But it was probably less than it would’ve 
cost anyone to investigate the situation seriously. And it clearly was a ground-breaking 
invention. And in consequence, they had no trouble licensing it, and people had no trouble 
getting access to the technology. It’s more or less the opposite of trolls, if you like. If you are in 
that position, you need to consider really rather carefully what it is sensible to do.236 
Had Cohen and Boyer refused to license their technique, it would have delayed 
the development of the biotech industry. Luckily, they decided to license their 
technique, which contributed to the rapid growth of the field.
237
 Cohen and Boyer’s 
licensing experience reflects the practical realities between patent holders and those 
non-right holders. Economically speaking, companies are likely to negotiate licensing 
agreements provided they can afford the transaction costs. The confidential processes of 
negotiation which occurs when a rights-holder realizes a potential infringement and 
sends a letter to the alleged offending party. If resolved, these instances do not have to 
go to court. The majority of the biotechnology stakeholders maintained that negotiated 
settlements are the most common result of any assertion of patent rights. 
238
 Therefore, 
although blocking patents could come in the form of patented processes or methods, 
most likely, patent holders will find it is more profitable to license inventions rather 
than hoard them.
239
 
2.6. Potential solutions  
 Although there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the presence of patent 
thickets in biotechnology, there remains a possibility that too many patents could 
encumber access to important technologies.
240
 As such, one could look towards 
potential solutions to prevent the development of a patent thicket. There are three 
                                               
236 Interview with Tim Roberts (British chartered patent attorney) on February 7, 2012. 
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popular solutions found within patent law discourse: (i) patent pools; (ii) the research 
exemption and (iii) compulsory licensing. 
2.6.1. Patent pools 
 Patent pools have been suggested to be a promising solution to patent thickets, 
which are essentially agreements between two or more patent holders to license one or 
more of their patents to each other, or to combine their patents into one package and 
license it to third parties.
241
  One clear advantage of a patent pool is licensing problems 
are easily overcome, provided the key players agree to pool their IPR assets together. 
However, in order for a patent pool in biotechnology to work, it would need to 
encompass a variety of rights, particularly essential products and processes like DNA 
and RNA sequences, proteins, recombinant DNA techniques, etc.  
 Nevertheless, due to the nature of biotechnology inventions, holders of the key 
inventions may be reluctant to join as there is no apparent benefit: 
Indeed, many private companies with valuable patents on key technologies may decide that 
joining a patent pool would be a financial blunder. Why would any company allow an outside 
organization to control its golden egg laying goose?242 
 
While in theory, patent pools can be regarded as a potential solution to the 
problem of a patent thicket, it relies on the voluntary participation of patent holders, 
particularly those with valuable patents on fundamental technologies. Therefore, not all 
patentees will participate. 
2.6.2. Research exemption 
 Since the landmark case Madey v. Duke University,
243
 the research exemption in 
the US has all but ceased to exist in practice:  
Regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial 
gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not 
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict philosophical inquiry, the act does not 
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.244 
                                               
241 For a discussion on the virtues of a patent pool, see: Resnik, D. “A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An 
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243 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Federal Circuit 2002). 
244 Ibid at 1362. 
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In Europe, the research exemption exists within patent law. Even though the 
EPC and the regulation on the unitary patent does not make any reference to it,
245
 EU 
Member States tend to include a provision within national patent legislation declaring 
that patent rights shall not extend to experimental acts that are directed to the subject 
matter of the patented invention.
246
 However, different EU Member States national 
legislation and courts interpret the scope of the exemption differently.  Moreover, the 
line between a commercial and non-commercial use is blurry in biotechnology, which is 
why the wording of research exemption clauses needs to be written and implemented 
carefully.
247
 
2.6.3. Compulsory licensing 
 A compulsory license is a tool that the state or court can employ to compel a 
patent holder to license the patented invention. Article 31 of TRIPS 
248
 asserts that it is 
up to WTO Member States to determine the grounds upon which to grant compulsory 
licenses. It has been suggested that a compulsory license can be used as a balancing 
mechanism between the biotechnology industry and access to healthcare. Former 
Canadian Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie argued that the Canadian government 
should implement a compulsory licensing scheme in ‘high-outlay, high-reward areas” 
like biotechnology.
249
 For instance, one can argue that a complete monopoly over a 
gene is inappropriate, and Sir Robin Jacob suggests that a well-designed compulsory 
license provisions would be helpful in the area:  
                                               
245 Article 63(1) of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973; Regulation (EU) 
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There are many who say that a complete monopoly over a gene is inappropriate, just because 
you were first to isolate it, or even if you are first to isolate it and know what it is for. It may be 
that well-designed compulsory license provisions would be helpful in this area…A lot depends 
on the nature of the invention – one that is not only high risk but involves billions in research 
and years in time to bring to market stands in a different economic category than an isolated 
gene, especially one isolated by more or less standard techniques.250  
 
However, compulsory licenses are granted only under extraordinary 
circumstances, like a national emergency.
251
 Moreover, the state may be hesitant to use 
it regularly as it is contrary to the essence of a patent right. 
2.7. Conclusion 
With the arrival of growing levels of patenting activity in biotechnology, the 
idea of the formation of a possible thicket that could obstruct access to essential 
technologies and create an anticommons has drawn certain consideration. The 
anticommons theory advances the argument that the over-fragmentation of patent rights 
can lead to additional costs and the potential underuse of a product or process. There are 
three main arguments that emphasize the existence of an anti-commons in 
biotechnology. First, institutions and companies who require access to many different 
types of technical knowledge to develop new inventions may encounter a thicket of 
patents. Second, blocking patents can exacerbate a patent thicket, referring to upstream 
patents that can affect future downstream inventions. Third, researchers and companies 
may have to pay high licensing fees because they will have to negotiate with several 
different companies who hold the relevant patents in the field. Moreover, proposed 
measures to control the negative effects of patent thickets include: patent pools, a 
research exemption, and compulsory licensing.  
This thesis acknowledges that due to the nature of gene patents, there is no way 
to invent around them. As a result, conditions conducive to the development of an 
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anticommons exist. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical evidence that proves the 
presence and negative consequences of patent thickets in biotechnology. Even so, the 
importance of biotechnology innovation encourages patent policy makers to take into 
account this issue when considering any potential patent law reforms. 
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Chapter 3: The Justifications of Patents for Human Genetic Materials 
 
“It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make the use of it 
common; but how the citizens are to be brought to it is the particular business of the 
legislator.” 
-Aristotle, The Politics, II.v. 
3.1. Introduction  
Aristotle’s quote above sets the tone for this chapter and overall thesis, 
maintaining that private property performs a social function, in the way that it serves the 
common good of society. The quote emphasizes that private property should be used in 
a way which increases the overall good of humanity. This social aspect of property is a 
noticeable theme in academic property discourse.
252
 This chapter provides a definition 
of property, followed by an inquiry into the concept of property as a social and legal 
construct. Next, the focus will return to a discussion of the patent system as a social 
contract between the state and patent holder with a focus on the right to exclude. It 
emphasizes that patents perform a social function, such as protecting business interests 
and the temporary nature of the right. The weaknesses of a natural law approach to the 
propertization of human biological materials will be addressed and an explanation for 
why it is limited in its application to patenting human biological materials. Instead, a 
social construction of property is appropriate for the justification of patenting genetic 
material, as the patent system is a social legal construction designed to increase societal 
welfare. The economic justifications of patenting human biological materials will 
follow.  The primary question is what type and extent of rights an inventor should have 
in human genetic materials that could meet the objectives of the patent system whilst 
also advancing societal interests.  
                                               
252See Lametti, D. “The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth,” in University 
of Toronto Law Journal. Vol. 53, pp.325-378.2003, Penner, J. The Idea of Property in Law. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997, Davies, M. & N. Naffine. Are Persons Property?: Legal Debates about Property 
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3.2. Defining Property 
Advances in the medical and biotechnological fields have resulted in a 
perception of how human genetic materials are valued economically, becoming 
increasingly valuable in parallel with the rising advancement of therapies and 
diagnostics, which compels the courts and legislators to re-examine granting property 
rights to the human biological materials. Before the arguments for and against the 
recognition of property rights on human biological material are examined, the definition 
of “property” will be clarified below. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines property as: “The right to possess, use, and 
enjoy a determinate thing...the right of ownership...Any external thing over which the 
rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised.”253 The right of ownership 
results in a variety of property interests: including “the rights to use, transfer, exclude; 
or-property protects the fruits of human labour, or activities in which human beings 
flourish.”254  From this definition, characteristics of ownership include: possession, 
ability to exclude, and transferability. Under this description of property, genetic 
information can qualify as property. An individual has rights and powers in one’s 
genetic information, including protection from third party interference. An individual’s 
right of control over one’s body, and right to exclude others from infringing on the body 
suggest that there is a property right to the human body, including one’s genetic 
material. 
Similarly, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines property as: “The 
condition of being owned by or belonging to some person or persons; hence, the fact of 
owning a thing; the holding of something as one’s own; the right (esp. the exclusive 
                                               
253 “Property” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.). Bryan A. Garner (Editor in Chief). Minnesota: Thomson 
West, 2004 at 1252 
254 Underkuffler, L. The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 
at 14. 
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right) to the possession, use, or disposal of anything; ownership, proprietorship.”255 The 
emphasis is on ownership and the right to possess, use, and dispose something. 
Along the same lines, the Law of the Twelve Tables, c.450 B.C., the first 
occasion of codified Roman law states: “When one makes a bond and a conveyance of 
property, as he has made formal declaration so let it be binding.”256  Two characteristics 
can be derived from this law: possession and the right to transfer. As long as one has 
formally declared one’s ties to the property, (in this case, it would be an oral 
announcement), one has legally acquired or possessed the assumed property. In 
addition, transferability rights can be established from the phrase “conveyance of 
property,” which means transferring ownership from one party to another. Table VI, 
Law 3 states: “A beam that is built into a house or a vineyard trellis one may not take 
from its place.”   From this law, a right of exclusion can be extracted from the phrase. 
Three common characteristics of property can be derived from these definitions 
of property: possession, exclusive use, and transferability. Thus, it is apparent that the 
concept of property in law is based on a comprehension of legal rights. 
3.3. An inquiry into the concept of property and ownership 
The categorical application of property theory to intellectual property law is a 
somewhat modern development in IP scholarship, in which there has been increased 
interest in studying the concept of intellectual property rights as property rights,
257
 
possibly due to a reappearance of property principles triggered by the innovative 
developments in the biotechnology field.
258
 For instance, one can argue that DNA 
sequences should not be patentable because no one should ‘own’ an aspect of the 
human genome. This argument is based on ideas about ownership. 
                                               
255“Property”. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles Part II 3rdedition.C.T. 
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It is fallacious, I would argue, to say that human DNA is ‘special’ because it is uniquely human. 
Firefly DNA is uniquely firefly-ish, but that does not in itself make it any more special than any 
other organism’s genetic material, that of homo sapiens [sic] included. But what about the larger 
claim that all DNA is inherently unsuitable as an object of property? If there can be rights of 
ownership over animals and plants, which our legal system clearly allows, then that claim is 
obviously untenable…As embodied in individual plants and animals, DNA is ‘ownable,’ 
however.259 
 
It might be considered that those who are against genetic patenting are so 
because they incorrectly perceive patents as complete ownership - granting the patent 
owner the entirety of the bundle of rights, instead of a temporary exclusive right to the 
granted patent claims in exchange for disclosure of valuable knowledge to the public. It 
must be emphasized that patent rights are not complete ownership rights.
260
 Ownership 
is a legal right a person(s) is granted which grants them a high degree of control over a 
scarce resource.
261
 In a patent context, a patent holder can own a temporary exclusive 
property right.
262
 
As a result of the different questions introduced in acquiring property rights to 
isolated DNA sequences and cDNA, some academics have considered conceptual 
property theory in an attempt to articulate the nature of intellectual property rights and 
the way in which legal principles outline and protect those rights.
263
 Although the 
fundamental queries in policy debates pertaining to intellectual property law are 
prescriptive and concerned with the establishment of norms, the arguments are based on 
the structure of legal doctrines. A conceptual analysis of intellectual property rights as 
property rights uncovers how intellectual property law either sustains or undercuts the 
normative policy disputes by revealing how legal doctrines are assembled to attain a 
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normative standard. Therefore, understanding property as a concept provides the 
structure of intellectual property as a property right. 
3.3.1. Legal construction of social relations  
There are many major contributions to the debate over property and its 
justifications.
264
 In the broadest sense, property is an institution governing the allocation 
of control of valuable resources to individuals.
265
 It is also understood as a set of legal 
relations composed of several rights and duties: “Property concerns the relationships 
between human beings and all things - physical or conceptual - which can be made into 
resources. It therefore also intimately concerns the structure of the social relationships 
between people.”266 Property also possesses a social aspect, in that it is a form of power, 
because property consists of social relations amongst people. This idea of individual 
power in private property is described by Jeremy Waldron: “In a system of private 
property, the rules governing access to and control of material resources are organized 
around the idea that resources are on the whole separable objects each assigned and 
therefore belonging to some particular individual.”
267
 This means that the quintessence 
of private property is that individuals are granted some degree of power over the 
command and use of a resource. Therefore, property is a concept shared by a range of 
academic fields.
268
 Presenting an explanation of the legal institution of property is not to 
                                               
264Wesley Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,  Anthony 
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discredit other accounts of property, but to highlight the fact that property rights must be 
legally assembled.
269
 
As a legally constructed institution, property is typically referred to as a ‘bundle 
of rights.’270 The bundle of rights metaphor has become the dominant paradigm in 
which property is considered,
271
 often being reflected in major jurisprudence 
writings.
272
 In addition, Anthony Honoré offers his eleven incidents of ownership, 
which form the sticks in the bundle of rights: “right to possess, the right to use, the right 
to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to 
security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition 
of harmful use, liability to execution and the incident of residuarity.”273 If there are an 
abundance of these qualities present, Honoré maintains that the conditions are rightfully 
set and an ‘owner’ is present. This approach is a follow-up to Hohfeld’s concept of 
property as it defines ownership from the perspective of a property owner and the 
ensuing entitled rights that may be claimed in respect to an object. Rather than 
emphasizing the duties non-property owners have, Honoré focuses on the range of the 
property owner’s permitted actions. Honoré claims that these incidents of ownership 
can extend to intangible goods: 
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In the law we find the following position. As regards external material objects, it is natural to 
speak of ownership. A person 'owns' a book, house or car. The terminology of ownership is also 
extended to some things other than material objects. A person may 'own' a copyright, leasehold 
property, goodwill, a business, patent rights. In these cases, the analogy with the incidents of the 
ownership of external material objects is a close one.274 
 
The bundle of rights perspective is not without criticism.
275
 The key accusation 
is, to quote Remigius Nwabueze, that “the ‘bundle of rights’ perspective entails a 
complete abstraction and disaggregation of property.”276 In other words, this account 
fragments the concept of property into a compilation of segregated legal interactions, 
which results in a disconnection of property rights and the object to which those rights 
pertain. Despite the critiques, however, the Hohfeld/Honoré approach persists as a 
central model for property, as reflected in the recent application of Honoré and 
Hohfeld’s “bundle of rights” property theory in discussions concerning the relationship 
between property and the human body.
277
  What can be taken from this demonstration 
of property is that it is a set of legal relations between a property right owner and a non-
right holder in reference to something. Absent from the Hohfeld/Honoré depiction of 
property is the role of the objects of property, which will be discussed in section 3.4.3. 
While the Hohfeld/ Honoré approach to property focused on the collection of 
legal relations designed by humans, legal realist Morris Cohen stressed that these social 
relationships are essential power relations and that property is a form of power over 
others. The power of property owners has been compared to sovereign power, an 
analogy famously made by Cohen, whose formulation of the property concept is found 
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in his classic essay, Property and Sovereignty.
278
 The sovereign metaphor is used to 
explain how the power of property owners is equivalent to a sovereign’s power over his 
or her subjects, submitting that property owners are like sovereigns because they have 
power over others due to their influence over scarce resources. “Property ownership 
thus comprises the power to command the services of people who are not economically 
independent and the power to tax the future social product-both of which also constitute 
the essence of sovereignty.”279 Cohen maintains that due to sovereign authority granted 
through exclusive property rights, the minority who acquire property ownership can 
exercise authority over the majority.
280
 As a result, property laws “confer sovereign 
power on our captains of industry and even more so on our captains of finance.”281 
Thus, Cohen emphasized the governance value of property, which institutes the 
property owner with qualities resembling those of the sovereign. Cohen suggested that 
the difference between property ownership and sovereignty is exaggerated, that they are 
closely related terms, and that property is merely another type of power over others.
282
 
3.3.2. Power to exclude  
A property right could be understood in terms of excludability: the right not to 
have one’s property violated regardless of the economic value.283 Cohen stated that “the 
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essence of private property is always the right to exclude others.”284 This conception of 
property as an exclusionary mechanism aligns with the Hohfeld/ Honoré approach that 
legal relationships are the basis for property rights, but Cohen goes one step further in 
emphasizing that the outcome of a property right holder possessing power over non-
right holders in relation to something is the right to exclude. The right to exclusion 
requires an obligation that is implementable by state pressure to submit to the property 
owner’s will. This is what Laura Underkuffler terms the common conception of 
property, the notion that property recognizes and safeguards individual interests against 
collective forces.
285
 David Lametti maintains that the most evident demonstration of 
assigning control to individuals is considered to be the ability to exclude others from 
access to or use of that claimed resource.
286
 If a property right is not given, this can 
result in the claimant being susceptible to the will of others, who may infringe on the 
claimant’s interests that have been deprived of protection.287 Not only is there a 
relationship between the property owner and the object of social wealth, but there is also 
a relationship between the owner and others with respect to the claimed object. This 
ability to exclude others and the de facto duty of others not to interfere is considered to 
be the most significant facet of the institution of property.
288
 This approach holds the 
view that property is best perceived as social relations between individuals with respect 
to things.
289
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The legal exclusion of property is grounded in the interest human beings have in 
the use of things.
290
 James Penner notes “the right to property is a right to exclude 
others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.”291 
This power to exclude is the foundation for maintaining that private property is 
worthwhile, and it is ultimately a right in rem.
292
 Penner does not classify intellectual 
property rights as rights in personam
293, but refers to them as “rights to monopolies” 
which correlate to duties in rem because everyone has a duty not to infringe the right 
holder’s monopoly.294 Penner maintains that a patent is a property right to a monopoly 
that is defined in the claimed idea, rather than a property right to the idea itself.
295
 
Furthermore, he notes that intellectual property rights “are rights directly to a practise of 
exclusion…correlating to duties in rem by which all subjects of the legal system have a 
negative duty not to do something. The duty is not one to refrain from interfering with 
material objects, but to refrain from working an invention.”296 However, excludability 
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does not encompass the complete spirit of property, as private property is both an idea 
and an institution which is composed of social relationships.  
3.3.3. Social-obligation  
The objective of this chapter is to recognize property rights as socially 
constructed relational concepts that are dependent on social institutions for their value 
and operation. Gregory Alexander articulates that property was always connected with 
proprietary customs in addition to self-interest.
297
 
[P]roperty is the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order, the 
private basis for the public good. The proprietarian tradition, whose roots can be traced back to 
Aristotle, takes seriously the idea that the common good can be defined in substantive terms. 
That is, it presumes that not all forms of social order are normatively equal but that some are 
morally superior to others.298 
 
This means that property not only serves individual interests, but social 
functions as well. Alexander proposes the social-obligation theory of the concept of 
property, holding that human beings have an obligation to their community to promote 
the capabilities that are indispensable to human flourishing.
299
 For property owners, this 
means that there is an obligation for them to share property to enhance the abilities of 
others to flourish. Alexander makes the following remarks on how the social-obligation 
theory can be applied to patent law, emphasizing that patents restrict public access to 
certain resources that may be necessary for human flourishing:  
From the perspective of promoting essential capabilities, notably health, those who own these 
intellectual property rights may owe members of their communities, including the global 
community, an obligation to facilitate access to these resources for those who cannot afford 
them.300 
 
Alexander argues that multinational companies, like large pharmaceutical firms 
are often the patent holders of essential inventions. Despite their magnitude and the 
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nature of their configuration, like individuals, they are able to engage in practical 
reasoning and are dependent on others for their development, and it is this dependency 
which embodies the human condition.  
The sets of relationships within which these firms develop and engage in practical reasoning are 
often much broader than those of individuals. This is especially true of the multinational 
companies and elite universities that are the most likely holders of patents or licenses…The 
world literally is their community. They would not be who they are without the world. Their 
dependence on the rest of the world creates obligations for them.301 
 
If one begins from the position of property rights as a social institution that is 
receptive to societal needs, then it can be argued that it is society that will determine the 
scope and thresholds of that institution. 
Private property is a social institution that comprises a variety of contextual relationships among 
individuals through objects of social wealth and is meant to serve a variety of individual and 
collective purposes. It is characterized by allocating to individuals a measure of control over the 
use and alienation of, some degree of exclusivity in the enjoyment of, and some measure of 
obligation to and responsibilities for scarce and separable objects of social wealth.302 
 
This argument is based on James Penner’s structuring of the property norm, 
particularly Penner’s emphasis on property’s asymmetrical structure.303 This means that 
exclusively allocating social resources to individuals essentially involves rights and 
powers, and as a result, duties and liabilities, these relations are facilitated through 
objects and, therefore, do not always correlate or flow in one direction. Penner notes 
this asymmetrical relationship is where the property’s rights and duties can be found. 
Like Penner, Lametti maintains that private property is social because of its structural 
asymmetry:  
Private property is necessarily social because of its structural asymmetry and underlying value 
and purposes-human survival, human development and flourishing, and so on - coupled with its 
scarcity. In short, property is social because of its ethical dimensions and implications.304 
 
This does not necessitate a rejection of the essential function that property fulfils 
in protecting individual interests; as such concerns are a necessary element in any 
system of social configuration. Instead, this thesis omits the notion that exclusionary 
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rights to property assume an unequivocal precedence over other interests. To quote from 
Lametti:  
So the limits on property rights generally, and the specific duties imposed on certain property 
rights, will be seen to serve larger ethical and moral principles: the common good, the 
development of individual goods, and the like. These principles govern how human beings 
should interact with scarce resources.
305
 
 
The implication of this conception of property is that it establishes stronger 
obligations on property owners. Cohen maintains that private ownership also confers 
positive duties to property owners, even though he did not go into detail about the 
boundaries of these duties: 
I wish however to urge that if the large property owner I viewed, as he ought to be, as a wielder 
of power over the lives of his fellow citizens, the law should not hesitate to develop a doctrine as 
to his positive duties in the public interest.306 
 
Therefore, Cohen emphasized there was a moral dimension to property, in which 
the interests of the community prevailed over individual ambition in the 
commodification of property: 
Property owners, like other individuals, are members of a community and must subordinate their 
ambition to the larger whole of which they are a part. They may find their compensation in 
spiritually identifying their good with that of the larger life.307 
 
From Cohen’s property theory, one can gather that a property right holder has an 
responsibility or obligation to the public. Although resilient private rights may dominate 
several areas of property dialogue, the ranking of private rights is not a sound 
prerequisite of property, but rather a result of the social environment in which property 
rights have developed.
308
 
As Laura Underkuffler advocates, the crucial question is not only about the 
rights of the individual property holder, but the relationship between the property right 
owner and the community. She claims that “the question of justice or fairness in law-on 
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which takings cases are purported to depend-is an inherently relational inquiry.”309 It is 
essential to recall that the grant of property to one individual inescapably prevents 
another from having that same right, which is that there needs to be a balancing “of 
competing interests and competing claims.”310 
It is submitted that private property must be limited in the interests of society. 
This thesis attempts to answer the question of if and to what extent patent rights on 
genetic sequences are beneficial to society overall. Although a society may favour 
strong private rights to exclude, private property may be and should be limited in the 
interests of society. Property for Alexander, Lametti, Cohen and Underkuffler share a 
similar feature, in that the need for private rights over objects is grounded in the purpose 
of providing some benefit to society. As a result, they maintain that property claims are 
not absolute, but are determined by the social context. It is submitted that property is a 
social correlative comprising a property owner’s exclusionary entitlement over a 
claimed object, for the purpose of promoting the social good. First and foremost, it is a 
social relationship, and second, a relationship that encompasses an exclusionary 
privilege. When exclusive control cannot be established over a resource, then it cannot 
be reduced to private property. There are three instances when exclusive control cannot, 
or ought not to be imposed on a resource, which include physical, legal and moral 
factors. 
The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition issued a Declaration 
on Patent Protection and maintained that: “the patent system should ultimately serve the 
public good by fostering economic growth and technological progress for the benefit of 
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society as a whole.”311 Thus, when present patent rights have substantial potential to 
hinder innovation, this may be a reason to remove them for the social good. 
3.3.4. Protecting intangible goods 
Property can be both tangible and intangible, and traditional conceptions of 
property often relate to tangible goods like land and water. Current legal systems protect 
tangible entities from trespassing activities and create ownership rights to limit their 
usage and protect their scarcity. On the other hand, intellectual property is inherently 
intangible subject matter and potentially boundless. It is not until the idea becomes 
public - which the issue of scarcity arises.  This is because when an idea becomes 
available to the public, it stops being scarce. The thought is that property rights are 
required to manage the distribution of scare resources fairly, because intellectual 
resources are easily replicated if they are not necessary identified with an 
author/inventor. In several cases, the costs of replication are minimal, which could 
eradicate scarcity. Property rights are granted to maintain scarcity which assists the 
owners and sustains incentives to others for long-term collective prosperity.
312
 
The abstract quality of intellectual property renders it unsuitable for being 
exclusively owned by any entity, and ideas can never be depleted or annihilated through 
exploitation, which begs the question: how can ideas be owned?
313
 The answer lies in 
the fact that the law creates temporal scarcity, as demonstrated by Yates J in his 
dissenting opinion in Millar v. Taylor: 
Ideas are free. While the author confines them to his study, they are like birds in a cage, which 
none but he can have a right to let fly; for, till he thinks proper to emancipate them, they are 
under his own dominion. It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he 
pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only 
to sight of his friends. In that state, the manuscript is in every sense his peculiar property; and no 
                                               
311 Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition. Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory 
Sovereignty under TRIPS. http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/patentdeclaration.cfm. Accessed April 15, 
2014 at 13. 
312 Becker, L. “Deserving to Own Intellectual Property” in Chicago-Kent Law Review. Vol. 68, 1993 at 
615-616. 
313 See 3.6.1 for a discussion on the topic of information as a public good. 
92 
 
man can take it from him, or make any use of it which he has not authorized, without being 
guilty of a violation of his property.314 
The inventor or creator of the idea retains property rights to his or her own 
process or product, but is also free to relinquish property rights by releasing the ideas 
into the commons. The law has institutionalized this property right to intangible matter 
through the intellectual property system. By employing the property structure once 
utilized for tangible matter and applying it to the intangible, intellectual property law 
safeguards creators and authors of those ideas a set of rights and ownership interests 
which are typical of powers of control over tangible property. Therefore, patented 
inventions are property and entitled to the same rights as other property.
315
 
3.4. Patent rights 
This section will elaborate on three characteristics of a patent right: (i) an 
exclusionary mechanism, (ii) a limited right and (iii) and performs a social function.  
3.4.1. An exclusionary mechanism 
Some scholars have adopted the view that IP is primarily a right to exclude and 
explained that the purpose of IP is to attain the normative utilitarian ideal of lessening 
information costs in the use of resources.
316
 The impracticability of physical exclusion 
may be corrected by using the law to assure exclusion. “They are exclusive rights – 
rights to stop other people doing things.”317 Information found in genetic sequences that 
is published can be considered incapable of physical exclusion, and can be argued to be 
incapable of being considered the object of private property rights. The legal 
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mechanism of an intellectual property right in the form of a patent can be used to 
facilitate exclusion, which creates a property right to genetic information.  
3.4.2. A limited right  
Since property rights embody the property owner’s power over third parties, the 
rights are limited.
318 
Lametti clarifies that ownership rights are not absolute and private 
property is a limited concept.
319
 He provides the example of patent rights: 
[P]atent rights, and the profits therefrom, are justified provided that the invention is put to use by 
the owner in such a way as to make its benefits available to society. When not so used, society is 
justified in otherwise licensing out the right, and sometimes even expropriating the right.
320
 
 
For Lametti, there is a strong duty on the part of patent owners to use the 
claimed invention in a way that will provide some benefit to the public because the 
wider social context is the source of justification for private property and the limits of 
the institution itself.
321
 Patents can only be justified if they provide more social good 
than bad.
322
 There is the expectation that a protected resource needs to be useful to 
society to justify the exclusion of others: 
Certainly where objects of social wealth as understood by society contain a strong sense of 
expected uses or destination, it is part of the contours of property analysis that, in granting a 
property right in the resource to the exclusion of others, society expects the resource to be 
used.
323
 
 
A patent right, then, can benefit society by incentivizing inventions and provide 
certainty to would be inventors which could encourage overall innovation. They can 
also promote better economic efficiency, such as preventing wasted research and too 
many overlapping works.
 324
 However, if the property right is used to only benefit the 
few, then greater state intervention may be required to rebalance the system in favour of 
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the public to neutralize the effects of the patent system. “[I]t would be as absurd to 
argue that the distribution of property must never be modified by law as it would be to 
argue that the distribution of political power must never be changed.”325 To rebalance 
the goals of the patent system, rights granted by the property system should be limited 
by public interest considerations, demonstrated through state regulation. "At any rate it 
is necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social ethics and 
public policy which ought to be brought to the discussion of any just form of 
government."
326
 The state can decide to bestow a property right by giving a person or 
group the right to request the state’s assistance to prevent others from using specific 
resources without the property right owner’s permission.327  
3.4.3. A socially constructed right 
An invention itself does not automatically acquire the status of a property right. 
It is through the social construction of a temporary monopoly, a patent, which a 
property right to the invention is granted to the inventor, by allowing the inventor to 
control the knowledge that defines the invention.  Recognizing property as "a set of 
social relations among human beings,"
328
 or an association between a right holder and 
non-right holders is the most applicable to intellectual property because it recognizes 
property as a socially constructed concept in which the law is used to demarcate rights 
for the goal of this legal bundle of rights benefitting society. 
A patent is not a natural right.
329
 Without the patent system, a right to an 
invention does not exist. Rather, the purpose of a patent is to provide would-be 
inventors the incentive of a temporary monopoly to commercially exploit the invention 
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in return for their divulging the knowledge. To benefit from this knowledge, society 
needs to be able to access this information.
 330
  It is submitted that the major benefit of 
patenting is disclosing useful knowledge to contribute to the public good when it is 
available and accessible.  
3.5. Patents: a social contract  
 This section discusses the concept of a patent as a social contract between an 
inventor and society, and how patents on human genetic materials are a reflection of this 
bargain.
331
 
3.5.1. A bargain between the inventor and society 
A patent is a social contract between the inventor and state, 
332
 whereby the 
inventor discloses the new and useful information to the public in exchange for an 
exclusive right for a set period of time to exclude others from commercially exploiting 
the invention, which includes: using, making or selling the invention.
333
 
Simply put, a patent is the right granted by the State to an inventor to exclude others from 
commercially exploiting the invention for a limited period, in return for the disclosure of the 
invention, so that others may gain the benefit of the invention. The disclosure of the invention is 
thus an important consideration in any patent granting procedure.334  
 
 The patent system benefits the public by encouraging inventors to disseminate 
valuable knowledge that could otherwise remain undisclosed. The disclosure must 
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University Press, 2010; Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government [1698] New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange 
Edition, 2010 and Macpherson, C. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 
Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1962. 
332 Geiger, C. “The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or how Ethics can Influence the Shape 
and Use of IP Law” in Dinwoodie, G. Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013. Geiger notes: “Intellectual property law is thus the product of a type of social 
contract between the author and society” at 165. 
333 Martens, J. Secret Patenting in the U.S.S.R. and Russia. Sante Fe: Deep North Press, 2010 at 31-32. 
334 World Intellectual Property Organization. WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and 
Use. 2004.  Available at: http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm. Accessed June 3, 2011. Chapter 2 at 17. 
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enable a person working in the state of the art to practice the invention.
335
 Patent law is 
a social contract designed to promote societal well-being, evaluated both in terms of 
access to the benefits of knowledge divulged and the level of production of 
knowledge.
336
  
3.5.2. The goals of the patent system 
The goals of the patent system include incentivizing would-be inventors to 
produce new and useful products and processes that will ultimately benefit society.
 337
  
As such, patents should be granted for inventions that are in the public interest. “Clearly 
the bargain of patent protection implies a goal or teleology to the right: societal needs 
for the new and useful product must be met.”338 The notion of the public interest 
dimension of intellectual property is reflected in the US Constitution. For instance, 
Article 1, Section 8, clause 8 of the US Constitution of 1787, ensures that the state 
promotes the freedom of arts and sciences:  
The Congress shall have Power …To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries. 
 
In safeguarding the freedom of arts and sciences, exclusive rights are bestowed 
insofar as they enable progress.
339
 The public interest is the reason for granting 
exclusive rights, but it can also be a reason for limiting them.
 340
 This line of reasoning 
rests on the social obligation theory
341
 and Gregory Alexander’s conception of 
                                               
335 Ibid. 
336 Henry, C. & J. Stiglitz. “Intellectual Property, Dissemination of Innovation and Sustainable 
Development” in Global Policy. Volume 3, Iss.3, October 2010 at 239. 
337 See supra note 4, Burk & Lemley at 1580. 
338 Lametti, D. “The Concept and Conceptions of Intellectual Property as Seen Through The Lens of 
Property” in Science and Law in the Prism of Comparative Law. G. Comandé, G. Ponzanelli (eds.). 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2004 at 276. 
339 Geiger, C. “Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments: Towards a 
New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles,” Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition Research Paper No. 14-10. 2014 at 17. 
340 See supra note 332, Geiger, C. at 153-176. 
341 See, for example:  Coombe, R. “Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property 
Laws and Democratic Dialogue,” in Texas Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 853-1883, 1991; Netanel, Neil. 
“Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,” in Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, pp. 283-387, 1996 and 
Fisher, W. “Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,” in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101, pp. 1659-795, 
June 1988. 
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“property-as-propriety”: “[P]roperty is the material foundation for creating and 
maintaining the proper social order, the private basis for the public good.”342  
This idea is developed on the basis of Aristotle’s idea that private property can 
promote the common good, as it promotes like responsibility, yet at the same time, 
encourages citizens to practice the virtue of generosity: 
For the superintendence of properties being divided among the owners will not cause these 
mutual complaints, and will improve the more because each will apply himself to it as to private 
business of his own; while on the other hand virtue will be exercised to make ‘friends' goods 
common goods,’ as the Proverb 3 goes, for the purpose of use… for individuals while owning 
their property privately put their own possessions at the service of their friends and make use of 
their friends' possessions as common property…It is clear therefore that it is better for 
possessions to be privately owned, but to make them common property in use; and to train the 
citizens to this is the special task of the legislator.343 
Therefore, Aristotle maintained that the common good could be maintained with 
the legal creation of private property, with the intention that private property owners 
will, in turn, share their property with others as common property, which will create an 
altruistic society. 
Metaphorically, the process of applying for a patent ensures that an object has an objective social 
utility-it must be <<useful>> - and the patent register objectifies the object or process that it is 
the subject-matter of the monopoly. In short, a patent is an object of social wealth which can be 
the subject of a general duty in rem on the part of non-holders not to interfere, and thus, can be 
safely considered to be an object of property in the analytic sense.”344 
 
If the social bargain no longer favours society, then society has every right to 
remove or alter that social construction. In UK case law, Lord Hoffman elaborated in 
Kirin-Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel
345
 on the primary object of the state in granting 
a monopoly: 
                                               
342 Alexander, G. “Property as Propriety” in Nebraska Law Review. Vol. 77, 1998 at 668. 
343Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944 at 1263a. 
344 Lametti, D. “The Concept and Conceptions of Intellectual Property as Seen Through The Lens of 
Property” in Science and Law in the Prism of Comparative Law. G. Comandé, G. Ponzanelli (eds.). 
Torino: Giappichelli, 2004 at 276. 
345 Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46 (21 October 2004). The case was 
between Amgen and Transkaryotic Therapeutics (TKT) regarding the scope of Amgen’s patent to their 
method of producing erythropoietin (EPO). The issue was whether TKT’s process violated Amgen’s 
patent since it made use of the same gene, or whether TKT’s process was a new way of producing the 
same protein which does not violate Amgen’s patent. Lord Hoffman interpreted Amgen’s patent claim as 
being restricted to the original claim, where the use of the DNA sequence to produce EPO  in a host cell, 
which should not include TKT’s different technique.  
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[T]he social contract between the state and the inventor which underlies patent law. The state 
gives the inventor a monopoly in return for an immediate disclosure of all the information 
necessary to enable performance of the invention. That disclosure is not only to enable other 
people to perform the invention after the patent has expired. If that were all, the inventor might 
as well be allowed to keep it secret during the life of the patent. It is also to enable anyone to 
make immediate use of the information for any purpose which does not infringe the claims.346 
The general benefits derived by the public from the disclosure of an invention 
come from being able to use the information during the patent term, provided it is a 
non-infringing use. Lord Hoffman asserted that Amgen’s patent should not block others 
from using basic information about the DNA sequence to invent around the patented 
method of creating erythropoietin.
347
 Patent law, then, does not exist as an end in itself, 
but as a means to an end of achieving a function.
348
  This is because the patent system is 
not a natural entity, but a human construction. In other words, patent rights perform a 
social function, and the key concept behind social function is ‘balance.’349 As Manuel 
Desantes notes: 
The patent system should serve a purpose that is not getting a monopoly, but to encourage 
innovation and development. That is why the patent system is a social contract where society 
should win more than the patent holder.350 
 
This means that there are no absolute rights that can be practised in a self-
centred custom without any concern for the effects.
351
 An example of the limits to a 
patent holders’ property right is the existence of research exceptions in Europe. In the 
US, march-in rights apply to federally funded research, where any patented products or 
processes are required to be licensed. However, march-in rights do not apply to 
privately funded institutions. These limits are put in place by the state because as part of 
the social bargain of patents, there is an expectation on behalf of society that a patent 
holder must make use of the patent productively. In granting a property right to an 
                                               
346 Ibid at 77. 
347 Erythropoietin (epo) is a hormone that regulates red blood cell production. 
348 Geiger, C. “‘Constitutionalising’ Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on 
Intellectual Property in the European Union” in International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law. Vol. 37, No.4, 2006 at 375. 
349 See supra note 332, Geiger, C. at 157. 
350Desantes, Manuel. “Past, present and future of patent protection and patent litigation in Europe.” 
European Patent Convention Course.  London, Queen Mary University of London. Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies. March 18, 2014. Lecture. 
351 See supra note 332, Geiger, C. at 158. 
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object of social wealth to an entity to the exclusion of others, there is a societal 
expectation that the resource is used in an acceptable way - or else governance tools like 
compulsory licenses or revocation of the patent can be justified. As a result of these 
levers that are built into the patent system,
352
 it can be maintained that the patent system 
is suitable in its current state and can continue to justify the grant of patents on 
inventions derived from human genetic materials, and that they are necessary in 
providing incentives for the creation of technology. 
It is worth mentioning that good patents are meant to be a barrier.
353
 As a part of 
the social bargain, the patent holder has a right to be compensated and rewarded for 
granting permission to others to use their product or process. It is important to note that 
the object of property in a patent is what is defined in the patent application’s claim and 
description-nothing more and nothing less. The perception that some institutions hold a 
monopoly right to genetic information raises concerns, particularly with regards to the 
potential consequences for further innovation.
354
 If someone obtains a patent, it does not 
mean that individual ‘owns’ the claimed gene sequence or protein. What the patent 
holder ‘owns’ are the commercial activities surrounding the biological material such as 
using it to develop a genetic testing kit or therapy, or licensing it to other companies. 
Other parties may look at it or do research with it, but they cannot commercialize it 
unless they pay the patent holder.  
                                               
352 See supra note 4, Burk & Lemley. 
353 Jacob, R. “IP Law: Keep Calm and Carry On?” in Current Legal Problems. Vol. 66, 2013 at 398.  
354 Stiglitz, J. “How Intellectual Property Reinforces Inequality” in New York Times. July 14, 2013. 
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/how-intellectual-property-reinforces-inequality/. Accessed 
January 3, 2014. Likewise, a Marxist approach to patents is that they are intrinsically flawed and have no 
place in a socialist system. There are three main arguments against capitalist patent systems: (i) they stifle 
the talents of the masses because workers are disinclined to invent when their labours only enrich the 
capitalists, (ii) they repeatedly hinder the use of the most sophisticated technologies because the 
capitalists conspire to engineer markets and (iii) they cultivate industrial secrecy which obstructs the flow 
of significant technical knowledge because patent owners try to reduce the distribution of useful 
information pertaining to their inventions. Martens, J. Secret Patenting in the U.S.S.R. and Russia. Sante 
Fe: Deep North Press, 2010 at 32.   
100 
 
3.5.3. Accommodating human genetic inventions within patent law 
The patent system has struggled to keep up with the pace of developments in 
biotechnology, yet the policy of choice in biotechnology rich countries is a pro-patent, 
“open doors” approach. This practice has recently been subject to legal evaluation both 
in Europe and the US, in which there has been a narrowing in the scope of patentable 
subject matter for biological materials. Court decisions challenging the patentability of 
human biological materials per se have been accompanied by patent offices issuing 
statements directing their patent examiners not to grant patents for certain subject 
matter. For instance, a day after the Myriad decision
 355
  the USPTO issued a 
memorandum explicitly stating that naturally occurring nucleic acids are not patent-
eligible merely because they have been isolated. “Examiners should now reject product 
claims drawn solely to naturally occurring nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether 
isolated or not, as being ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.”356 This 
decision may seem to signify a change in approach towards patenting genetic matter, 
and commentators have pointed out that the decision is a significant departure from US 
patent practice over the past thirty years since a genetically modified oil-eating 
bacterium was held to be eligible subject matter for patenting in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.
357
 
A number of commentators propose that patent law should be changed to take 
into consideration the particular needs of the biotech industry. Some scholars suggest 
that genetic material is exceptionally more complex than any mechanical apparatus and 
this should be reflected in patent policy.
358
 Another position is that patents on human 
                                               
355 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013) 
356 Commissioner for Patents, USPTO. Memorandum: Supreme Court Decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.  June 13, 2013. 
357 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
358 See Keller, E. Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors and 
Machines. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003; Dutfield, G. “DNA patenting: implications for 
public health research”, in Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Vol. 84, Iss. 5, pp. 388-392, 2006. 
Meanwhile, Nobel laureate John Sulston notes: “We are right at the beginning, not the end; we don’t 
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genetic materials are inappropriate
359
, while others dispute the types of inventions that 
should be protected.
360
 Others contend that genes should be protected under a sui 
generis system.
361
 Some suggest that the non-obviousness standard should be higher,
362
 
or that the scope of DNA sequence patents should be limited.
363
 
In considering the elements of the social contract of the patent system, one must 
be willing to evaluate the social consequences of restricting the use of human genes by 
granting gene patents. James Watson notes that there are social consequences of 
restricting the use of human genes. Emphasizing the informational nature of human 
genes, Watson explains that they can reveal information that can be important in life-or-
death situations:  
The information contained in our genes lets us predict our future. With a gene sequence in hand, 
we can know with some degree of certainty whether we will develop cancer, a neurological 
disease, or some other malady. This information should not be monopolized by any one 
individual, company, or government.
364
 
 
Watson argues that patents for human genes are not necessary in incentivizing 
scientists to continue research and develop biotechnology inventions. Rather, the area 
                                                                                                                                         
know what most of the genes look like, or when or where they’re expressed. The genome alone doesn’t 
tell you any of these things. Nevertheless, the information is there as a resource and a toolkit to which 
people will come back again and again as they build up knowledge of the complete structure of the body 
from the foundation.” Sulston, J. and G. Ferry. The Common Thread: Science, Politics, Ethics and the 
Human Genome. Great Britain: Bantam Press, 2003 at 287-288. 
359 See Gallini, N. “The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform” in Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 121-154. Spring 2002.  
360 For a general overview, see: OECD. Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing 
Practices, Report of a Workshop Organized by the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology, at 11. 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf. Accessed February 5, 2012; see Burk, D. “Patenting 
Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective” in Houston  Law  Review. Vol. 30, pp. 1650-
68, 1993-1994. Burk argues that the benefits from patenting transgenic human embryos are dubious and 
may not be overcome by the benefits of the incentive. “Offering such a costly incentive in areas where it 
is unclear that society wishes to encourage activity is a strategy guaranteed to maximize the probability 
that the societal benefit from the patent will never exceed its costs.” (1659) 
361 For discussion, see Palombi, L. Gene Cartels: Biotech Patents in the Age of Free Trade. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2009 and Litman, M. “The Legal Status of Genetic Material” in B. 
Knoppers et al (eds.) Human DNA: Law and Policy: International and Comparative Perspectives. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997 at 27. 
362 See Dastgheib-Vinarov, S. “Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical 
Research from the Big Chill” in Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review. Vol.4, 2000 at 157-158 
(advancing that the court should raise the non-obviousness standard to bring stability to biotechnology). 
363 See Wilson, J.  “Patenting Organisms: Intellectual Property Law Meets Biology,” in D. Magnus,  A. 
Caplan & G. McGee (Eds). Who Owns Life? New York: Prometheus Books, 2002 at 42. Wilson 
advances narrow process claims and few product claims to prevent ‘blocking’ future innovations. 
364 Brief of James D. Watson as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party. The Association of 
Molecular Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., No. 12-398, 2013 at 14. 
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which requires patent protection are the technologies that use human genes, which is 
why he argues human genes should be accessible to as many researchers.
365
 However, 
the financial realities in the biotechnology sector must also be taken into consideration 
in asking whether patents are necessary for human genetic materials. 
3.6. The Biotechnology Industry and Innovation 
 A law-and-economics analysis of intellectual property rights has been the 
dominant approach since its emergence in the 1960s.
366
 It presumes that the legal 
protection of property rights constructs reasons to exploit resources efficiently.
367
 A 
law-and-economics approach to patents is that it promotes investment in R&D by 
granting investors an exclusive right so they can recoup on their costs.
368
 If the investor 
is not able to recover the costs of the invention because the information pertaining to the 
invention was accessible to everyone, then the amount of innovation would be 
substandard.
369
 In inciting a competitive and strong market economy, one is largely 
concerned with the level to which the distribution of resources will fulfil the economic 
wants and needs of society and the extent to which such distribution of resources among 
members of society will produce the greatest level of social good. When resources are 
optimally allocated, individuals who experience gains can do so without making others 
worse off, this is known as ‘Pareto optimality’.370 To attain a Pareto optimal or efficient 
                                               
365 Ibid,  4. 
366 Rahmatian, A. “A fundamental Critique of the Law-and-economics Analysis of Intellectual Property 
Rights” in Dinwoodie, G. Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
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analysis to intellectual property law. 
367 Posner, R.  Economic Analysis of Law 5th edition. New York: Aspen Law and Business. 1998 at 36. 
368 Sir Robin Jacob writes: “Patents for inventions and the knowledge they can be obtained and relied 
upon to protect the investment and research that went into making and developing them have been really 
important drivers from the beginning of the industrial revolution to now.” See Jacob, R. “IP Law: Keep 
Calm and Carry On?” in Current Legal Problems. Vol. 66, 2013 at 393. 
369 Dam, K. “The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law” in The Journal of Legal Studies. Vol. 23, No. 
1, pp.247-271. 1994. 
370 Samuelson, P. and W. Nordhaus. Economics. London: McGraw-Hill, 1989 at 548. Cooter, R. and T. 
Ulen. Law & Economics. Boston: Pearson Educational International, 2003. Pp.16-17. As a result of the 
existence of public goods and the consequential free-riding that can occur, Pareto optimality is extremely 
difficult to attain, and a slightly less demanding alternative is the ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ efficiency model.  
According to this model, society is better off as long as net gains to some part of society exceed the losses 
suffered. See Mercuro, N. & S. Medema. Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism. 
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state, there needs to be a competitive market, a lack of externalities (public goods), and 
private property rights. However, the realization of Pareto efficiency is challenging 
when faced with public goods only regulated by the needs and demands of market 
forces, which could result in free-riding, which is a known externality in the field of 
intellectual property goods.
371As Harold Demsetz remarks: “A primary function of 
property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
externalities.”372  He provides the example of land ownership, which, if land is held in 
common, will result in great externalities because each individual user of the land will 
not experience the entire impact of the land use. If hunting on the same area, there is the 
tendency to overhunt because there is no incentive to preserve the supply of game since 
the advantage of one person doing so cannot control whether others do the same. 
Therefore, the land will most likely be overhunted. The effects of the land and the 
supply of game will be felt by subsequent generations.  The solution is private 
ownership, which will: 
Internalize many of the external costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, 
by virtue of his power to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associated 
                                                                                                                                         
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Pp18-22.Both the Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency principles are indebted to the utilitarian theory, which developed from its two largest 
contributors, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Jeremy Bentham developed the "greatest happiness 
principle", or the principle of utility, stating that happiness equated to a prevalence of pleasure over pain:  
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It 
is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On 
the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are 
fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. 
See Bentham, Jeremy. Theory of Legislation: Being Principes de legislation, and Traites de legislation, 
civele et penale. Volume 1. London: Humphrey Milford, 1914.Chapter 1, p3. 
Likewise, Mill’s utilitarian theory justifies property rights because it can help maximize human 
happiness. Social utility theory maintains that society benefits from supporting individuals to take 
unexploited resources and develop them for a more competent function. Since the protection of property 
interests augments social well-being, individual claims to the created product needs to be protected.  The 
theory also justifies a temporal monopoly awarded to inventors through the patent system. The benefit to 
society of obtaining scientific and technical advances justifies limiting property rights to inventions 
because complete ownership of inventions will be in direct conflict with society’s well-being. If property 
interests do not promote the common good, then they are not protectable. See Mill, John Stuart. 
Utilitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906. 
371 Externalities refers to situations when the effect of production or consumption of goods and services 
imposes costs or benefits on others which are not reflected in the prices charged for the goods and 
services being provided. OECD Glossary. 
372 Demsetz, Harold. ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” in The American Economic Review. Vol. 57, 
No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association. May 1967 at 348. 
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with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land. This concentration of benefits 
and costs on owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.373 
 
In addressing intellectual property rights specifically, Demsetz writes:  
Consider the problems of copyrights and patents. If a new idea is freely appropriable by all, if 
there exist communal rights to new ideas, incentives for developing such ideas will be lacking. 
The benefits derivable from these ideas will not be concentrated on their originators. If we 
extend some degree of private rights to the originators, these ideas will come forth at a more 
rapid pace.374 
 
Thus, according to Demsetz, intellectual property protection is a mark of state 
intervention to correct market failure, which is to internalise the externalities brought up 
by the public goods experience.
375
 This is perceived to be one of the most competent 
measures to acquire valuable development at the smallest cost.
376
 Intellectual property 
protection then is required to promote innovative activities and the production and 
dissemination of valuable knowledge.  
3.6.1. Public goods   
Even though the patent system imposes a structure of scarcity, a patented 
invention is a ‘public good’ because the protected knowledge cannot be exhausted by 
                                               
373 Ibid, 356. 
374 Ibid, 359. 
375 Mark Lemley challenges Demsetz’s treating of intellectual property as ‘real property,’ and acting to 
internalise negative externalities such as free-riding.  Lemley embraces the idea that ‘intellectual 
property’ as it exists and is understood today is fundamentally flawed, and subsequently the rhetoric of 
‘free-riding’ in intellectual property is misguided. He argued that intellectual property should be limited 
to the extent that creators and inventors were sufficiently compensated to return a fair return on their 
initial investment.  Lemley also attacked the notion that intellectual property existed to prevent free riding 
and combat the tragedy of the commons by highlighting the non-rivalrous nature of ideas, which cannot 
be used up. Lemley asserted that free riding was likely to occur in information goods, but this was not a 
problem because the use of ideas did not harm the originator of those ideas.  In fact, he maintains that the 
entire purpose of intellectual property was to disseminate ideas that would have been held in secret. See 
Lemley, Mark. “Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property” in UC Berkeley Public 
Law Research Paper No. 144. 2004. 
376 Supporters of this view include: Landes, W.M. and R.A. Posner. The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003 at 332 and F-K Beier & J Strauss, The Patent 
System and its Information Function-Yesterday and Today in International Review of Industrial Property 
and Copyright, Vol. 8, 1977 at 391. However, there is some scepticism regarding the part performed by 
the intellectual property system in contributing to industrial progress: See Machlup, Fritz. An Economic 
Review of the Patent System.65th Congress 2d Session. United States Printing Office Washington: 1958. 
After an intense economic review of the patent system commissioned by the United States Congress, 
Machlup determined that: “[I]f we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on our present 
knowledge of the economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent 
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend 
abolishing it.” (80) Thus, despite some shortcomings, the patent system should not be abolished on the 
basis that dismantling it would be too costly.  
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use.
377
 Protected knowledge is different from tangible property because knowledge is 
inexhaustible which is why information is classified as a ‘public good.’378A public good 
possesses two qualities: non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability. First, the 
subject matter of intellectual property, comprised of ideas, is non-rivalrous because an 
individual’s use of the good does not leave behind less for others to use.379 In fact, the 
more people use it, the more valuable it becomes, and restricting its use would actually 
be wasteful.
380
 Second, a public good is non-excludable since the use of it by one 
individual does not restrict another’s use of it.381 Since knowledge and information are 
non-excludable and the reproduction costs are almost zero, access is restricted through 
the use of patents, which creates a temporary monopoly with which the inventor can 
exclude others from the protected information/knowledge. However, intellectual 
property’s non-excludable nature raises the issue of free riding because once the 
knowledge is divulged in the public realm, it can be freely copied by others. 
3.6.2. The Issue of Free-riding  
Public goods may encounter a “free-rider”382 problem because in a market where 
non-excludability and non-rivalry can exist, people can access and copy the good 
without paying for it.
383
 It is argued that free-riding can negatively affect future 
                                               
377 Samuelson defines a public good as:  “[goods] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
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of that good...” in Samuelson, Paul A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" in Review of Economics 
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innovation because companies are less likely to invest resources in creating new 
products if they know that competing entities can easily recreate the product at a much 
lower cost since they do not have to bear the original cost of creating it the first time 
around.
384
 Competitors ultimately decrease the cost of the product since they expend 
fewer resources on developing the product. As a result, the original creator of the 
product is less likely to recoup the original costs of development if competitors are 
allowed to copy and reproduce the product. 
Intellectual property law is justified economically to prevent free-riding and 
ensure that creators and inventors are able to sufficiently profit in the marketplace and 
recover their total costs. This rationale is the underlying justification for the protection 
of intellectual property. The power to exclude is an essential feature of intellectual 
property rights, as it provides the incentive to invest time and resources in R&D. If 
creators of the intellectual property cannot recoup their initial costs, then would-be 
investors may be discouraged from investing. Economists Mazzoleni and Nelson note 
the benefits of patent protection:  
The collection of small and medium sized firms in the American biotechnology industry is, of 
course, a striking example of enterprises that would not have come into existence without the 
prospect of a patent, and which depend on patent protection to make their profits, and to attract 
capital.
385
 
 
A strong claim for patents is that free-riding can easily occur in the 
biotechnology field, particularly within the drug industry, where drug companies can 
reverse-engineer molecules to develop bioequivalent versions of a patented drug and 
sell them at a lower rate compared to the patented drug.
386
 However, the intellectual 
property system should not over-compensate the creators and inventors by granting 
                                               
384 See supra note 201, Landes & Posner at 16. 
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the Current Debate” in Research Policy.Vol.27, 1998 at 275-276. 
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them absolute property rights.
387
 This is particularly true of genomic patents, which 
seek to acquire protection for naturally occurring substances. There is concern that the 
patenting of biological research tools may obstruct further biotechnological 
development: 
[P]rotection has gone overboard insofar as it allows those persons who have isolated the BRCA 
gene for breast cancer to patent not only its use outside the body, but to prevent persons from 
receiving treatment of their own genetic disorders without the approval of the gene patent holder. 
That protection is too broad. Gene patents should be limited to those substances that are in a 
commercialized test tube, not those that remained locked in a cell.388 
 
Although patents can be a positive social tool as an incentivizing mechanism for 
the creation and development of socially desirable goods, there is also the cost of lack of 
access to patentable knowledge that forms the basic foundational unit from which to 
further technological advances. Products of biotechnology have the potential to benefit 
society, but this can only be actualized when resources are allocated in a way that 
maximizes wealth while minimizing transaction costs and waste. For example, if 
numerous individual patented gene fragments are required for developing a further 
product, the transaction costs of accumulating the necessary genetic material needed to 
create another manufacture are significant.
389
 The social value of property rights could 
be insignificant if the costs of enforcement or appropriation are greater than the value of 
the right itself.  This line of reasoning can lead to the rationale that for policy reasons, 
some intellectual property rights should be ‘depropertized’ and some forms of property 
should be accessible for widespread use rather than owned. 
                                               
387 Lemley, M. “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,” in Texas Law Review. Vol. 83, 2005. 
Lemley acknowledges that free riding occurs in information goods, but he does not perceive it as a 
negative thing. He maintains that as valuable information spreads, others are able to copy it and 
exponentially increase available resources, which enables more people to enjoy it. As long as inventors 
and creators are able to recoup on their average fixed costs, Lemley asserts that there is no economic 
justification for absolute intellectual property rights. “Granting intellectual property rights impose a 
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provide incentives to create. The economics of intellectual property simply do not justify the elimination 
of free riding.” (1065) 
388 Epstein, R “The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property” in Regulation. Vol. 30, No. 4, 
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3.6.3. IP and Innovation 
 Joseph Schumpeter distinguishes innovation from invention,
390
 observing that an 
invention itself has “no economically relevant effect at all.”391 On the contrary, 
innovation is an economic process between the invention of a product or process and 
bringing it to market.
392
 Schumpeter argued that a patent monopoly encourages 
innovation better than competition, basing his argument on the fact that economic 
developments are usually attributed to large monopolistic entities rather than to firms in 
disparate competitive industries.
393
 Similarly to Kitch, Schumpeter maintained that the 
protection afforded by the patent granted the firms the necessary time and space to 
create further developments. This ‘prospect’ of exceptional reimbursements allows 
innovators to generate investment.
394
 This means that a monopoly acquired through 
patent protection could intensify the use of an invention by expediting its launch into 
the market. As a result, he held that patent monopolies were necessary to promote 
investment in innovation rather than inventions. In this scenario, an existing patent 
continues to incentivize after it has been granted, due to investment in its continual 
development during the course of the patent term. Ko maintains that Schumpeter’s idea 
that patent monopoly exceeds competition in stimulating innovation is sustained in the 
field of biotechnology, pointing to the ability of small biotechnology start-up firms with 
patents that provide them with a monopoly over significant products or processes and 
allow them to overtake larger pharmaceutical companies.
395
 
 Although Schumpeter advances a broad scope of patent protection, he offers 
minimal assistance in how to determine the appropriate scope of the claim, only stating 
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that the scope should consider the cost and difficulty of the innovation.
396
 Despite the 
prevalence of the law-and economics theory, the fact that economists are still unable to 
resolve the question of whether activity incentivized by the patent system improves or 
reduces social welfare suggests that an economic understanding of intellectual property 
law is insufficient.
397
  
3.6.4. The nature of innovation in biotechnology  
It is submitted that the particular characteristics of the biotechnology industry 
render patent protection necessary. The product development timeframe in 
biotechnology is extremely long and costly. Delays in bringing a product to market is 
partly because of the regulatory approval process over the safety of new products and 
processes pertaining to health.
 398
 As a result of the high degree of investment required 
for biotechnology R&D, a dependable and strong patent system and steadfast case law 
is necessary for biotech inventions. For instance, Sir Robin Jacob maintains that 
companies would not spend 20 percent of their income on R&D without the security of 
property provided by a patent. 
399
 This argument is also reflected in interviews with 
biotechnology industry stakeholders.
400
 
It is also suggested that patent protection may be necessary not only to spur 
investment in R&D, but it allows an inventor to appropriate on the returns from the 
                                               
396 Ibid.. 
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invention.
401
 The nature of DNA patents is that once a sequence is discovered, it can be 
readily copied. For example, the laborious effort required to produce a cDNA sequence 
that codes for a protein lies in identifying and isolating the correct sequence. Once the 
sequence is discovered, it is easily replicable. Patent law provides protection to the 
inventor to recoup on the costs of R&D.   
Another characteristic associated with innovation in biotechnology is that there 
is significant uncertainty in research because biotechnology products come from living 
systems and are characteristically anticipated to interact with other living systems.
402
  
These interactions are complex and as a result, the functionality of biotechnology 
products is not completely predictable and “always involves a high degree of 
uncertainty and risk.”403 Consistent with these characteristics, the existence of several 
functional equivalents to a certain DNA sequence means that patent protection needs to 
be broad enough to exclude easy design-arounds.
404
  
As a result, the entire process of innovation in biotechnology, involves not only 
the research aspect, but also the development stage, which is time-consuming, costly 
and carries potential risks, which is why patent protection may be necessary to bring 
products to market.  Due to the extensive development and testing lead time required for 
DNA-related innovation, the production of the product, and obtaining regulatory 
approval.  
                                               
401 See 3.7 for a discussion on the ‘reward-by-monopoly’ theory for patents. 
402 A controversial question in biotechnology pertaining to intellectual property rights is how much 
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3.6.5. Why biotechnology needs patents 
In the biotech industry, the value of knowledge is high. It is not the end product 
itself that is expensive to produce, but attaining the knowledge of a gene on a 
chromosome and the various mutations that can reveal whether one is susceptible to a 
disease. The number of hours in the laboratory finding that gene and sequencing it, and 
then developing a diagnostic kit to test for a gene that is related to a disease.  Thus, it is 
necessary for products of biotechnology to have at least limited property rights in 
response to modern biological and economic actualities. Remigius Nwabueze observed 
the law should reflect the knowledge-based global economy: 
[T]here seems to be no reason in principle why the flexible qualities of property should not be 
applicable to commercially or medically valuable information; such pieces of information can be 
transferred for value and thus possess an essential characteristic of property rights...genetic 
information is a legally protectable property because it shares some of the characteristics of 
property and scales through the justificatory theories of property.405 
New forms of technology bring about change in the form of property, which 
may result in a new conception of property that reflects societal expectations and needs. 
The current debate about gene patenting reveals society’s expectation that a section of 
the public expects that the human body, or any component of it, should be subject to 
commercial interests, and that products of biotechnology will be beneficial to society. 
Thus, granting a legal property right to the human body and its components protects one 
of society’s expectations.  
Economic considerations also justify the need for the patentability of 
biotechnological inventions and shed light on appropriate patent scope. Intellectual 
property provides the necessary incentives to encourage investment in research and 
development that will ultimately benefit society. It emphasizes that society benefits 
from offering protection for useful ideas as they provide incentives and encourage 
progress. This position also maintains that intellectual property protection is necessary 
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in protecting stakeholder interests, and acting as a reward to inventors and authors for 
their contribution. This approach is reflected in modern day legal instruments, such as 
the US Constitution, which states that the purpose of intellectual property rights is to 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts.”406 However, there are contentions 
between scholars about whether protection should be granted, and if so, how much. 
Defenders of gene patents in biotechnology maintain that patents are necessary 
as they encourage incentives for innovations by attracting investors: “I think it’s 
unfortunate that we create fictions in the law about why we file patents. It doesn’t 
encourage invention, not in biotech, certainly. But it does encourage investment.”407 
Joseph Straus notes that patents are not only attractive to investors, but also to the 
scientists and technicians who are the actual inventors: 
I’m sometimes a little bit surprised that people engaged in patenting and the day by day work 
underestimate the attractiveness of patents to scientists and technicians. It would be wrong to say 
that without patents there would be no inventions. But I think many things are invented because 
we do have patents. And not only the investment after the invention is incentivized by that, but 
also the invention itself.
408
 
 
In the field of biotechnology, the business model and realities of investment in 
R&D make the patent system necessary as insurance that there is the possibility of 
recouping on a major investment.
409
  As a result, other interests are denied protection as 
property. Therefore, the ways in which property rights are defined and allocated 
determine which interests are protected. One criticism of the system is that it can be 
argued that patent law represents the interests of businesses, corporations and other 
central investors in potential inventions. For instance, in Monsanto Canada Inc. v 
                                               
406US Constitution, Article 1, s.8, cl.8.  
407Rowland, B. “Discussion: Session 1” in Vogel, F. and R. Grunwald (Eds.). Patenting of Genes and 
Living Organisms. New York: Springer, 1994 at 38. 
408 Straus, J. “Discussion: Session 1” in Vogel, F. and R. Grunwald (Eds.). Patenting of Genes and Living 
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409 However, the recent Max Planck Declaration on Patent Protection stipulates that the patent system is 
not a defensive mechanism to exclude other research and development outcomes, but is used as an 
offensive tactic to “influence the conditions of competition.” The report, however, does not further 
discuss what these conditions of competition (i.e. patent trolling, licensing). A further elaboration on how 
patents are used as a strategic asset would have been beneficial. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition. Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS. 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/patentdeclaration.cfm. Accessed on April 15, 2014 at 2. 
113 
 
Schmeiser,
410
 the Canadian Supreme Court decided whether a genetically modified gene 
in a canola seed was eligible for patent protection.
411
 There was a possible collision 
between Monsanto’s intellectual property rights and Schmeiser’s own property rights as 
a farmer over his canola seeds. It was submitted that the Canadian Supreme Court 
decided the issue was one of intellectual property protection instead of Schmeiser’s 
property rights over his canola seeds, reflecting the importance attached to upholding 
intellectual property rights, particularly with respect to maintaining an friendly 
environment for continued investment in biotechnology in safeguarding business 
interests. The majority held that Schmeiser’s ownership of his seeds was not a valid 
argument against an infringement of Monsanto’s patent right.412 This approach allowed 
the court to dissolve the issue of personal rights over property and intellectual property 
rights.
413
 
The fusion of these two questions is analogous to the decision adopted by the 
Californian Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.
414
 
The court opted to focus on intellectual property right protection, whilst diminishing 
potential property rights over genetic materials. The majority established that Moore 
had no property rights to his discarded body parts or the commercial gains derived from 
them. The court held that once an individual’s cells are removed from one’s body, there 
                                               
410Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34.Monsanto Canada Inc. was 
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is no longer any legally protected property interest in the removed cells. The court was 
unwilling to acknowledge a protected property interest in the genetic information 
enclosed in Moore’s excised cells, explaining that Moore did not intend to preserve his 
excised cells after the splenectomy. In effect, the court relied on the fact that Moore was 
deficient in one property right - the right to possess one’s cells after their removal-to 
circumvent the realization of a property right possessed by Moore to his genetic 
material encoded in his cells. Although it was determined that Moore did not possess a 
property interest in his spleen, he had a cause of action for lack of informed consent. 
The court recognized that Moore had a “limited right to control the use of excised 
cells,”415 maintaining that Dr.Golde had a duty under the doctrine of informed consent 
to make known his underlying interests in the excised cells to Moore before he 
recommended the splenectomy. However, in holding that Moore possessed a cause of 
action for lack of informed consent, the Court actually established that Moore had a 
property interest in the information encoded in his DNA. 
As demonstrated above, state power defines and allocates property rights to 
society and in turn, property rights allocate power and vulnerability. In the present 
system, it gives investors in inventions a property right, whilst denying individuals a 
property right in their own bodily materials. The two cases above illustrate the fact that 
there is an emphasis by the courts in upholding patents to naturally occurring living 
organisms to continue to provide incentives for innovation in biotechnology.  This 
argument is part of the law-and-economic analysis of patent rights and intellectual 
property in general. 
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3.6.6. Arguments for granting broad gene patents  
One convincing argument for granting broad patents is from Edmund Kitch’s 
prospect theory of patent law.
416
  Kitch argues that a patent right provides the chance to 
develop a recognized technical possibility; this is a ‘prospect’ with related possibilities 
of costs and returns.
417
 “By a prospect I mean a particular opportunity to develop a 
known technological possibility.”418 Kitch argues that patents perform a function in the 
market by internalizing the costs and benefits and serving as the exclusive right to 
exploit a resource. He draws an analogy between awarding exclusive mineral claims in 
America and patents. Like mineral claims, which grant property rights to those who 
discover new and valuable minerals, which in turn encourages landowners to develop 
the land efficiently, patent owners are also offered the chance to further exploit their 
inventions through commercialization. Kitch maintains that patent rights provide the 
patent owner with exclusive rights over auxiliary exploitation of the invention like 
improvements which are essential: 
[A] patent “prospect” increases the efficiency with which investment can be managed…[T]he 
patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without 
fear that the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by 
competitors. This is important only if the development of patented inventions generally requires 
significant investments that lead to unpatented information a competitor can appropriate...In the 
case of many patents, extensive development is required before any commercial application is 
possible…The investments may be required simply to apply existing technology to the 
manufacture and design of the product and be so mechanical in their application as to be 
unpatentable.
419
 
 
 Kitch’s prospect theory maintains that the patent scope should not be limited to 
the invention that is described in the patent claim, but should also encompass further 
changes as well. This means that if the patent holder’s competitors’ research yields 
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improved adaptations of the patented invention, those versions will still fall under the 
jurisdiction of the patent owner until the patent elapses.
420
  
Another rationale for granting broad patents to pioneer inventions is Kitch’s 
articulation of coordinated developments.
421
 Kitch clarified that patents should be broad 
because the information contained in the patent claim is not exhausted by use; thus, 
providing a property right to the invention advances the efficiency in which the 
resources are managed.
422
 It is believed that if a patent owner holds an exclusive right to 
commercially exploit and enhance the technology as stated in the patent claims, then 
others will not invest in advancing this technology without seeking a licensing 
agreement with the patent holder.
423
 As a result, the patent owner can compel their 
competitors to share their information and avoid similar research efforts and a waste of 
resources.
424
  
A third justification for broad patents connects to the issues that can emerge 
when overly narrow patents are methodologically granted.
425
 If too many narrow patents 
are granted in a particular field to multiple entities who are also likely to be competitors 
with one another, it could lead to an area that is overly fragmented, requiring 
competitors to coordinate their efforts to develop any practical product or process 
without the occurrence of infringement.
426
  
3.6.7. Potential risks of broad patents  
Critics of the prospect theory question whether the grant of a broad patent, 
particularly for ‘pioneering inventions’, can induce further development and innovation. 
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For instance, Merges and Nelson argue that there is more technical change when there is 
greater competition between groups vying to invent a product than in an environment 
where few groups dominate a monopoly and control developments. Merges and Nelson 
differ from Kitch’s prospect theory in holding that patent scope should not be of 
‘unduly wide scope.’427 Due to the nature of biotechnology technologies, it is essential 
that patents do not act as a hurdle towards further research. They argue that overly broad 
patents have stifled the pace of development in the science-based industries, particularly 
in the field of biotechnology.
428
 For instance, they disapprove of Genentech’s patent for 
the recombinant DNA technique developed by Cohen and Boyer, asserting that they 
“simply were the first to practice techniques that persons ‘skilled in the art’ knew could 
be made to work.”429 Whilst the authors recognize that Cohen and Boyer made a clear 
contribution to gene expression techniques, they hold that the breadth of the patent 
scope raises problems.  
Holders of broad patents would be operating as tollkeepers, not coordinators, and the subsequent 
development of prospects would proceed in spite of, or at least in indifference to, the broad 
patent. Nevertheless, if a broad prospect patent is granted and upheld, we would much rather see 
the patent holder widely granting licenses than trying to develop the prospect herself.
430
  
 
Merges and Nelson’s general conclusion is that they would prefer multiple 
competitive sources of invention rather than a few. They argue that patent law should 
promote inventive rivalry rather than obstruct it, and warn against the social danger of 
permitting the advancement of a technology to be under the dominion of a single or a 
few entities.
431
 It is reasonable to believe that a broad patent, or the expectation on the 
part of potential inventors that they will be granted one may in the beginning encourage 
more inventive attempts compared to if the expectation for a patent was strictly pared 
down to the actual realization. However, when a patent is granted, the scope of the 
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patent weakens incentives for others, compared to a patent whose claims are reduced to 
the actual accomplishment.
432
  
One justification for restricting patent scope to what is actually a contribution to 
the art is that it brings into line patent incentives with the objectives they are meant to 
promote. 
433
 An operative patent system “should effectively and promptly mete out 
incentives that foster innovations that fill those gaps. To do so: the patent system needs 
to accurately assess the contours of the state of the art and the contributions made by 
alleged innovations.”434 This entails a legal grasp of innovation that is on par with the 
actual technological landscape. When overly-broad or overly-narrow patents are 
systematically granted, a chasm between the legal interpretation and technological 
actuality can ensue, which can diminish the efficacy of patent law in promoting 
technological innovation. 
Exceedingly broad patents can excessively credit innovations that have not yet 
been invented. As a result, this could dis-incentivize prospective innovative activities 
because when an invention is ultimately produced, there is no patent. Moreover, overly 
broad patents can incite wasteful patent races and inspire precarious research.
435
 For 
instance, Tim Hubbard and James Hubbard note that higher incentives brought about 
from increased levels of patent protection have actually resulted in promoting R&D of 
‘diminishing returns.’436 Thus, the emphasis on patenting in biotechnology may be 
indicative of excessive incentives created by very broad patents. 
 A counterargument to Merges and Nelson’s argument for restricting broad 
patents is that biotechnology requires substantial investment. Hence, a broad patent is 
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necessary to carve out an area so patent holders can continue to develop and expand 
upon the claimed invention to recoup on their investment. This line of argument is 
consistent with Kitch’s ‘prospect’ theory which favours broad patent scope for 
inventions to allocate the coordination of ensuing research.
437
 
 A broad “upstream” patent does not automatically mean that it will deter 
downstream research from being conducted. For instance, Human Genome Science’s 
(HGS) broad patent on Neutrokine-a did not deter its competitors from researching and 
finding major benefits within the broad claim.
438
 In HGS v. Eli Lilly,
439
 Lilly argued that 
HGS’ identification of the neutrokine-a polypeptide as a member of the TNF ligand 
family and description of its activities and uses was not supported by data obtained from 
in vitro or in vivo studies. Rather, the description was based on knowledge known about 
other members of the TNF superfamily. Lilly maintained that the patent should be 
revoked on the basis that the claims were a speculative prediction and the scope of 
protection exceeded what HGS actually contributed to the state of the art. However, 
Kitchin J at first instance noted that despite HGS’ broad patent, it did not stop research 
from being conducted, specifically highlighting the efforts and results of Biogen and 
Lilly.
440
  
Biogen conducted a range of studies to try and find where the protein was expressed, where its 
receptors were expressed and how the two interacted to produce a biological response. Again, 
this was a precursor to the research necessary to begin to find a diagnostic or therapeutic 
application…Lilly workers also tried to develop assays but, without any idea of the function of 
the protein, they could not determine the reason for their failure to identify activity. It was only 
in 1999 and with the benefit of their work with transgenic animals and having read the Moore 
paper that they appreciated that Neutrokine-a induced B cell proliferation and was a potentially 
important therapeutic target. Ultimately they developed a lead candidate relatively quickly but 
they did so by using the Medarex mice, which was seen as a powerful technology and one which 
was not established to be generally available to anyone who was prepared to pay for it.441  
                                               
437 See 3.6.6. 
438 HGS was granted European Patent (UK) 0,939,804 claiming Neutrokine-a, a novel member of the 
TNF ligand superfamily of cytokines, consisting of the encoding nucleotide and the amino acid sequence. 
439 Human Genome Sciences Inc v Eli Lilly and Company [2011] UKSC 51 
440 Eli Lilly & Company v Human Genome Sciences Inc [2008] EWHC 1903 (Pat), Para. 142-168. 
441 Ibid, Para. 258. 
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Moreover, Lilly spent about $50 million acquiring a monoclonal antibody to 
Neutrokine-a and intended to spend another $250 million for clinical trials.
442
 
Therefore, despite HGS’ patent claims on Neutrokine-a, it did not deter one of its 
competitors from conducting downstream research and finding a lead antibody within 
the broad claim. 
Another illustration where broad patents do not necessarily inhibit downstream 
research is regarding Chiron Corporation’s (Chiron) patents on the Hepatitis C virus. By 
2004, Chiron acquired over 100 patents in 20 countries on the virus and successfully 
sued its infringers.
443
 Although Chiron licensed to its competitors, there were 
complaints that Chiron’s licensing terms delayed research, particularly for smaller 
companies who maintain that they have abandoned research because they could not 
afford Chiron’s licensing fees. While Chiron’s patents may have halted some research 
for smaller companies, it cannot be said that it completely blocked all downstream 
research given that Chiron had licensed its patent to five pharmaceutical companies for 
drug development work.
444
 Moreover, in 2004, Chiron altered its licensing policies to 
allow smaller businesses to conduct research. Under this agreement, companies can 
license Chiron’s patents without having to pay upfront fees. In return, once these 
companies have attained certain targets in their research, they would they have to pay 
steeper royalties for products they bring to market.
445
 The first start up company to 
license Chiron’s patents under the new conditions was Prosetta.446 Therefore, a hold-up 
created by a broad patent tends to be a theoretical construct rather than a real problem, 
as companies can find practical solutions to ensure research is not stifled. 
                                               
442 Ibid, Para. 10. 
443 Storz, U., W. Flasche & J. Driehaus. Intellectual Property Issues: Therapeutics, Vaccines and 
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3.7. Economic justifications of patents 
It may be enlightening to begin this section with a quote from Fritz Machlup: 
If one does not know whether a system ‘as a whole’...is good or bad, the safest ‘policy 
conclusion’ is to ‘muddle through’ - either with it, if one has long lived with it, or without it, if 
one has lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. 
However, since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.447 
 
This statement sheds light on what can be regarded as a lack of clear foundation 
for granting legal protection to objects of IP. For the time being, the dominant 
justification for intellectual property rights is grounded in utilitarian theory, which 
asserts that intellectual property rights are justified because their exclusionary effects 
are outweighed by their incentivizing effects on the possible creation of new inventions 
and their commercialization which increases overall societal welfare.
 448
 This section 
discusses and analyzes the main utilitarian theoretical justifications for the patent 
system: (i) reward by monopoly (ii) incentive to invent and (iii) exchange for secrets.
449
 
The incentive to invent theory and exchange for secrets theory are the most capable of 
substantiating the modern patent system.
450
 Each of the three theories will be addressed 
                                               
447 Machlup, Fritz. An Economic Review of the Patent System. 65th Congress 2d Session. United States 
Printing Office Washington: 1958 at 80. 
448 For a critique of the law-and-economics approach to intellectual property rights, see: Rahmatian, A. 
“A fundamental Critique of the Law-and-Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights” in 
Dinwoodie, G. Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013. 
Rahmatian argues that an economic analysis is actually damaging to the structure of patent law and its 
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Bernier notes that:  
The economic incentive aspect of the utilitarian theory focuses on a limited set of stakeholders, 
on those who value patented products the most in economic terms rather than considering the 
needs of all agents, including the less powerful.  In fact, the only need that seems important is 
the need for efficiency, while the link between IP and other social needs remain unaddressed.     
Bernier, L. Justice in Genetics: Intellectual Property and Human Rights from a Cosmopolitan Liberal 
Perspective. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010 at 110. 
449 See Fisher, M. Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and Scope of Protection. Oxford: Hart 
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Philosophy of Intellectual Property” in Georgetown Law Journal. Vol. 77, pp.287-367, 1988. 
450Fisher, M. Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and Scope of Protection. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007 at 89. 
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in the following subsections, with a particular emphasis on the two more relevant to this 
analysis: the incentive theory and the exchange for secrets theory.  
A. Reward by monopoly 
The reward-by-monopoly thesis claims that an individual needs to be 
proportionally rewarded for their contribution to society. Since conventional market 
forces cannot guarantee this reward, the state needs to intervene to guarantee the reward 
through the patent system.
451
 “Inventors render useful services, and the most appropriate 
way to secure them commensurate rewards is by means of temporary monopolies in the 
form of exclusive patent rights in their inventions.”452 Economists Adam Smith, John 
Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham supported the reward by monopoly approach in 
justifying patents. 
Adam Smith held that the patent system was economically justified and 
necessary, stating that the state intervention was essential because unregulated market 
forces are not optimal. He maintained that the state needed to use the legal system to 
ensure that resources were allocated proficiently and to preserve a competitive 
economy. Smith’s justification for the patent system is grounded in two claims. First, a 
temporary monopoly was “the easiest and most natural way in which the state can 
recompense…for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public 
is afterwards to reap the benefit.”453 He says this is preferable to a prize system, as 
prizes “would hardly ever be so precisely proportioned to the merit of the invention.”454 
Smith’s second claim is that granting monopolies to inventors is harmless to society 
because if the invention is useful, it will benefit the public and the inventor will be 
rewarded for this invention. However, if the invention is not useful to society, then the 
                                               
451 Ibid, 68. 
452 Machlup, F. An Economic Review of the Patent System.65th Congress 2d Session. United States 
Printing Office. Washington: 1958 at 80. Machlup acknowledge the shortfalls of this theory, noting that 
patenting rewards seldom go towards the inventors and may not be proportionate to the benefit brought to 
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453Smith, A. The Wealth of Nations. New York: The Modern Library, 1937 at 712. 
454Ibid at 83. 
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inventor will not be compensated.
455
 Hence, Smith’s support for patents rests on the 
assumption that a patent is the best form of reward for the inventor and the temporary 
monopoly will not be harmful to society. 
Applying Smith’s rationale would justify patenting human biological materials 
like genetic modification techniques and product patents like isolated genes and 
chemicals like epo on the basis that doing so was harmless to society. “[I]f the invention 
be good and as such is profitable to mankind…will probably make a fortune by it; but if 
it be of no value he also will reap no benefit.”456 Smith’s rationale does not hold 
because there are some patents on human biological materials are damaging and 
harmful to society, and it presumes that patent holders will act in a certain way. It can 
be argued that companies like Myriad Genetics, which isolated two profitable genes 
related to breast and ovarian cancer and aggressively asserted their patent rights whilst 
refusing to license, did cause some harm to society. The gene sequence coding for 
breast cancer is profitable to mankind and Myriad did make a fortune from their patents, 
but on balance, it tipped towards the rights holder whilst holding the public in a hostage 
position, particularly because Myriad Genetics was not the only researcher who worked 
on sequencing the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.
457
 Whilst not all diagnostic companies 
act like Myriad Genetics, it can be argued that the grant of such a broad monopoly on a 
genetic sequence can be harmful and, in some cases, a patent grant may not be an 
economically justifiable means to an end, particularly when there are numerous parties 
engaged in the same research. The question turns to whether the research would have 
even begun had there not been the potential of receiving a patent.  
                                               
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 There was fierce competition amongst 7 major research teams from the US, UK, France, Japan and 
Canada in locating and identifying the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. See: Gold, R. and J. Carbone, “Myriad 
Genetics: In the eye of the policy storm” in Genetics in Medicine. Vol. 12, No.4, S39–S70. April 2010 
Supplement at 42. 
124 
 
John Stuart Mill, another candid supporter of the reward-by-monopoly theory, 
observed that the purpose of the institution of property was to reward individuals with a 
property right to their own exertions: 
The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in 
each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own 
exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who 
produced it…together with his right to give this to any other person if he chooses, and the right 
of that other to receive and enjoy it.458 
Mill’s statement could be a foundation for a property right in that an inventor 
should be rewarded and compensated for the invention, and not doing so “would be a 
gross immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a person’s work without his 
consent, and without giving him an equivalent.”459 But Mill was convinced that the 
exclusive reward should be proportional to the level of utility of the invention:  
[T]he reward conferred by it depends upon the invention’s being found useful, and the greater 
the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is paid by the very persons to whom the 
service is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.460 
 
Like Mill, Jeremy Bentham justifies the existence of patents on the basis of 
reward. He maintained that property is a social construction in which the state uses the 
law to create property rights.
 461
  For Bentham, the state grants patent rights to reward 
inventors:  
With respect to a great number of inventions in the arts, an exclusive privilege is absolutely 
necessary, in order that what is sown may be reaped. In new inventions, protection against 
imitators is not less necessary than in established manufactures protection against thieves. He 
who has no hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which one man has 
invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost 
always be driven out of the market by his rival who finding himself, without any expense, in 
possession of a discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, would be able to 
deprive him of all his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price.462 
 
                                               
458Mill, J.  Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. Vol. 
1. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864 at 278. 
459Mill, J. Principles of Political Economy, Vol.2. London: Green & Company, 1929 at 933. 
460Ibid, 932. 
461 Bentham, J. Principles of the Civil Code. Edinburgh: The Works, published under the superintendence 
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B. Incentive to invent 
The “monopoly-profit-incentive” rationale is perceived as the primary 
underpinning of the patent system
463
, which advocates that for investment to occur in 
research and development and rectify the issue of underinvestment in public goods, 
patents are essential to incentivize investment in the creation of new inventions with the 
assurance of an exclusive right. The transaction is the social cost of the grant of a 
temporary monopoly in exchange for the betterment of society through new and useful 
inventions that are produced and disclosed through the patent system.
464
 The thesis 
presumes that inventions are required for progress to occur, but cannot be adequately 
exploited without society intervening to increase investors’ profit expectations, and 
granting temporary monopolies is the “simplest, cheapest and most effective way.”465 
The theory is based on the following assumptions: 
1. Growth and industrial progress are desirable 
2. Inventions are a necessary requirement for industrial progress 
3. Too few inventions will be made or used unless there are effective incentives  
4. Patents are the cheapest and most effective incentives466 
Machlup ultimately holds that the patent system’s incentive effects are due to 
expected profits arising from output restrictions produced from patented inventions.
467
 
“These output restrictions are the very essence of the patent system because only by 
restricting output below the competitive level can the patent system secure an income to 
                                               
463 See e.g. The Banks Committee, The British Patent System: Report of the Committee to Examine the 
Patent System and Patent Law, Cmbd 2207, July 1970 at 1: “The primary intention of the patent system is 
the encouragement of new industries in the country.” Merges, Robert P. and Richard R. Nelson, “Market 
Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope Decisions,” in Thomas M. Jorde David J. 
Teece (eds.) Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp.185-
232. 
464 Eisenberg, R. “Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use” in 
University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 56, 1989 at 1025-1028. 
465See supra note 447, Machlup, F. at 21. 
466 Ibid. 
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its owner.”468 In other words, the patent system rests on the need to incentivize and 
efficiently exploit inventions to create a competitive market economy and maximize 
social wealth. Although there are some critiques of this theory
469
, this is the common 
economic justification for intellectual property rights, with one commentator stating that 
it has been the economic model for the last 200 years.
470
 
Despite the agreement among most scholars that intellectual property rights are 
justified by the incentive to invent theory, there is conflict as there continues to be 
problems in empirically assessing the costs of monopoly patent exclusion and the 
benefits of inventions and their contribution to enhancing social welfare. This type of 
empirical analysis requires information to determine whether the economic trade-off is 
favourable insofar as the benefits offset the costs. However, when speaking of 
intellectual property rights, “the variables have proven extremely complex and 
heterogeneous.”471 Therefore, there is no definite empirical data that can prove 
definitely if the patent system, through the grant of exclusive rights, incentivizes new 
                                               
468Ibid. 
469 Two common limitations of the incentive theory are that (i) innovation will still occur without an 
intellectual property system and (ii) patents can discourage further inventions by curbing follow on 
inventions. See Palombi, Luigi. Gene Cartels: Biotech Patents in the Age of Free Trade. Cheltenham: 
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Teece (eds.) Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp.185-
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Inventors and Money-Makers. New York: 1915 at 17) 
 
The defenders of patent legislation often descant on the public’s benefit from inventions as if 
there were a special moral desert on the part of the projectors and patentees.  They put their case 
badly. What deserves emphasis is the influence of calculated profit in directing the inventor’s 
activity, spontaneous though it be, into channels of general usefulness. 
470Lemley, Mark. “Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital” in Journal of Small and 
Emerging Business Law. Vol. 4, 2000 at 139: 
[T]he patent law model we have is quite simple: the government issues you a patent; the patent 
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471Mossoff, A (ed.). Intellectual Property and Property Rights. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013 at xv. 
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inventions.
472
 However, some scholars have reconfigured the justification for patents as 
commercializing new inventions rather than incentivizing inventions.
473
 
C. Exchange-for-secrets 
The “exchange-for-secrets” theory maintains there is a deal between society and 
inventors, in which the inventor exchanges their knowledge with society for temporary 
protection of that knowledge. This argument assumes that progress cannot occur 
without complete disclosure of new and useful knowledge. “Hence, it is in the interest 
of society to bargain with the inventor and make him disclose his secret for the use of 
future generations. This can best be done by offering him exclusive patent rights in 
return for public disclosure of the invention.”474 Machlup disagrees with this thesis, 
claiming that in reality, society would not lose any valuable information because very 
few innovators can succeed in safeguarding their secrets and, furthermore, it is likely 
that several people simultaneously develop similar ideas within a short time span.  
Despite highlighting the shortfalls of economic justification of the patent system, 
Machlup ultimately believes that the patent system is worth having on the basis that 
dismantling it would be too costly. He contends that there is no empirical evidence for 
why it should not be in place.  
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the 
patent system, as it now operates confers a net benefit or a net loss upon society. The best he can 
do is state assumptions and make guesses about the extent to which reality corresponds to these 
assumptions.
475
 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
This chapter started by discussing the dominant conception of property as a 
‘bundle of rights’ designed by human beings. These social relationships are essential 
                                               
472 See Priest, G. “What Economists Can Tell Lawyers about Intellectual Property” in Research in Law & 
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power relations and property is a form of power over third parties. More specifically, 
the form of power best translates as an exclusionary mechanism, which requires an 
obligation, that is implementable by the state to submit to the property right holder’s 
will, which is what is known as the ‘common conception of property,’ the idea that 
property protects individuals’ interests against collective forces. Property plays only a 
marginal role in a far-reaching institutional unit whose primary purpose is to achieve 
societal good.  Moreover, right owners have an obligation to their community to 
promote the capabilities that are indispensable to human flourishing and nurture the 
realization of a just and desirable society.   
The need for symmetry between individual rights and the societal good is 
epitomized in the way a patent is structured: a limited right, both in time and scope, to 
its claims. As property rights, particularly in the biotechnology industry, patents are 
necessary tools to incentivize investment due to the financial realities of R&D. Next, 
patent rights were discussed from a law-and-economics perspective, maintaining that 
the intangible nature of intellectual property can lead to free-riding, which is why a 
state-created patent right is necessary. The advantages and disadvantages of broad 
patents were also discussed in relation to biotechnology. The two economic justification 
theories underlying the grant of genetic inventions are incentive-to-invent and 
exchange-for-secrets. 
It is submitted that patented inventions are forms of intangible property that 
perform a social function. Inventors are granted a limited exclusionary right in both 
length and scope of the property claims in exchange for disclosing new and useful 
knowledge to the benefit of society through the publication of the claimed invention. A 
patent right is an economically efficient way to distribute resources due to the fact that 
invented knowledge is a public good. Protecting knowledge through patents can 
incentivize further innovation and lead to technological advancement by carving out a 
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small segment of the field to encourage inventors to develop further add-on inventions. 
Due to the nature and costs of creating genetic inventions, patent protection is essential 
to encourage the patent owner to exploit and improve the invention because locating 
and identifying the correct region of the genome and linking it to a disease or target may 
only be the starting point. It is a worthwhile bargain to exclude others and give a 
temporary exclusionary right to reward the inventor and exchange for secrets, all in the 
name of promoting the social good. At the same time, in the name of the promoting the 
social good, patents should not act as a blockade towards further research. This means 
that overly broad patents like claims to entire genetic sequences that disallow other 
parties from conducting research should not be permissible. 
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Chapter 4: Comparative analysis of the legal approaches adopted in Europe and 
the United States 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores how the state can use the category of “patentable subject 
matter” as a policy lever to limit the acceptable scope of patents and to direct patent 
protection towards completed products.
476
 An analysis of the conception of ‘invention’ 
within patent law reveals how principles like the ‘product of nature’ doctrine in the US 
and the dichotomy between invention/discovery in Europe exist to ensure that things 
that should not be patented are not patented. US patent legislation does not specifically 
exclude any type of subject matter from patent protection, whilst European patent laws 
provide for specific articles for patentable and non-patentable subject matter. 
An examination of European and US patent law jurisprudence illustrates how 
Europe and the US have addressed human genetic material in determining patent 
eligibility and the scope of protection. This will include a comparative review of how 
the US Supreme Court and the EPO Board of Appeal addressed Myriad’s BRCA1 and 
BRCA2  gene patents, followed by an overview of the patent eligibility status of hESCs  
in the two jurisdictions. 
4.2. Invention vs. discovery 
The onset of a patent claim is that the subject matter qualifies as an invention. 
The discrepancy between invention and discovery is particularly significant in the area 
of patenting human genetic resources. The meaning of the term ‘invention’ suggests the 
production of an intellectual pursuit in the creation of new knowledge of a technical 
nature and implies a distinction between a creation and a mere discovery.
477
 Meanwhile, 
a discovery refers to finding something, which already exists but was unknown. This is 
                                               
476 See supra note 4, Burk & Lemley at 1642. 
477 Correa, C. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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in contrast to an invention, which is the creation of something that does not exist in 
nature. There is a blurred distinction between a discovery and an invention. 
The central area of disagreement on the patentability of bioscience lies in the 
definitions of “invention” and “discovery” and the uncertain demarcation of the two 
terms. In patent law, patents are only granted for inventions, not for discoveries. The 
definition of “invention” in patent law differs from the more familiar term of invention 
that emphasizes ingenuity.   In the patent realm, an invention consists of anything that 
(i) involves human intervention, (ii) altered something from its original form and 
developed something that did not exist before, (iii) is inventive and (iv) the resulting 
product or process is useful.
478
  
There is a fine line between a discovery and an invention, especially since an 
invention may ensue from a discovery, which is why it may be challenging to 
differentiate between them.
479
 The standard distinction between a “discovery” and 
“invention” was made in the following statement by English judge Buckley J. in 
Reynolds v. Herbert Smith & Co., Ltd.: 
Discovery adds to the amount of human knowledge, but it does so only by lifting the veil and 
disclosing something which before had been unseen or dimly seen. Invention also adds to human 
knowledge, but not merely by disclosing something. Invention necessarily involves also the 
suggestion of an act to be done, and it must be an act which results in a new product, or a new 
result, or a new process, or a new combination for producing an old product or an old result.
480
 
From the above statement, a “discovery” can refer to the acquisition of 
knowledge of a new gene and subsequently what protein the gene codes for. In contrast, 
an “invention” can refer to a new tool developed from knowledge of the gene, and this 
                                               
478 This mechanical definition of invention explains why in the E.U. isolated human genes may qualify as 
inventions under the customary tenets of patent law. 
479Crespi, S. “Patenting and Ethics--A Dubious Connection” in Journal of the Patent and Trademark 
Office Society. Vol.85, January, 2003 at 34. 
480 20 Reports of Patent, Design & Trademark Cases.123 (Ch. D.) 1902. In this case, the patent claim was 
for a material composed of commonly used materials. The invention consisted of a strip of canvas with a 
piece of India rubber attached to it for the purpose of wrapping around damaged tires to make a repair. 
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tool should qualify for patent eligibility given that it did not exist prior to the acquisition 
of the gene.  
4.2.1. What is an invention?  
 Patents are only granted for ‘inventions.’ The requirements of an invention 
according to legislation in both jurisdictions seem to indicate that the requirements are 
stagnant. However, the meaning of ‘invention’ is hugely contested.481 It is actually an 
evolving concept which has accommodated policy considerations based on three main 
factors: (i) justification of granting patents; (ii) economic policy and (iii) the national 
legal system itself. 
The common theme underlying the definition of an invention is that the idea has 
to be “technical”. Li Westerlund proposes the idea of the inventive kernel: 
The notion of invention indicates the presence of a technical idea, and this idea must relate to 
‘something,’ we can call this the inventive kernel. To look at the definition as it already has been 
elucidated what it reveals is that an invention within its legal meaning can only be a creation of 
technical ideas by which a law of nature is used. As explained the given definition does not 
suffice for reasons of imprecision. Since otherwise it scope may further be broadened at the 
expense of discoveries precision that makes possible to reliably control eligibility for patent 
protection is desirable for future development of biological matter.
482
 
 
The problem is that when talking about invention, there is the tendency to 
discuss it by differentiating it from a discovery.
483
  Understandably, the distinction is 
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Resnik argues that focusing on economic values is inadequate, and despite what some may believe, not 
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others. (153) Instead, groups with a stake in the issue all need to engage in dialogue. “Since gene 
patenting is a controversial public policy issue, we should find a way of giving serious consideration to 
different sides of this debate through a democratic process.” (154) Resnik recognizes potential critiques of 
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helpful to an extent, but it may be difficult to draw a clear distinction between a 
discovery and an invention. As Antony Taubman notes: 
I think there’s inevitably a limited role for the legislators to actually draw a bright line. The 
principle, I think it’s not too hard to understand. The principle has been around a long time. It’s 
like the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright. I mean, you kind of, intuitively, it makes sense. 
But can the legislature actually pre-emptively apply that distinction? Is it its job to articulate that 
distinction very clearly, or is its job to pre-emptively apply that to already carved up subject 
matter? Well, an analogy would be with the EU Biotech Directive, where there’s a general rule 
on ethical exclusion from patentable subject matter. And it goes on to say “and in particular, we 
had in mind human cloning and whatever.” Do we want to do that with the invention/discovery 
dichotomy? So the legislators say: “Patents are not for mere discoveries, but they are for true 
inventions, in particular we say this precludes from patentability the following...484 
 
In effect, it may be difficult to clearly identify a discovery from an invention. 
However, to understand that particular dichotomy better, it may be helpful begin with a 
discussion of invention on its own.
485
 This is important because the entire purpose of the 
patent system is to grant a temporary exclusive monopoly right to an invention, and 
therefore it is essential to determine the requirements of an invention. 
4.2.2. Positive and negative definition 
A legal definition of an invention can take two forms: a positive one and a 
negative one. It is rare for countries to adopt a positive legal definition of ‘invention,’ 
whereby patent laws identify eligible subject matter.
486
 This may be because a positive 
definition intended to cover all eligible subject matter can only be conveyed in an 
abstract form, which “might not serve as a practical legal standard applicable to 
inventions not yet anticipated.”487 This could explain why a negative legal definition of 
‘invention’ may be more appropriate. Relying on a list of subject matter that does not 
                                                                                                                                         
his position, acknowledging that legal courts and patent examination offices may not be ideal settings to 
discuss noneconomic values in gene patenting. However, he counters by stating that he sees no reason 
why the courts and patent examination boards cannot address noneconomic values, as they rely on expert 
testimony before making their decision (159). 
484 Interview with Antony Taubman WTO on February 23, 2012. 
485 Justine Pila maintains that a positive definition of “invention” is both possible and necessary, and that 
the concept of ‘technological’ is not particularly helpful in its definition. Instead, Pila maintains that the 
requirements for an invention has been influenced and shaped by policy, yet a “more meaningful 
definition of the invention than that which currently exists” (88) is needed. In Pila, Justine. “The Future of 
the Requirement for an Invention: Inherent Patentability as a Pre- and Post-Patent Determinant,” in 
Arezzo, E. and G. Ghidini (eds.) Biotechnology and Software Patent Law: A Comparative Review of 
New Developments. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011.  
486Westerlund, L. Biotech Patents, Equivalency and Exclusions Under European and US Patent Law. New 
York: Kluwer Law International, 2002 at 24.  
487 Ibid, 25. 
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qualify as ‘inventions’ is the current standard of the courts in both Europe and the US. 
“[T]hey have all but ignored the fundamental question, ‘what does it mean for a subject 
matter to be patentable qua invention?’”488 Without a coherent theory underlying it, the 
concept of an invention results in uncertainty and confusion in understanding the 
requirements of an invention. For instance, it is difficult to ascertain the ‘technical’ 
aspect and the categories or properties that are necessary for something to be classified 
as ‘technical’.  
4.2.3. Are gene sequences inventions? 
 Scholars have shied away from this question,
489
 and responses from interview 
participants also emphasize that this question has not been adequately addressed. There 
has been a tendency to conflate, rather than to distinguish between public policy in the 
broader sense and the technical patentability criteria - whether the thing is in itself an 
invention and whether the outcome is useful. This is unfortunate because the technical 
patentability criteria are a distillation, a codification of centuries of debate, litigation and 
legislation that is exactly focused on public policy interests. The technical patentability 
criteria did not emerge from the patent office as a technical filter, but from the 
legislature as an articulation of public policy, which applies in the area of biotechnology 
inventions. This is why in the gene patenting debate, there is an important conclusion to 
clear up: Is there really no invention? The following sections will illustrate how the 
courts in Europe and the US have struggled to find an answer to this question  
4.3. Patenting Human Genetic Materials in the US  
“Invention” in the US refers to either an “invention or discovery,” although the 
term “discovery” refers to the practical arts rather than theories.490 US patent law 
                                               
488 Ibid. 
489 See Kevles, D. & A. Berkowitz. “The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of Law, Economic 
Interests, and Ethics,” in Brooklyn Law Review. Vol. 67, pp. 233-248, 2001; See supra note 133, Conley 
& Makowski.  
490 US law on the distinction between invention and discovery has been described as puzzling. James 
Swanson notes: “What U.S law says about discovery and invention is extremely confusing, especially if 
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requires that an invention must pass the standard subject matter test in order to be 
patentable.
491
 In particular, claimed DNA sequences and biotechnology inventions 
which include living organisms or naturally occurring substances cannot include those 
that merely exist in nature.
492
  
4.3.1. Patent eligibility 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent 
protection. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful [emphasis added] 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”493 ‘Discoveries’ are recognized as patentable subject matter 
under Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S Constitution: “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries [emphasis added].” 
Thomas Jefferson’s term ‘Discoveries’ has evolved through common law to mean 
inventions, which require some sort of human ingenuity, as established in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.
494
 This means that true discoveries are not patentable, as they are 
something that already exists in nature, but that someone has acquired new knowledge 
of.
495
 As the following will establish, US case law has a lengthy custom of rejecting 
patents for products of nature, despite the fact that the word ‘discoveries’ still exists in 
statutory provisions. It is due to the judicial interpretation of statutes as reflected 
through case law in which US patent law in the area of ‘discoveries’ has evolved.  
                                                                                                                                         
one applies modern meaning to the terms ‘discover’ and ‘invent.” Swanson, J. Scientific Discoveries and 
Soviet Law. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984 at 9. 
491 Ibid. 
492 See 66 Federal Register 1093, 2001.   
493 35 U.S.C. §101 
494Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
495Westerlund, L. Biotech Patents, Equivalency and Exclusions Under European and US Patent Law at 
24. 
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4.3.2. Exceptions to 35 U.S.C. §101 
Even though Section 101 of the Patent Act stipulates that a patent can be granted 
for any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, the 
provision includes judicially-created exceptions: laws of nature, natural phenomena and 
abstract ideas.
496
 
Some of the underpinning rationales of Myriad’s497 invalidation of isolated gene 
patents are apparent in earlier US Supreme Court cases such as Bilski v. Kappos 
(“Bilski”)498 and Mayo v. Prometheus (“Mayo”) 499 
In Bilski, the US Supreme Court held that a business method of hedging risk in 
commodities trading not eligible for patent protection. The court held the claims at issue 
constituted abstract ideas, which were not patent eligible. In addition, the court held that 
the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test for determining the patent 
eligibility of a process, but rather "a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for 
determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101."
500
 The court 
stated that the abstract ideas could not be patented to prevent patents from pre-empting 
access to foundational features, which also include laws of nature and physical 
phenomena. Citing Funk Bros., the court stated that the purpose of excluding subject 
matter including laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas is because these 
articles are considered to embody the “storehouse of knowledge of all men.”501 Even 
though the case was about hedging risk, the case has relevance to Myriad as it has 
                                               
496 For instance, in Diamond v Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Supreme Court held that patent 
protection is not granted to “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 
497 AMP v Myriad (2013) 
498 Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw v. David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
499 Mayo Collaborative Services, DBA Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. 566 , 132 S.Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012) 
500 Ibid, 8. 
501 Ibid, 5 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 130 (1948)) 
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implications in how the judiciary interprets “nature.”502 The notion of preserving 
essential articles within the public domain was also reiterated strongly in Mayo. 
In Mayo,  the US Supreme Court unanimously held that claims involving  
methods optimizing the therapeutic efficacy of a drug was not  patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
 503 
The claims were directed to optimizing treatment of an 
immune-related disorder by administering a drug and determining whether the level of a 
metabolite in a patient’s blood was within a desired range. The issue was whether the 
claims merely described laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, or 
whether they described patent-eligible applications of those concepts. The court 
maintained that “scientists already understood that the levels in a patient’s blood of 
certain metabolites”504 and the claimed method “add nothing specific to the laws of 
nature other than what is well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously 
engaged in by those in the field.”505 Notably, the court maintained that the patent 
application must include a significant inventive component past the abstract idea or the 
natural process.
 506 
Thus, upholding the claims which were directed to routine 
application of a law of nature would result in a “monopolization of those tools” and 
                                               
502 This opinion was expressed by Judge Rader in the Federal Circuit decision: “Natural laws and 
phenomena can never quality for patent protection because they cannot be invented at all.” In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
503 In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mayo v. Prometheus for more constrained rules for 
patenting, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently issued a memorandum 
involving the eligibility of process claims involving laws of nature under 35 U.S.C. §101. The 
memorandum presents three questions essential for examining subject matter eligibility:  
(1) Is the claimed invention a process? If so, then, 
(2) Does the claim focus on the use of a "natural principle"? If so, then: 
(3) Does the claim include the "additional steps" or an element combination that incorporates the 
natural principle into the claimed inventions such that it moves the invention beyond the natural principle, 
as stipulated by the Mayo v. Prometheus decision? 
If the answer to the third question is ‘yes,’ then the claim is deemed to be eligible for 
patentability. However, one of the more challenging tasks is determining when the additional steps or 
element combinations in the claim meet the requirement set out in Mayo v. Prometheus. 
Since the United States does not apply any of the exclusions listed in Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the memorandum could potentially apply to microbiological, biological and non-biological 
process claims for the production of plants and animals. If the claim is a process claim and includes the 
use of a “natural principle,” and includes the “additional steps” or combination of elements which 
incorporates the use of the natural principle into the claimed invention which moves the invention beyond 
the natural principle, then the process claim could be patent eligible. 
504 Ibid at 4 
505 Ibid at 3 
506 Ibid  
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“impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”507 In articulating the 
importance of excluding laws of nature from patentability, this line of reasoning could 
be applied to Myriad in that the failure to invent around genetic sequences increases the 
necessity of keeping them in the public domain.
 
It appears that in addition to the three categories of patent ineligibility, which 
include laws of nature, abstract ideas and natural phenomena, the courts seem to be 
creating another item to add to the list of exceptions to patentability. In the case where a 
claimed product is technical, but possesses the genetic character of something which 
already exists in nature, then that product is an exclusion to eligible subject matter for 
patent protection, irrespective of the degree of inventiveness required in the creation of 
the invention. Justine Pila characterizes this distinction in US patent law as between 
inherently patentable and inherently unpatentable technical subject matter.
508
 For 
instance, in Myriad, the US Supreme Court clearly labelled Myriad’s DNA claims as 
falling within the law of nature exception.
509
 The court acknowledged Myriad had 
narrowed the possible locations for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences and sought to 
import those extensive research efforts into the §101 patent eligible criteria, yet 
“extensive effort alone is insufficient to satisfy the demands of §101.”510 The reasoning 
of the Supreme Court suggests that there was not sufficient human intervention and the 
decision helps establish a robust exclusion for natural phenomena from patentable 
subject matter. 
Recently, the US Supreme Court addressed the patent eligibility of method and 
system claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.
511
 The issue was whether 
claims directed to a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating settlement risk by 
                                               
507 Ibid at 2 
508 Pila, J. “Isolated Human Genes: The Patent Equivalent of a Non-Copyrightable Sound Recording” in 
Law Quarterly Review (forthcoming) 2014 at 3. 
509 Ibid at 2. 
510 AMP v. Myriad (2013) at 14. 
511 Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al. 573 U.S._2014 
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using a third-party intermediary amounted to an abstract idea. The case is a restatement 
of the pre-emptive reasoning for the barring of laws of nature, natural phenomena and 
abstract ideas from patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court referred 
back to its decision in Mayo in laying out a framework for addressing patent eligibility. 
Using this framework, the first step includes deciding whether the claims at issue fall 
into one of the patent-ineligible categories. If so, one then considers the parts of each of 
the claims both individually and in combination to assess whether there is an inventive 
concept present which adds ‘enough’ to transform the abstract idea into a patentable 
invention.
512
 As a result, the ‘inventive concept’ as stated by Justice Breyer in Mayo has 
led to the interpretation of patent eligibility that is ultimately a fusion with patentability 
requirements in assessing claimed methods under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
513
 
Regarding the first step, the court maintained that Alice’s claims are directed to 
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement.
514
 Comparing the similarities of the claims 
to the abstract idea in Bilski, the court held that Alice’s claims constituted an abstract 
idea, and merely requiring generic computer implementation was insufficient in 
transforming the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
515
  
Pertaining to the second step, the court noted that assessing the claim elements 
separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely 
conventional.
516
 Considered as a combination, the components of the method do not add 
anything “that is not already present when the steps are considered separately.”517 
Therefore, the court held that the method claims do not improve the functioning of the 
computer itself or “effect improvement in any other technology or technical field.”518  
Ultimately, the ruling in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International states that any claims 
                                               
512 Ibid, Slip op at 7. 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid at 10. 
516 Ibid at 15. 
517 Ibid. 
518 Ibid. 
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over an implementation of an abstract idea requires proof of an inventive concept which 
adds ‘enough’ to transform the idea into a patentable invention, be it in the form of new 
steps rather than routine steps.
519
  
The case provides a few lessons pertaining to patent eligibility under § 101. The 
court provided some guidance, albeit incomplete, on what constitutes an abstract idea. 
The court explicitly highlighted that in the past, ideas, algorithms, mathematical 
formulas and fundamental economic practices like hedging risk and using intermediated 
settlements are not eligible for patent protection. Yet, the court does not provide any 
assistance in defining the boundaries of the abstract idea exception. But it does suggest 
that a technological requirement is important for eligibility, noting in Diamond v. 
Diehr
520
 that a technological improvement is important in solving an industry problem.  
It is important to note that unlike Myriad, the Supreme Court in Alice seems to 
be unwilling to hold business methods per se ineligible, as it notes that many computer-
implemented claims are eligible subject matter. Yet, all four cases above demonstrate 
that there is an eagerness to maintain an area of nonpatentability for natural phenomena 
to keep the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” available to potential 
researchers.
521
 
4.3.3. Genesis of the product of nature doctrine 
The difference between unpatentable and patentable subject matter for 35 U.S.C. 
§101 is whether the claimed object is a product of nature (whether living or not) or a 
man-made invention.
522
 A product of nature does not fall within the invention category. 
                                               
519 Ibid. 
520 Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Diehr, et al. 450 U.S. 175 (1981) at 177, 178. 
The US Supreme Court held that directing implementation of a physical process (which in this case, 
involved curing rubber with a rubber-curing machine) through the use of computer program does not 
preclude it from being eligible for patent protection as a whole. Even though the claim involved a well-
known mathematical formula, the computer used the equation in a way that solved a technological 
problem in conventional industry practice.   
521 AMP v. Myriad at 14, citing Mayo. 
522Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) at 313 and reiterated in J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred  Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124  (2001) at 134: “As this Court held in Chakrabarty, “the 
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The crux of the doctrine is that the unearthing of something that naturally exists is not 
patentable because it is not an invention.
523
 The “product of nature” doctrine developed 
in two separate but linked ways. The doctrine first emerged in Ex parte Latimer
524
 
(“Latimer”) when the Commissioner of Patents rejected a patent for an extracted plant 
fiber. The doctrine was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Funk Bros v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co.
525(“Funk Bros.”), Diamond v. Chakrabarty526 (“Chakrabarty”) and its 
resurgence in the recent AMP v. Myriad
527
 (“Myriad”). In these cases, the product of 
nature has referred to a composition of matter which did not fall within the patentable 
subject matter category because it was found to be undifferentiated from a naturally 
occurring entity. The second way the doctrine has been interpreted is in terms of the 
reference to claims which fall short of novelty and non-obviousness because they 
encompassed natural substances which were obtained from a new process or are in only 
a slightly purer form than their naturally occurring counterparts.
528
 This reading of the 
product of nature doctrine appears in Parke-Davis v. H.K. Mulford,
529
 (“Parke-Davis”) 
and Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation
530
 (“Merck”). 
A.  Ex Parte Latimer 
The ‘product of nature’ principle was first asserted in Latimer, which has been 
used as a guiding point in the judiciary in deciding between discovered objects (not 
patentable) and processes used to extract those objects (patentable).
531
 In 1889, the 
                                                                                                                                         
relevant distinction” for purposes of §101 is not “between living and inanimate things, but between 
products of nature, whether living or not, and human made inventions.” 
523Conley, 113. 
524 Ex parte Latimer, Decisions of the Commissioner of Patents. Decided March 12,1889 
525 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
526 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
527 AMP v. Myriad (2013) 
528 See supra note 133, Conley& Makowski at 320. 
529 See supra note 135. 
530 Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Circuit 1958) 
531 Ex Parte Latimer, March 12, 1889, C.D., 46 O.G. 1638, United States Patent Office, “Decisions of the 
Commissioner of Patents and the United States Courts in Patent Cases.” 1889 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1890). The patent examiner initially refused the application, stressing the 
indistinguishability of characteristics between the claimed element and its naturally existing counterpart: 
“The claim and description do not set forth any physical characteristics by which the fiber can be 
distinguished from other vegetable fibers…Hence, since the fiber claimed is not, and cannot be, 
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Commissioner of Patents rejected an application for a fibre in a needle of a pine tree, 
maintaining that the fibre was not an ‘invention.’532  
While the Commissioner noted that the process of producing the claimed fiber 
constituted an invention,
533
 the Commissioner considered it unreasonable to allow 
something that already existed in the earth to be patented merely because someone 
discovered it even if the claimed product is useful and has value to society.
534
 The 
finding of the fibre in the needle of a pine tree could not be patented, “anymore than to 
find a new gem or jewel in the earth would entitle the discoverer to patent all gems 
which should be subsequently found.”535 The reasoning was that granting a patent for 
the claimed substance itself would have detrimental consequences. 
Otherwise, it would be possible for an element or principle to be secured by patent, and the 
patentee would obtain the right, to the exclusion of all other men, of securing by his new process 
from the trees of the forest (in this case the Pinus australis) the fiber which nature has produced 
and which nature has intended to be equally for the use of all men.
536
  
 
As a result, granting a patent on a tree fiber would exclude everyone else from 
the use of a natural product with the outcome that “patents might be obtained upon the 
trees of the forest and the plants of the earth.”537  
The Commissioner explained if the applicant’s process included another step in 
which (i) the fiber was withdrawn or separated from the leaf or (ii) the natural state of 
                                                                                                                                         
distinguished from other fibers by any physical characteristic, the claim therefor must be refused.” 124. 
The Commissioner agreed with the patent examiner’s denial of the patent and expanded on the subject of 
indifferentiability: “It is also well known that the pure fiber after it has been eliminated from the natural 
matrix of the leaf or stalk or wood in which nature forms and develops it is essentially the same thing and 
possesses the same construction. The chemical formula for this cellulose in all these varieties of plants, I 
am advised, is the same.” 125 
532 The claim was for “a new article of manufacture…consisting of the cellular tissues of the Pinus 
australis [southern pine] eliminated in full lengths from the silicious, resinous, and pulpy parts of the pine 
needles and subdivided into long, pliant filaments adapted to be spun and woven.” Ibid, 123. 
533 The patent for the process of producing the claimed fiber was granted. Ibid. 
534 The Commissioner considered the economic argument to grant a patent on such a claimed product, 
exposing the burden he felt to authorize the patent because he felt it was a valuable contribution to 
society: 
“I have given this application no little consideration, and have experienced an anxiety, if possible, to 
secure the applicant a patent. The alleged invention is unquestionably very valuable, and one, according 
to the statements presented to me, of immense value to the people of the country…but while the 
production may be thus regarded as a very valuable one, the invention resides, I am compelled to say, 
exclusively in the process and not at all in the product.” Ibid, 127. 
535 Ibid. 
536Ibid, 125-126. 
537Ibid. 
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the fiber was changed so it acquired a new quality or function which did not exist in its 
natural state, the fiber might have qualified as an invention as a product.
538
 
Therefore, one can derive three elements of the product of nature doctrine from 
Latimer: 
1. A claimed product whose physical traits are undifferentiated from those of its 
naturally occurring counterpart is not patentable subject matter. 
2. The novelty of the discovery is not connected to the product’s patentable subject 
matter status. However, there may be an argument for a patent for the process 
used in the discovery of the product provided the nature of the process fulfils the 
patentability requirements. 
3. If a product is inherently unpatentable, the product’s utility and value to society 
is not a justification for making the product patentable subject matter. 
The significance of this judgement is that the Commissioner emphasized that 
there are some things that are inherently unpatentable, despite their utility and value to 
society. Indeed, a string of cases followed this principle and upheld the ‘product of 
nature’ doctrine after Latimer.539 The product of nature doctrine was referred to in 
subsequent cases.
540
  
B. Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
A key case in the context of biotechnology and anti-patentability decisions on 
natural products is Funk Bros. Seed Co.v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (1948),
541
 which was one  
of the leading cases guiding the Myriad decision. Notably, in Funk Bros., the Supreme 
                                               
538 Ibid. 
539The court in Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887 (7th Circuit 1910) held 
that aspirin was patentable; in General Electric Company v. De Forest Radio Company 28 F.2d 641 (3d 
Circuit 1928) the Court found that tungsten wire was patentable subject matter; Merck & Company v. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Circuit 1958) found that a fermented-
derived vitamin B-12 was patentable subject matter. 
540 See e.g. DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664 (1931), In re Marden 47 F.2d 958 
(C.C.P.A. 1931), Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 333 U.S. 127 (1948), In re Williams 80 
U.S.P.Q. 150 (C.C.P.A. 1958), Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th 
Cir. 1958), J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).                                                      
541 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
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Court reaffirmed the strength of the product of nature doctrine and established the rule 
that natural existing subject matter is not patentable by invalidating a product patent 
claiming strains of root-nodule bacteria, which were combined together to fix nitrogen 
in the soil. The mixture of bacteria infected the roots of plants so that plants could 
absorb nitrogen more easily. The Court held that the claimed strains of bacteria as a 
product was not eligible for patent protection, because each of the bacteria existed in 
nature and its combination was a discovery. In addition, the mixing of the strains did not 
change the bacteria’s natural function. The Court emphasized two points. The first was 
a general statement that laws of nature are not patentable subject matter: “manifestations 
of laws of nature”542 are “part of the storehouse of knowledge,”543 and “free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none.”544 The case was a restatement of the nineteenth 
century law of nature cases, with attention focused on where to draw the line between 
an unpatentable law of nature and a prospective patentable application.
545
 Second, the 
Court held the claimed application of the discovery unpatentable, even though the 
mixed culture was commercially useful, the mixture fell “short of invention within the 
meaning of the patent statutes.”546 Justice Douglas emphasized the inventiveness 
requirement, explaining that “the state of the art made the production of a mixed 
inoculants a simple step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it certainly 
was not the product of invention.”547 Justice Douglas’ statement emphasized that an 
obvious application of an law of nature was unpatentable even if the natural event itself 
is a new and nonobvious discovery. This judgement added to the law-of-nature principle 
                                               
542 Ibid, 130. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
545 Beauchamp, C. “Patenting Nature: A Problem of History,” in Stanford Technology Law Review. Vol. 
16, 2013 at 302. 
546 Funk Brothers Seed Co. (1948), 130. 
547 Ibid, 132. 
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with a deeper inventiveness requirement.
548
 Moreover, it was a resurrection of the 
product of nature doctrine as stated in Latimer.
549
 
What was noticeably missing in this judgement was any reference to Parke-
Davis and the principle of “useful difference” in differentiating a non-patentable natural 
substance to a useful application of scientific knowledge to things which do not exist 
naturally.
550
 However, the court opted to disregard Parke-Davis. It was not until another 
chemical case came along that Learned Hand’s comments in Parke-Davis became a 
standard reference in case law.
551
  
C. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Chakrabarty, the Court for Customs and 
Patent Appeals consolidated two cases, Bergy and Chakrabarty,
552
 to decide whether 
living organisms constituted either a "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under  
35 U.S.C § 101
553
 The majority referred to three ‘doors’ that the inventor must pass 
through “on the difficult path to patentability” which include section 101 (eligibility 
criteria), section 102 (novelty) and section 103 (non-obviousness). The first door that 
the inventor must pass through is section 101, where the inventor must possess a certain 
kind of invention which falls into one of the named categories: a process, machine, 
                                               
548 Beauchamp, 302. 
549 “Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the 
work of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable…For the qualities of these bacteria, like the 
heat of the sun, electricity, and or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law 
of nature to a new and useful end.” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. - 333 U.S. 127 (1948) 
at 130. 
550 See supra note 135 for full case citation and refer to 4.3.4 for a summary on the case. 
551 Beauchamp, 303-304. 
552 See In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (maintaining that a purified strain of bacteria 
was patentable subject matter), cert. granted and vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 
(1979) (mem.), vacated in part sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) (mem.), on remand sub 
nom. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), cert granted sub nom., No. 79-136 (U.S., Oct. 29, 1979). 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (mem.), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
553In re Bergy, 596 F. 2d 952, (C.C.P.A. 1979) at 960. Dr. Bergy created a novel process to prepare the 
antibiotic lincomycin using a previously unknown microorganism, Streptomyces vellosus, in a 
biologically pure culture. The second patent at issue was Chakrabarty’s claim for a genetically engineered 
strain of bacteria which allowed for a more effective invention of a new genetically engineered strain of 
bacteria for the more effective disintegration of oil spills. For both patents, the CCPA held that the 
claimed inventions were patentable subject matter within 35 U.S.C.S. § 101.  
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manufacture or composition of matter, or any improvement thereof. Even though 
section 101 mentions three requirements, novelty, utility and statutory subject matter, 
the court insisted that the three requirements are separate and distinct.
554
  “Thus, the 
questions of whether a particular invention is novel or useful are questions wholly apart 
from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.”555 
Therefore, the question of whether a claimed invention falls within statutory subject 
matter should be determined solely by whether it is a machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, and not affected by the existence or lack of novelty or utility.
556
 
There are three points worth mentioning from the majority’s decision: 
1. Chakrabarty’s genetically engineered bacteria amounted to a “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter”.557 
                                               
554 The court emphasized that this understanding is long-standing and universally accepted. In re Bergy, 
596 F. 2d 952, (C.C.P.A. 1979) at 960.  
555 In re Bergy, 596 F. 2d 952, (C.C.P.A. 1979) at 960-961. 
556 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 374. 
557Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 213.Previously, the oil-eating bacterium would have been conceived as a 
‘product of nature,’ and may have been denied a patent based on it being a living thing. However in this 
case, the Court chose to view the bacterium as a natural compound that had been modified structurally, 
which made it a new ‘composition of matter,’ or ‘manufacture’ that was not natural. See Dutfield, 
Graham, “Who Invents Life: Intelligent Designers, Blind Watchmakers, or Genetic Engineers?” in 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice. Vol. 5, No. 7, 2010. 535 .In addition, since the Court 
adopted  the ‘life as chemistry’ approach , the bacterium was now perceived to be a natural chemical 
matter in which a new and useful trait was introduced into it and made it ‘unnatural,’ and subsequently, 
patentable. This is in agreement with the customary practice with regards to chemical products, where a 
natural chemical becomes an ‘invention’ upon human modification through various methods, including 
removing something from the substance and purifying it and adding something to it like a gene. See 
Dutfield, G. and Uma Suthersanen. Global Intellectual Property Law. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2008, 301. Classifying life as ‘chemicals’ is a controversial issue.  The Courts have 
interpreted living organisms as chemicals, but there is a debate as to whether this is the correct approach. 
There is the view that employing terms like “life is largely chemical” misleads judges into wrongly 
thinking things are inventions when, in fact, they are merely discoveries. Graham Dutfield claims there 
are limitations to metaphors and analogies used by scientists, particularly in the field of synthetic biology, 
a new branch of biology that has created minimal genomes, standardized parts, devices and systems, and 
metabolic engineering. (Dutfield, Graham. “‘The Genetic Code is 3.6 Billion Years Old: It’s Time for a 
Rewrite’ Questioning the Metaphors and Analogies of Synthetic Biology and Life Science Patenting” in 
Annabelle Lever’s (ed.) New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2011, 4.) In addition, Rebecca Eisenberg, a respected academic in the field, criticizes 
the chemical analogy that is employed in respect to DNA sequences, which fails to associate the 
sequences to valuable information that is intellectual property. (Eisenberg, Rebecca. “How Can you 
Patent Genes?” in David Magnus, A. Caplan and G. McGee (eds.) Who Owns Life? New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2002, 118.) 
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2. The bacterium was new and a product of human ingenuity, possessing 
characteristics that were markedly different from ones found in nature, and had 
the potential for considerable utility.
558
 
3. Broad interpretation of §101: it did not matter whether it was living or non-
living because Congress anticipated and expected patentable subject matter to 
include organisms that were created with human involvement.
559
 
The Supreme Court observed the product of nature question was solely a §101 
patentable subject matter query.
560
 The main question the judges had to answer was 
whether Chakrabarty’s claimed bacterium was the type of phenomenon that could be 
patented. Unlike the approach adopted by the lower courts, the court chose not to focus 
on novelty and non-obviousness.
561
 Rather, the court opted to cite Funk Bros. for the 
suggestion that patents could not be granted for “‘manifestations of…nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.’”562 The Court made a distinction between Funk 
Bros. and Chakrabarty. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that the 
patentee in Funk had merely discovered a natural opportunity: the amalgamation of 
                                               
558Supra note 64, Diamond v. Chakrabarty at 310. “[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature, and one having the potential for significant 
utility. His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own.” 
559 The speaker for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger, rested his judgement on interpreting 
Thomas Jefferson’s patent law of 1793, declaring that patents could be granted for “any new and useful 
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof.’ By 
adopting a broad interpretation of s.101, the Court stretched the scope of patentable subject matter. Even 
though the code did not make specific reference to patenting living organisms, the Court interpreted the 
broad language of the patent code as including “inventions in areas unforeseen by Congress, including 
genetic technology, and to cover living organisms.” (Kevles, D. Of Mice & Money: The Story of the 
World’s First Animal Patent” in Daedalus, vol. 131, No. 2, On Intellectual Property (Spring 2002), p78).  
The minority, on the other hand, did not accept the majority’s broad interpretation of Jefferson’s Act, 
arguing that the purpose of the act was not to extend patents for every progress made. 
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation’s deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the 
need to encourage progress...Given the complexity and legislative nature of this delicate task, we 
must be careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has provided. In particular, 
were there an absence of legislative direction, the courts should leave to Congress the decisions 
whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding 
has been that patents are not available. (Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 319) 
560 See supra note 133, Conley& Makowski at 376. 
561 “The unambiguous implication is that arguments about novelty and non-obviousness are unresponsive 
to an objection that something is unpatentable because it is a product of nature.” Ibid. 
562 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, citing Funk, 333 U.S. at 130. 
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certain root-nodule bacteria. On the other hand, Chakrabarty had genetically 
manipulated the bacterium which nature did not create: 
Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not 
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.563 
 
The notion behind the distinction between natural and artificial materials was 
shown to have played a significant role in the decision. Therefore, it would seem that 
any genetic modification could end up being a possible patentable invention.
564
 The 
case is significant because it is the first case in which the court decided that an 
microorganism as an end product could be patented. The decision also redefined the 
boundaries of the product of nature doctrine, clearly stating that living organisms are 
patentable subject matter despite the fact that two statutes had been legislated for a 
special type of patent protection for specific living organisms.
565
 It appears that the 
majority extended the scope of patent protection without considering the effects of 
patenting living organisms by adopting a narrow interpretation of statute law rather than 
addressing the larger issue of the patentability of higher life forms and the policy issues 
surrounding it.
566
  
As mentioned above, the purpose of patent law in the United States is to 
promote the progress of science, which is found in the Constitution. Biotechnology in 
the US is a substantial filed and the reasonable explanation for this is patent law and 
policy.
567
 After the Supreme Court expressed a liberal benchmark for patentable subject 
matter in Chakrabarty, it opened the floodgates for patents on other living organisms, 
which contributed to the growth of biotechnology. Despite criticisms of this close 
                                               
563 Ibid. 
564 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 375. 
565 1930 Plant Patent Act and 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act 
566 Worth noting are the four dissenting opinions. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and White claimed 
that the 1930 Plant Patent Act did not cover living organisms and the 1970 Plant Varieties Protection Act 
excluded bacteria from the scope of patentable subject matter. These two points led to their argument that 
Section 101 did not “encompass living organisms.” U.S. Supreme Court Bulletin, 1980, pp. 3139-41. 
567 Ebermann, P. Patents as Protection of Traditional Medical Knowledge? A Law and Economics 
Analysis. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012 at 79. 
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decision, it is a coherent decision and follows US patent case law in the essential 
distinction between a discovery and an invention. 
4.3.4. Intertwining the product of nature doctrine with novelty and utility 
The blending of subject matter (section 101) with novelty (102) reflects the 
duplicitous feature of the product of nature doctrine. This is especially evident in cases 
where natural products that were purified or modified by human intervention that were 
of practical, commercial, and therapeutic value could be eligible for patent protection. 
As a result, judges may concurrently hold that the claimed subject matter is 
unpatentable because it is a product of nature whilst maintaining that it also falls short 
of the novelty requirement because the claimed subject is a product of nature and 
therefore already known.
568
 
A. Parke-Davis v. H.K. Mulford Co. 
A legal principle that has been dominant in the patenting of life science 
inventions in the US stems from Learned Hand’s dicta: if the claimed invention has a 
practical purpose, then there is a good ground for a patent.
569
 The crux of the principle 
stems from the usefulness of a claimed invention to society and that social policy should 
not create barriers to research groups acquiring temporary exclusive rights to genetic 
sequences. The facts and issues of the case will be discussed and analyzed below. 
In Parke-Davis, a patent for isolated and purified hormone adrenaline was 
upheld.
 570
  Learned Hand addressed the product of nature argument as a technical 
objection to the patent and emphasized that purified adrenaline did not naturally exist 
and that the value of adrenaline in its pure form was a better treatment for patients with 
                                               
568 Chisum, D. Chisum on Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity and Infringement. 
New York: Matthew Bender, 1978-, Release 140, 2013 at 57. 
569 See supra note 135. 
570 Ibid. Dr. Jokichi Takamine, the inventor was granted patents for the extraction process and product. 
The issue was whether an isolated purified substance, in this case, adrenaline, a naturally occurring 
hormone in mammals, was patentable. H.K. Mulford challenged the validity of the patent, claiming that 
naturally occurring products were unpatentable. 
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low blood pressure.
571
 Learned Hand reasoned that isolating and purifying a substance 
constituted a “new” thing which was patentable. Notably, Learned Hand held that an 
isolated purified substance without any difference in function from its naturally 
occurring counterpart was patentable:  
But, even if it were merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that such 
products are not patentable. Takamine was the first to make it available for any use by removing 
it from the other gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible logically 
to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically.572 
 
Learned Hand applied a pragmatic approach to reward Takamine, the inventor, 
for creating a valuable product. A line of rationalization emerged which requires two 
conditions to be met to prevail over the product of nature doctrine for naturally 
occurring subject matter: (i) the purified version of the claimed product must not 
naturally exist and (ii) the pure form must possess a greater value than its naturally 
occurring counterpart. However, there is an exception to the purity rule, in that the new 
pure compound must differ “in kind” and not merely “in degree.” Learned Hand 
explained that a difference “in kind” could be established if the purified compound has 
an completely novel utility from the original one.
573
 
 The way in which the doctrine was interpreted and applied to later cases, 
particularly in those concerning chemical patents, ultimately distorted the limit of the 
doctrine as stated in Latimer.
574
 What emerged from Parke-Davis was the ‘useful 
difference’ which would influence future cases.575 In fact, Learned Hand’s “failure to 
take Ex parte Latimer into account” has been described as one of the “greatest 
shortcomings” of this opinion.576 Subsequent cases, particularly those concerning 
                                               
571 Ibid, 102-103. 
572 Ibid, 103. 
573 Ibid. 
574 It is only in the last decade that the US Supreme Court has shown a desire to narrow the scope of 
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 using the product of nature doctrine. 
575 Beauchamp, C. “Patenting Nature: A Problem of History,” in Stanford Technology Law Review. Vol. 
16, 2013 at 285. 
576 Harkness, J. “Dicta on Adrenalin (e): Myriad Problems with Learned Hand’s Product-of-Nature 
Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford” in Journal of Patent & Trademark Office Society. Vol. 93, 
2011 at 391. 
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chemical patents, reveal a blurring of the Latimer definitional restrictions and, 
accordingly, an effective slackening of the product of nature barrier.
577
 
B. Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 
Learned Hand’s dicta were applied in Merck,578 in which the product of nature 
doctrine shifted to an emphasis on demonstrating something novel and useful to society. 
This line of argument is essentially a conflation of sections 101 and 102 in determining 
patentable subject matter. There are some similarities with Parke-Davis. It was found in 
1926 that pernicious anemia patients benefitted from including substantial amounts of 
cattle livers in their diet.
579
 For the next twenty years, researchers struggled to isolate 
and identify the substance in the liver which created the anti-pernicious anemia 
effect.
580
 In 1947, Merck researchers isolated a pure, red crystalline material from 
several fermentates of microorganisms and the livers of cattle. The isolated crystalline 
material possessed the same chemical structure and function to that of the fermentates.  
The Merck researchers labelled this pure substance as a vitamin and because it was 
water-soluble, it was put in the B group, and was given the number “12” since it was the 
twelfth member to be added.
581
 Like in Parke-Davis, the isolated and purified vitamin 
B12 swiftly displaced the rudimentary extracts previously on the market.
582
  The issue 
before the Court pertained to the product claims entitled “Vitamin B (12)-Active 
Composition and Process of Preparing Same.”583 Merck’s patent claims were directed at 
the composition vitamin B12, which had a level of activity lower than the pure 
substance.
584
 The District Court held the product claims invalid, maintaining that the 
                                               
577 See supra note 133, Conley& Makowski at 325. 
578Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Circuit 1958) 
579 Ibid, 158. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Ibid, 160. 
582 Ibid, 158. 
583 Ibid, 157. 
584 The process claims of the patent were not the issue in this case, as they were withdrawn from the case. 
Ibid, 157. 
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claims covered a 'product of nature' based on evidence that the claimed B12 compound 
existed naturally in the livers of cattle and, thus, there was no invention.
585
  
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, maintaining Merck’s creation 
was not a product of nature and provided an appraisal of the doctrine:  
There is nothing in the language of the [Patent] Act [of 1952] which precludes the issuance of a 
patent upon a ‘product of nature’ when it is a ‘new and useful composition of matter’ and there 
is compliance with the specified conditions for patentability. All of the tangible things with 
which man deals and for which patent protection is granted are products of nature in the sense 
that nature provides the basic source materials. The ‘matter’ of which patentable new and useful 
compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing elements and materials.
586
 
 
 Two main points can be taken from this statement. First, whilst the Court 
recognized the ongoing strength of the doctrine, it undercut the power of the doctrine by 
interpreting the doctrine as a ‘label’ rather than a ‘freestanding bar to patentability.’587 
Where as in Latimer, the product of nature doctrine was regarded as a separate 
restriction to patentable subject matter, the court in Merck construed a product of nature 
as a category for claimed products which are not ‘new’ or ‘useful’: “A product which is 
not a ‘new and useful’ machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’ is not 
patentable, for it is not within the statutory definition of those things which may be 
patented.”588 Reading the doctrine as a mere identifier of claimed compositions that are 
not “new and useful” significantly redefines the boundaries of the product of nature 
doctrine. Secondly, in identifying the doctrine as a category label for things that are not 
‘new and useful,’ the court narrowed the scope and meaning of “products of nature.” 
The compositions of the patent here have all the novelty and utility required by the Act for 
patentability. They never existed before; there was nothing comparable to them. If we regard 
them as a purification of the active principle in natural fermentates, the natural fermentates are 
quite useless, while the patented compositions are of great medicinal and commercial 
value….The new and useful compositions are not the same as the old, but new and useful 
compositions entitled to the protection of the patent.589 
 
                                               
585 Merck & Company, Inc., v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., D.C.W.D.Va., 152 F.Supp. 690. 1957. 
586 Ibid, 161-162. 
587 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 327. 
588 Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Circuit 1958) at 
162. 
589 Ibid, 164. 
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The Merck decision altered the meaning of the doctrine from Latimer, in which 
the main question in considering whether a claimed substance constituted a product of 
nature was whether it was differentiable from the natural correspondent. If the claimed 
object was not distinguishable, then it was declared unpatentable irrespective of how 
useful or surprising its detection may be. But in Merck, the product of nature doctrine 
was tied to novelty and utility.
590
  The court remarked on the novelty of the claimed 
product: “The new product, not just the method, had such advantageous characteristics 
as to replace the liver products. What was produced was in no sense an old product.”591 
Also puzzling was the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on the claimed substance’s utility and 
value to society. “The patentees have given us for the first time a medicine which can be 
used successfully in the treatment of pernicious anemia, a medicine which avoids the 
dangers and disadvantages of the liver extracts, the only remedies available prior to this 
invention.”592 These interpretations made by the Fourth Circuit seem to recommend that 
the abundant utility of a claimed product alone can trump the product of nature doctrine 
in determining patentable subject matter.
593
 This is in contrast with the conventional 
view of the product of nature, which was as a primary and autonomous barrier which 
must be surpassed before utility, novelty and non-obviousness could be measured.    
Merck and some of the other purity cases…seem to treat the patentable subject matter standard 
as nothing more than a summary of the novelty, utility and non-obviousness requirements. By 
treating the product of nature doctrine as merely a subset of the novelty test (and by finding 
utility somehow relevant to whether something is a product of nature), those cases effectively 
hold that if a claimed invention is novel (in section 102 terms), useful and non-obvious, then it 
automatically comprises patentable subject matter.594 
 
This case put forward an exception to the general principle that renders natural 
products as unpatentable: as long as the claimed product is purified or modified, it can 
                                               
590 Novelty was relevant almost as an afterthought: the inherent unpatentability of a product of nature 
could be restated in terms of the impossibility of anything found in nature being new.” See supra note 
133, Conley & Makowski at 329. 
591 Merck & Company v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation 116 U.S.P.Q. 484 (4th Circuit 1958) at 
163. 
592 Ibid, 164. 
593 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 329. 
594 Ibid, 330. 
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be patented. The conception that purification can singlehandedly differentiate a claimed 
product from a naturally occurring one ultimately took command in the subject matter 
case law.
595
  
However, current biotechnology practice has once again adopted the traditional 
understanding of patentable subject matter and put aside the logic of Merck and those of 
the purification cases. This thesis argues that this is due to the slackening of the 
application of the product of nature doctrine, combined with the treatment of 
biotechnology inventions as chemical patents that has allowed gene patents to flourish 
for thirty years. 
4.3.5. Summary of the product of nature doctrine after Chakrabarty 
 What can be derived from the above discussion about the status of the product of 
nature doctrine is the following:
596
 
1. The status of patentable subject matter for an invention is a separate and distinct 
issue that is to be decided by the courts without reference to novelty, utility and 
non-obviousness. The question to be decided is whether the claimed subject 
matter falls within one of the categories of patentable subject matter: an invented 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. 
2. Product of nature is a section 101 subject matter query. If the claims are found to 
constitute a product of nature, then it cannot be an invented machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter. As a result, a product of nature should be 
deemed unpatentable subject matter without having to assess its novelty, utility 
or non-obviousness. 
3. However, there have been cases where the courts have considered questions of 
novelty and utility in deliberating the product of nature doctrine. Some courts 
                                               
595 Ibid, 326. 
596 The following six points are based on Conley & Makowski at 377-379, supra note 133. 
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have dealt with the doctrine as a label for claimed inventions which are found to 
lack novelty, rather than as a separate and distinct bar to patentability. 
4. The approach in point 3 has been renounced by the Supreme Court decision in 
Chakrabarty. 
5. The distinction between a product of nature and an invented machine, 
manufacture and composition matter is unclear. Some guidance can be found in 
the Supreme Court decisions in Funk and Chakrabarty who provided examples 
of two types of inventions that fall on either side of the line. In Funk, the court 
maintained that the mixing of different strains of bacteria that could occur in 
nature but had not been detected constituted the plain discovery of a product of 
nature. In Chakrabarty, the court maintained that the introduction of new DNA 
into a bacterium to produce an organism that does not naturally exist is the 
invention of a composition of matter. This means that it is not adequate to 
merely combine existing biological entities without doing any more. Equally, it 
is satisfactory to change the genetic composition of a species into something that 
does not presumably occur in nature. 
6. Decisions resulting from the lower courts have not been accommodating in 
demarcating the line between a product of nature and a patentable invention. 
This is because courts have been inconsistent in how they address product of 
nature. Some have interpreted it as a section 101 subject matter query, whilst 
others have dealt with it as a section 102 novelty question or section 103 non-
obviousness question, or some have combined all three in assessing product of 
nature.  Yet, what has consistently emerged is that a claimed invention derived 
from a living organism must be different in some significant and substantial way 
from its natural counterpart. In deciding this, courts have looked to both the 
chemical structure and the characteristics of the matter at issue. In addition, there 
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has been the common suggestion that purification can, in principle, operate to 
differentiate a claimed matter from its naturally occurring equivalent. 
4.3.6. The product of nature doctrine and current biotechnology practice 
Natural compounds like DNA sequences and proteins are not ‘living’ per se, but 
naturally occur. Until recently, under US patent law, they have been patentable provided 
they are new and purified from nature.
597
 This is because patent claims for DNA 
sequences have been considered to be chemical molecules no different from other 
chemicals and as such, have been treated like chemical patents in which ‘isolated’ and 
‘purified’ have become magic words to overcome the product of nature objection.598 
Although claims to DNA sequences may prompt the product of nature exclusion, courts 
have upheld patent claims for isolated and purified DNA sequences as new 
compositions of matter stemming from human intervention.
599
 
[B]y 1991, the Federal Circuit had acquiesced in the proposition that the words “purified and 
isolated” were sufficient to distinguish a claimed gene from its naturally occurring 
counterpart…The acceptance of this fundamental distinction by the courts and the USPTO has 
underlain all subsequent gene patenting.600 
 
 This is reflected in what is one of the most important Federal Circuit 
biotechnology cases in Amgen Inc. v. Chughai Pharmaceutical Co. (“Amgen”).601 Three 
companies battled over the patent rights to the genetic sequences which encoded the 
human erythropoietin (EPO) protein, which promotes the production of red blood cells. 
Amgen’s patent claims were quite broad: “A purified and isolated DNA sequence 
consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin.”602 This 
means that Amgen claimed all purified and isolated genetic sequences that coded for the 
                                               
597 See 66 Federal Register 1093, 2001 and Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., et al. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013) 
598 See Golden, J. “Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention 
in the American System” in Emory Law Journal. Vol.50, 2001 at 128 and Conley & Makowski, supra 
note 133 at 381. 
599 See 66 Federal Register 1093, 2001 
600Conley, J. “Gene Patents and the Product of Nature Doctrine” in Chicago-Kent Law Review.Vol.84, 
No.1, pp.109-132, 2009-2010 at 116.  
601 Amgen Inc. v. Chughai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 12000 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
602Ibid, 1204. 
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EPO protein. The court held that the DNA sequences were patentable provided they 
were newly “purified and isolated” sequences from the original source found in nature. 
The invention as claimed in the ‘008 patent is not as plaintiff argues the DNA sequence 
encoding human EPO since that is a nonpatentable natural phenomenon ‘free to all men and 
reserved to none’…Rather, the invention…is the ‘purified and isolated’ DNA sequence encoding 
erythropoietin.603 
 
  Although the case did not mention the “product of nature” doctrine by name, it 
signifies the negligible part the doctrine should perform. It seems that after Chakrabarty 
and Amgen, a “specialized interpretation of the purification rule” had “all but mooted 
the product of nature doctrine.”604 
  It is submitted that purity should be assessed if the claimed product is different 
from its naturally occurring counterpart “in kind”, rather than merely “in degree.” This 
means that purity is only a beginning for patentability if it results in a material 
difference between the claimed product and its natural predecessor.
605
 Chisum 
maintains that what can be derived from Parke-Davis is that a claim to purity offers a 
review into the physical alteration; it does not offer a blanket exemption from the 
product of nature inspection.
606
 Chisum further noted that a new utility may be 
indicative of a claimed substance being different “in kind” from the naturally occurring 
compound: 
Thus, the aspirin exception to the purity rule comes into play only if the new pure compound 
differs ‘in kind’ rather than merely ‘in degree’ from the old compound. A difference ‘in kind’ 
will normally be found only if the new pure compound has an entirely new utility from the old 
one.607 
 
In 2000, the USPTO issued revised utility guidelines which demonstrated the 
organization’s pragmatic departure from the product of nature doctrine.608 It is 
maintained that the Office perceived the utility requirements to be a means to regulate 
                                               
603 Ibid. 
604 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 381. 
605 Ibid, 386. 
606 Chisum, D. Chisum on Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity and Infringement. 
New York: Matthew Bender, 1978-, Release 140, 2013 at 57. 
607 Ibid. 
608United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Utility Examination Guidelines” in Federal Register. Vol. 
66, No.4, Friday, January 5, 2001. Pp.1092-1099. 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf.Accessed October 18, 2012. 
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the abundance of gene related patents, and wanted to constrict its utility standards.
609
 In 
addition, the focus on changing its examination procedures regarding utility is a 
reflection of the widely-held belief that the utility requirement is an arduous hurdle to 
acquiring patents in biotechnology.
610
 The reason for this belief is that it has become 
standard routine to identify base pair sequences, but more difficult to identify the 
function of those sequences.
611
  
The 2001 guidelines require that the patent claims include a “specific and 
substantial utility” which “would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in 
the art” to satisfy the ‘usefulness’ requirement under Section 101, which excludes 
‘throw-away,’ ‘insubstantial,’ and ‘non-specific’ utilities.612  This requirement will have 
an effect on biotech patent applications, particularly those connected to DNA like ESTs. 
In other words, if the claimed invention fails to perform a ‘specific and substantial 
utility,’ then it may be rejected for a patent under Section 101 and 112. 
This requirement that the disclosed utility be ‘specific and substantial’ is aimed 
at resolving the issues that have come up in biotechnology. The utility requirement may 
be difficult to satisfy for genetic inventions because a substantial amount of research is 
required to be able to confirm a speculated utility. However, finding one specific, 
substantial and credible function may not be adequate to satisfy the utility requirement, 
because the substance may have more than one function. A sequence can target 
numerous different genes, and several DNA sequences can code for the same gene, 
which is why product claims for entire genetic sequences may be inappropriate in scope. 
                                               
609 See supra note 133, Conley & Makowski at 381. 
610 See Dastgheib-Vinarov, Sara. “Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting 
Biomedical Research from the Big Chill” in Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review. Pp.143-180. 
(2000). Similarly, see Forman, Julian David. “Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in 
Biotechnology Patent Applications” in Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology.Vol.12. Pp. 647-
682. (2001-2002). 
611 Holman, M. & S. Munzer. “Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration 
Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags” in Iowa Law Review. Vol. 85, No.3, March 2000 at 758-760. 
612 United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Utility Examination Guidelines” in Federal Register. Vol. 
66, No.4, Friday, January 5, 2001 at 1098. 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf. Accessed October 18, 2012. 
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This could have blocking effects on downstream research on the substance if 
researchers find associated functions that are specific, substantial and credible. 
Another issue related to utility is whether it is a ‘predicted utility’ or ‘real world 
utility.’613 Concerning DNA fragments, this means that the patent application must 
demonstrate that the fragment is useful in the ‘real world.’ Another instance is when a 
newly isolated protein is claimed to be useful, yet its function is unknown. Thus, 
inventions which need further investigation to determine what their ‘real world’ 
functions are deemed to lack utility. This approach is in harmony with Brenner v. 
Mason.
614
 This assessment is a means of narrowing the claims in which utility is 
demonstrated, and of fully rejecting claims that fail to demonstrate substantial and 
specific utility. By enacting these new utility guidelines, the US patent office is 
attempting to deter claimed inventions which satisfy the ‘usefulness’ category merely 
because they could be used as landfill. 
The USPTO invited comments regarding gene patents after publishing its new 
Interim Utility Guidelines on December 21, 1999.
615
 The 2000 revised guidelines 
included the comments and also the USPTO’s responses to those comments. 
Revealingly, the Office published the comments pertaining to the utility requirement 
and many of them went beyond the topic of utility and addressed the patentable subject 
matter: 
Several comments state that while inventions are patentable, discoveries are not patentable. 
According to the comments, genes are discoveries rather than inventions. These comments urge 
the USPTO not to issue patents for genes on the ground that genes are not inventions.616 
 
                                               
613 As some scholars note, it is difficult to find the ‘real world’ utility of miRNAs. See Bonnie W McLeod 
et al., ‘The ‘real world’ utility of miRNA patents: lessons learned from expressed sequence tags,’ Nature 
Biotechnology. Vol. 29, no. 2, February 2011 at 129. 
614Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) 
615United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, Requests for 
Comments” in Federal Register.Vol.64, Iss. 224. Pp. 71440-71442. December 21, 1999. 
616 United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Utility Examination Guidelines” in Federal Register. Vol. 
66, No.4, Friday, January 5, 2001 at 1092. 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf. Accessed October 18, 2012. 
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 However, the Office rejected this approach and responded by declaring that the 
isolation, purification and synthesis of DNA sequences would make them eligible for 
patent protection: 
A patent claim directed to an isolated and purified DNA molecule could cover, e.g., a gene 
excised from a natural chromosome or a synthesized DNA molecule. An isolated and purified 
DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent 
because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as an article of 
manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) 
synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is different from 
the naturally occurring compound.
 617
 
 
The terms ‘isolation,’ ‘purification,’ and ‘synthesis’ have been used 
synonymously by the USPTO in holding DNA molecules to be patentable once they are 
isolated, purified or synthesized from their chemical origins. This meaning is 
disconcerting in numerous respects, because it is based on the notion that DNA 
molecules are merely chemical compounds. As Arti Rai compellingly advocates: 
“Although DNA is, obviously, enough, a chemical compound, it is more fundamentally 
a carrier of information.”618 As a result, the value of DNA molecules is not just an end 
product in itself, but also a necessary means for further innovation.
619
 Therefore, 
making the leap from regular chemicals to DNA sequences and the resulting products is 
a doubtful suggestion. It is submitted that these utility examination guidelines are 
somewhat incoherent because they confuse isolation with purification and synthetic 
biology.  
4.4. Patenting Human Genetic Materials in Europe 
Article 52 of the European Patent Convention
620
 (EPC) is comparable to 35 
U.S.C. §101, in that both address patentable subject matter. The EPC clearly states that 
patents are only to be granted for inventions, although it does not provide a statutory 
                                               
617 Ibid, 1093. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf.Accessed October 18, 
2012. 
618 Rai, A. “Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology,” in Wake Forest 
Law Review. Vol. 34. 1999 at 836. 
619 See supra note 133, Conley and Makowski at 387. 
620 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 1973, 
Munich. 
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definition of the concept of an invention.
621
 But the mere presence of an invention is 
insufficient to warrant a patent, as there are other patentable requirements which include 
novelty, inventive step and susceptibility to industrial application.
622
 In addition, the 
patent claim has to fulfil the written description requirements which must be clear, 
concise and supported by the description.
623
  
The EPC includes a list of exclusion provisions in  Articles 52(2) and (3) by 
excluding certain subject matter: (a) discoveries, (emphasis) (b) scientific theories and 
mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; 
(d) presentations of information.
624
 This list of exclusions, in reference to Article 52(1) 
of the EPC, holds that items that are abstract in nature and lacking of technical attributes 
fall beyond the scope of what is deemed to be an invention. This list of exclusions, in 
reference to Article 52(1) of the EPC, can be considered a negative definition of 
“invention”. 
4.4.1. Discoveries and Inventions 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the explicit exclusionary provision 
regarding discoveries as stated in Article 52 (2) (a) EPC. Some guidance can be 
obtained from the Examination Guidelines for the EPO on the distinction between a 
discovery and an invention, stating that a discovery as such is abstract and does not 
possess a technical nature in itself, which is why it is excluded from patent protection: 
“If a new property of a known material or article is found out, that is mere discovery 
and unpatentable because discovery as such has no technical effect and is therefore not 
                                               
621 There is no definition of an ‘invention’ in the EPC, and an search through the Travaux Préparatoires 
does not provide any further assistance as to the definition. See: European Patent Office. Travaux 
Préparatoires EPC 1973. Available at: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/archive/epc-
1973/traveaux.html.  Accessed November 8, 2013.  
622 In addition, the patent claim has to fulfil the written description requirements which must be clear, 
concise and supported by the description. Article 84 of the EPC states: “The claims shall define the matter 
for which protection is sought. They shall be clear and concise and be supported by the description.” 
623 EPC Article 84: “The claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought. They shall be clear 
and concise and be supported by the description.” 
624 EPC Article 52(2) 
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an invention within the meaning of Art.52(1).”625 However, a discovery can be the 
source of an invention if it is practically applied in some manner, such as: 
[T]hat of a substance occurring in nature which is found to have an antibiotic effect. In addition, 
if a microorganism is discovered to exist in nature and to produce an antibiotic, the 
microorganism itself may also be patentable as one aspect of the invention. Similarly, a gene 
which is discovered to exist in nature may be patentable if a technical effect is revealed, e.g. its 
use in making a certain polypeptide or in gene therapy.626   
 
This is also recognized in Article 52 (3) EPC which restricts the limitations on 
the exclusions from patentability to the extent to which the patent claims are directed at 
the subject matter as such. 
Moreover, while a claim that comprises subject matter found in Article 52(2) 
EPC is not patentable, the restriction does not expand to claims which incorporate both 
technical and non-technical subject matter.  Although discoveries ‘as such’ are 
commonly recognized as the mere identification of what already exists and are thus 
excluded from patent protection, human intervention or a technical application of what 
already exists can establish the distinction between a discovery as such and an 
invention.
627
 This means that inventions which possess both technical and non-technical 
features can be patentable as long as the technical features of the invention do not lie 
within the excluded field of Article 52(2).
628
  
4.4.2. The importance of ‘technical character’ 
In the US, there is a distinction between inherently patentable and inherently 
unpatentable technical subject matter.
629
 Conversely in Europe, this distinction has not 
tended to appear, as the EPO has long considered inherent patentability generously, as 
long as it is for a technical invention.
630
 In Europe, technical subject matter refers to 
                                               
625 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Revised edition, September 2013.  Part G, 
Chapter II, 3.1. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Paterson, G. The European Patent System: The Law and Practice of the European Patent Convention. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001 at 413.  
628 Ibid. 
629 Pila, J. “Isolated Human Genes: The Patent Equivalent of a Non-Copyrightable Sound Recording” in 
Law Quarterly Review (forthcoming) 2014. 
630 See e. g. T 22/85, OJ 1990, 12; T 154/04, OJ 2008, 46 
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subject matter that is the instrumental and observable outcome of any purposive human 
action on the physical world.
631
 This broad understanding of technical subject matter is 
sufficiently generous to sustain the patenting of isolated human genes and is also 
consistent with entrenched EPO case law and legislation in this area.
632
 It is submitted 
that the requirement of an inventor showing an invention is ‘technical’ is a policy lever 
to encourage innovation.  
A reading of Article 52(1) which defines “invention” alongside the exclusionary 
provisions found in Articles 52(2) and (3) by the EPO Boards of Appeal suggests that 
an invention is technical when a technical effect is accomplished by the invention or if 
technical considerations are needed to carry out the invention.
633
 This means that 
‘technical character’ is essential to the concept of ‘invention’ when discussing 
patentable subject matter. Even though European jurisprudence shows that patent 
protection is limited to a technical invention,
634
 Sir Robin Jacob maintains that 
“technical” is a fuzzy concept: “what is ‘technical’ (a test often asked) is an easy 
question to ask but not to answer.”635 As a result, it is up to judges to draw the line 
between what is technical and what is not.  
                                               
631 See G 0002/07 (Broccoli/PLANT BIOSCIENCE) of 9.12.10 and G1/08 BROCCOLI & 
TOMATOES/Essentially biological processes [2011] EPOR 27 (Tomatoes 1). These are two important 
decisions that the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EBoA) recently issued 
relating to patenting essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals. The cases 
were combined and in December 2010, the EBoA held that methods for the traditional breeding of plants 
and animals did not amount to technical processes and are therefore unpatentable. The EBoA decided that 
claims directed at any non-microbiological processes for the sexual crossing of the whole genome of 
plants are considered to be ‘essentially biological.’ 
632 See Article 3(2) of EU Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnology Inventions: 
“Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produce by means of a technical 
process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature” as well as HOWARD 
FLOREY/Relaxin [1995] E.P.O.R. 388 
633 “Article 52(1) EPC plainly expresses that patent protection is reserved for creations in the technical 
field. In order to be patentable, the subject-matter claimed must have which have do you need? therefore 
have a ‘technical character’ or, to be more precise, involve a ‘technical teaching’, i.e. an instruction 
addressed to a skilled person as to how to solve a particular technical problem using particular technical 
means.” Official Journal of the European Patent Office Special Edition. 4, 2007. p48. 
634 See e. g. T 22/85, OJ 1990, 12; T 154/04, OJ 2008, 46 
635 Jacob, R. “Woolly Lines in Intellectual Property Law,” in Patents and Technological Progress in a 
Globalized World. Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. (eds.) Berlin: Springer, 2009 at 787. 
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For instance, the EPO Board of Appeal in Novartis
636
 noted that a patent claim 
for a specific plant variety as the subject matter is not patentable. However, claims in 
which certain plant varieties are not claimed as subject matter are not excluded from 
patentability. The Novartis decision was so influential on European practice that the 
decision is reflected in the EPO’s Implementing Guidelines, which held that inventions 
regarding plants and animals were patentable as long as the technical feasibility was not 
restricted to an individual plant or animal variety.
637
 This can account for the patents 
granted for transgenic plants, which are not claimed as plant varieties in the application. 
Also, in T 154/04,
638
 ‘technical subject matter’ was defined for the first time, 
which included the causal, perceivable result of a purposive human action on the 
physical world. In addition, this expansive understanding of a technical invention is 
found in the ‘broccoli’ and ‘tomato’ cases.639 But lately, the expansive understanding of 
inherent patentability reinforced by the EPO was confronted before the Enlarged Board 
of Appeal in Tomatoes II.
640
 The issue in this case was whether a technical plant or 
animal is excluded from patentability if the process used to make it is essentially 
biological. The problem surfaces because essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals are excluded from patentability. Article 53(b) EPC 
prohibits patents for plant and animal varieties.
641
 However, plants and animals are 
patentable provided the technical feasibility of the invention is not constrained to a plant 
or animal variety.
642
 As stated in Tomatoes I, the EPO’s interpretation of that exclusion 
includes any conventional plant breeding process which, even if it involves the use of 
                                               
636
 Novartis, Decision T 1054/9S Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.4. 1997. 
637
 EPC Rule 23c (b): “Biotechnological inventions shall also be patentable if they concern plants or 
animals if the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety.” 
638 T 154/04 Duns Licensing Associates/Estimating Sales Activity [2007] EPOR 38 
639 G2/07 & G1/08 BROCCOLI & TOMATOES/Essentially biological processes [2011] EPOR 27 
(Tomatoes 1). 
640 Case G 2/12 - Referral under Art 112(1)a) EPC by the Technical Board of Appeal T 1242/06 - 3.3.04 
(Appl. No. 00940724.8) to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, pending under Ref. N° G 2/12 (Tomatoes II).   
641 Article 53(b) of the EPC 
642 See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 1998. In fact, the EPO 
began granting patents for plants and animals in the beginning of the 19909s. 
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technical means, is distinguished by the fact that the traits of the plant or animal 
resulting from it are governed by underlying natural forces and not by the technical 
process itself.
643
  
4.4.3. Ordre Public and Morality 
Objections to increasing fields of patentable subject matter may be linked to 
arguments stemming from morality, particularly with respect to patenting inventions 
derived from hESCs. In the US, arguments based on morality have failed to gain any 
ground. There is the opinion that, in the US, the courts have declined to make moral 
judgements in patent cases involving innovative technologies.
644
 In regards to the patent 
office, the courts have argued that patent examiners’ influence should be limited to their 
technical expertise in assessing an invention’s patentability requirements.645 As a result, 
through case law, issues of morality and ethics are not within the realm of patent offices 
but left to Congress.
646
 
However, in Europe, there is greater room for morality arguments to be heard in 
an official setting, given the morality clause in Article 53 of the EPC and Article 6.1 of 
the Directive 98/44/EC.
647
 Moral concepts in patent law are found in the Strasbourg 
Convention (1963), which influenced the EPC (1973).
648
 Article 53(a) of the EPC 
excludes patent protection for any invention “the publication or exploitation of which is 
contrary to morality or ordre public.” Article 6 of Directive 98/44/EC excludes some 
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644 Whitehill, J. “Patenting Human Embryonic Stem Cells: What is so Immoral?” in Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 34, Issue 3, pp. (2009) at 1075. 
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646 Ibid at 1075. 
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648The 1977 Guidelines for Examination by the EPO explain the policy basis of how Article 53 (a) should 
be interpreted, which is “to consider whether it is probable that the public in general would regard the 
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inventions on moral and ethical grounds.
649
 Whilst Article 6(1) contains the morality 
clause which states that inventions cannot be patented if their commercial exploitation 
is contrary to the ordre public or morality, Article 6(2) provides a list of unpatentable 
inventions. These provisions are in line with Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which allows Member States to prohibit the commercial exploitation of inventions that 
is “necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment.” This means Member 
States would be required to show that commercial exploitation of the invention would 
be contrary to ordre public or morality. Although the provision has been applied in 
regional legislation, such as Article 53(a) in the EPC and underlined in Article 6(1) in 
Directive 98/44/EC, the exception has not sanctioned a common exclusion of the 
patentability of living organisms. 
 A. Article 53(a) EPC 
Article 53(a) of the EPC is relevant when discussing the patentability of DNA 
sequences and biotechnology inventions. The article denies patents for inventions 
whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to the ordre public or morality.
650
 
The concept has been developed in paltry case law as “the culture inherent in European 
society and civilisation.”651 However, Article 53(a) of the EPC is not a suitable 
instrument for establishing exceptions to patentability. First, it is difficult to determine 
                                               
649Article 6 of Directive 98/44/EC: 
“1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
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650 Article 53(a) of the EPC 
651 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The Ethics of Patenting DNA. London: Nuffield Council, 2002 at 
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what the “public in general” believes is right and wrong, who the group 
includes/excludes, and how to measure the general consensus, if there is one. The 
Guidelines do not address this question. It is suggested that the lack of guidance and 
clarity from the Guidelines is an indication that “the EPO Guidelines support the view 
that it was never, and is not now, the intention of the drafters of the EPC to permit 
European institutions to determine patentability using moral criteria on anything more 
than a cursory basis. That the Guidelines are unclear is testament to the fact that there 
exists no single European concept of morality.”652 
B. Objections to morality considerations in patent law 
The morality/ordre public consideration as an exclusion of patentability has 
been argued by some scholars as inappropriate in a European Directive.
653
 This can be 
particularly problematic in terms of implementation given that each legal system within 
an EU Member State may have a different opinion of what constitutes morality. This is 
not aided by the presence of a legal gap in common assessment of this undefined legal 
term.  As there is no single European concept of morality, it may be helpful if the EPO 
Member States develop a stance on the role of morality within the patent system in 
order to develop effective harmonized legislation. The revised 2000 EPC shows that 
exceptions to patentability are determined not simply on substantive patentability 
criteria, but also on ethical principles and social policy, which add even more confusion 
to biotech patent applications.
654
 Both the 2000 EPC and EPO cases indicate that 
morality should be handled by European institutions, which must be worked out 
practically in national legislation. Unless individual Member States do that, the 
implications of EPO jurisprudence will continue to dictate what and potentially cause 
more confusion. Also, because there is no criterion for assessing ordre public and 
                                               
652Mills, O. Biotechnological Inventions: Moral Restraints and Patent Law.  England: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2010 at 56. 
653 Chemtob-Concé M. C. et Gallochat A., Le Brevetabilité des inventions technologiques appliquées à 
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morality, divergent approaches to biotech inventions amongst member states could 
continue.  
Stephen Crespi proposes that there needs to be an “overwhelming consensus that 
a particular invention is immoral” before a patent should be revoked: “[i]t should not be 
invoked by patent authorities merely on the basis that some section of society condemns 
the activity as immoral.”655 In a similar vein, Lord Hoffman believes that ethics and 
morals should in some way be incorporated into the patent system, but only for 
activities that are especially repulsive, like creating human monsters, and that the 
exclusions in the Biotech Directive are a good example of excludable patentable subject 
matter for matters relating to ethics and morality. Lord Hoffman states: 
The only reason I can think of on ethical grounds for not granting a patent is that what you’re 
trying to patent is an activity which is so repulsive that the state ought not to give its support to it 
by property or monopoly. But there are very few activities that fall into that category.656 
 
In fact, a reading of case law reveals there are already issues with biotech 
inventions meeting the substantive criteria of patentability, and morality creates further 
difficulties if it is introduced as another requirement for patentability.
657
 Even if there is 
a moral policy, it is questionable whether it can clearly set out its goals and whether 
they can be achieved through the patent system. If these questions can be answered, 
there is the further necessary consideration of balancing the economic and moral 
policies equally.
658
 Unfortunately, there is no legal test in respect to assessing what 
counts as offensive to morality. Thus, it is up to the courts and the patent offices to 
decide what type of invention would offend public morality. The EPO has attempted to 
shed more light on the concept by suggesting that the test be based on whether the 
                                               
655Crespi, S. “An Analysis of Moral Issues Affecting Patenting Inventions in the Life Sciences: A 
European Perspective” in Science and Engineering Ethics (2000) Vol. 6 at 163. 
656 Interview with Lord Hoffman, March 21, 2012.  
657 See supra note 652, Mills, O. at 11: Patent law “is not designed, or, indeed, appropriate to regulate 
biotechnology and any attempt to do so, in particular by denying patents on the basis of morality, is 
misplaced as such a solution does not match the nature of the problem...There is little doubt that 
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patent law.”  
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public deems such an activity as so ‘abhorrent’ that granting a patent on said activity 
would  be ‘inconceivable’.659 
Moreover, some patent professionals are doubtful of the correctness of inserting 
ethical considerations into patent law, which is mainly focused on the evaluation of 
novelty, inventive step and utility/industrial applicability. Patent law “is not a suitable 
medium for the raising of philosophical objections to the patenting of living organisms 
and genetic inventions.”660 Rather, there is the view that any questions of morality 
should be handled by the national legislators rather than the patent system.
661
 
I don’t think there is a place for the moral aspect here. It should be outside patent law, definitely. 
I think there’s an ongoing debate, as there always is in terms of national and international ethical 
issues which you can bring philosophers and scientists in [to], and they will discuss that. 
Government[s] themselves will or will not approve those components. I don’t think you need to 
bring it into a case of patents because then it becomes very confusing as to what exactly are the 
issues. What you should try to address is: is it moral? Is it ethical? Or is it a business decision? 
So I would prefer that those issues are actually dealt with at a national level rather than a patent 
level.
662
 
C. Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems NV 
In Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems NV,
663
 Greenpeace objected to an 
application claiming herbicide-resistant transgenic plants, arguing that the creation of 
the engineered plant was immoral and contravened Article 53(a) of the EPC. 
Greenpeace further elaborated that it was immoral to claim ownership of plants, which 
were the common heritage of mankind. At the European Patent Office Boards of 
Appeal, the panel sided with the examination’s view that it was not the appropriate 
forum for discussing the “pros and contras” of the genetic engineering of plants.664  
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D. Harvard/Onco-Mouse T 19/90 
Likewise, in Harvard/Onco-Mouse T 19/90,
665 
the Examining Division at first 
instance of the EPO did not apply Article 53(a) to the case, as the Division reasoned that 
patent law was not the right legislative tool for resolving such problems, although it did 
list some ethical issues related to patenting higher organisms. At the Technical Board of 
Appeal, however, the board held that in that particular case, there were compelling 
reasons to assess the ethical and moral questions in relation to patent eligibility, and 
remitted the case back to the Examining Division, which was required to carry out the 
balancing test.
666
 
This thesis maintains that the granting of an exclusive right to an invention for 
twenty years is mostly ethically neutral. This is because a patent is representative of a 
state stamp of approval on an invention, which signifies that the invention is worthy of 
an exclusive right. It is up to human action whether a patent is enforced or not. A patent 
enables the patent holder to exclude others from infringing on the patent but if 
infringement does occur, there are several options available to choose from. One option 
is for the patent holder to sue the alleged infringer. Second, the patent holder can offer 
the alleged infringer a license for the patented invention. And third, if the infringement 
is not serious or worth the cost of litigation, the patent holder can ignore the 
infringement. It can be argued, then, that patenting itself as an action is not inherently 
right or wrong, as “[t]he grant of a patent is an event from which nothing follows 
consequentially and inevitably in terms of human action.”667 Therefore, patenting, as 
such, is ethically neutral. However, what can be ethically contentious are particular 
inventions, for instance, those directed or derived from hESCs.  
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4.4.4. Directive 98/44/EC 
European policy makers acknowledged that the products and processes of 
modern biotechnology are not as well adapted as to the traditional principles of 
patentability and issued  the Directive 98/44/EC for Biotechnological Inventions (1998), 
which required the EU Member States to adopt and harmonize their legislation 
pertaining to biotechnology inventions.
668
 Article 1 of the Directive includes the broad 
requirement to protect biotechnological inventions, although there is no definition of a 
biotechnological invention in Directive 98/44/EC.
669
 However, the Administrative 
Council of the EPO provides the following definition:  
“Biotechnological inventions” are inventions which concern a product consisting of or 
containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, 
processed or used.670 
 
This definition includes DNA-derived inventions like isolated DNA sequences 
and the encoding gene.
671
  However, Article 52(2) (a) EPC states that discoveries are 
not patentable. This clear exclusion of discoveries may seem to be at odds with the 
enclosure of biological materials within the capacity of patentable inventions in 
Directive 98/44/EC, which illustrates the complexities of the boundaries between 
                                               
668 The EPC was not created by the EU. Thus, EU directives do not have a binding effect on the EPO. But 
in 1999, the Administrative Council of the EPO decided to include provisions of the EU Biotech 
Directive in their Implementing Regulations by creating a new Chapter VI  “Biotechnological Inventions” 
in Part II of the EPC Implementing Regulations. See Official Journal of the EPO, Administrative Council 
of June 16, 1999, amending the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, available 
at: http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj99/7_99/7_4379.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2014. 
669 The EPO Examination Guidelines provide the following definition: 
“‘Biotechnological’ inventions are inventions which concern a product consisting of or containing 
biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used. 
‘Biological material’ means any material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself 
or being reproduced in a biological system.”  Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, 
Revised edition, September 2013.  Part G, 5.1. 
670 See Official Journal of the EPO, Administrative Council of June 16, 1999, amending the 
Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, available at: 
http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj99/7_99/7_4379.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2014. Rule 23b. 
671 Rule 23c maintains that inventions which encompass biological materials like DNA, microbiological 
processes, plants and animals are patentable. However, the claimed invention is patentable only if the 
technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a certain plant or animal variety. See Official 
Journal of the EPO, Administrative Council of June 16, 1999, amending the Implementing Regulations to 
the European Patent Convention, available at: http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj99/7_99/7_4379.pdf. 
Accessed May 5, 2014. Rule 23b. 
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discoveries (which are not patentable) and biotechnological inventions (which are 
protected). 
Moreover, certain inventions are excluded from patent protection because they 
would transgress the EPC’s ban on patents whose commercial exploitation is contrary to 
the ordre public or morality:  
 Processes for cloning human beings 
 Processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings 
 Uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes 
 Processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely 
to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or 
animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.
672
 
4.4.5. Isolation and purification: sidestepping the product of nature objection 
In the EPO, an isolated and or purified DNA sequence is not patentable without 
disclosing a function, which is in line with industrial application requirements. Since the 
1980s, the techniques of isolation and purification have become increasingly accepted 
as a justification for removing a DNA sequence from the unpatentable realm of either a 
“product of nature” in the US or a “discovery” in the EPO into the ambit of patentable 
subject matter.
673
 The Preamble to Directive 98/44/EC indicated that research regarding 
the isolation of elements of the human body that are deemed valuable to the production 
of medicine should be promoted by the patent system.   
Article 5(1) of Directive 98/44/EC states: “the human body, at the various stages 
of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, 
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable 
inventions.”674 This means a mere DNA sequence without suggestion of a function is 
                                               
672 Article 6 of Directive 98/44/EC 
673 See supra note 133, Conley and Makowski.  
674 Article 5(1) of Directive 98/44/EC 
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deemed not to carry any technical information and therefore is not patentable. Genes 
clearly constitute a part of the human body and this exclusion, at first glance, may imply 
that genes are unpatentable in the EPO.  However, Article 5(2) affirms that naturally 
occurring substances are patentable subject matter provided they are isolated from their 
natural environment.
675
 
This provision is comparable to the ‘human intervention’ element constructed by 
the US Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, and the UK Court in Amgen when it determined 
that gene sequences are only required to be ‘purified and isolated’ to be patentable. 
Article 5(3) of Directive 98/44/EC emphasizes that the importance of the industrial 
application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent 
application.
676
 The inclusion of this clause is likely to be of significance for assessing 
new techniques and products in biotechnology, such as recognizing cDNA as being 
essential for developing diagnostic therapies.  
According to the EPO, biotechnological inventions are patentable under the EPC 
even if they already occur in nature, provided they are isolated from their natural 
environment.  This also applies to the human body, where an element like a gene 
sequence that is isolated from the body using a technical process can be patented.  This 
reaffirms Rule 29(1) and (2) of the EPC. 
4.4.6. Limitations of Article 5(2) of Directive 98/44/EC 
In respect to the human body, Article 5(2) of Directive 98/44/EC is inadequate 
and outdated given the current state of biomedical research. There are three reasons why 
Article 5 is no longer relevant. First, the isolation and purification technique has become 
a standard research tool. Unless there is a new and better isolation technique that is 
developed, products which are isolated and purified should not be perceived as new and 
inventive. Moreover, the concept of isolation and purification is inadequate. It is a legal 
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term, artificially constructed to draw a line between what is/not patentable pertaining to 
human genetic information. However, the concept of isolation has been adopted by the 
EPO and USPTO with a legal value. In the US, this has taken place through case law. In 
the EU, this development was through the enactment of Directive 98/44/EC. It is 
submitted that principles such as ‘isolation,’ ‘purification’ and ‘modification’ of 
naturally occurring substances are emphasized in determining whether the claimed 
product or process constitutes an ‘invention,’ ridding decision makers the task of 
making decisions based on policy.  
4.5. Patenting isolated genes in the EPO and US 
4.5.1. AMP v. Myriad (2013) 
In the United States, isolated genes are no longer considered inventions after 
Myriad because they are ‘products of nature.’677 The Supreme Court decided whether 
Myriad’s claimed isolated DNA sequences were products of nature using Chakrabarty’s 
“markedly different” test. The ‘markedly different’ test is now being utilized in 
assessing whether there is a difference in the information between the claimed sequence 
and the naturally occurring one. The Supreme Court maintained that Myriad’s BRCA 
sequences were not ‘markedly different’ from the naturally occurring sequences. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to provide further clarification of what the 
                                               
677 Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013) 
Ten amicus briefs were filed from groups with an economic stake in biotechnology patents. These groups 
included Genentech, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the New York Patent Law 
Association, and the American Society for Microbiology, the American Patent Law Association, the 
American Bar Association, James Watson, Eric Lander and James Watson.  James Watson, co-discoverer 
of the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid, maintains that human genes should not be 
patented, emphasizing the informational nature of a gene and that it is a product of nature.  See: Brief of 
James D. Watson, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party. The Association of Molecular 
Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., No. 12-398. 2013 at 4. The American Bar Association 
submitted that isolated DNA compounds should be held eligible for patenting. Otherwise, it would disrupt 
decades of reliance on the Court’s precedent and the USPTO’s practice in allowing such claims. See: 
Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. The Association of 
Molecular Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., No. 12-398. 2013 at 4. Eric Lander, a 
geneticist and molecular biologist, maintained that in the scientific community, it is a well-accepted fact 
that isolated DNA fragments of the human genome (including isolated DNA fragments of the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes) are routinely discovered in the human body and are thus, products of nature and not 
eligible patent subject matter. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party. 
The Association of Molecular Pathology, et al., v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., No. 12-398. 2013 at 29. 
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notion of ‘markedly different characteristics’ encompasses, and how these differ from 
characteristics that are not markedly different. It is uncertain whether the markedly 
different test is based on a different chemical structure or a greater concentration, or 
whether the utility of the claimed function needs to be entirely different from the natural 
function.  
The reason why the case is confusing is because prior to this case, the product of 
nature doctrine had been circumvented by novelty and utility of the invention through 
isolation and purification (Parke-Davis). In the Federal Circuit, the court applied the 
Parke-Davis line of argument to the tools for isolation and purification of genes in 
determining whether they were new and useful.
678
  Novelty was determined by 
considering the chemical differences between the naturally occurring gene and the 
claimed isolated gene, rather than the informational content. For the utility requirement, 
the court considered the isolated sequences useful in developing a diagnostic test for 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. However, this argument was not adopted by the Supreme 
Court, which instead has returned to an ‘old school’ product of nature interpretation as 
found in Latimer and Funk Bros by holding that the claimed isolated genes are not 
markedly different enough to qualify as an invention, which is the first of its kind since 
the industry expected the acts of isolation and purification to overcome the product of 
nature doctrine.  
It is submitted that the observance of isolated genomic sequences as products of 
nature is a result of the emphasis on their informational qualities. As a result, there 
seems to be a shift in perception of DNA, as it is no longer considered to be a mere 
chemical molecule no different from other chemicals. It can be argued that information 
inherent in DNA represents a law of nature, although there are still disagreements over 
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how DNA should be understood.
679
 But for now, it seems in the US that the function of 
a claimed DNA sequence (and not merely its chemical structure) needs to be markedly 
different, or possess a completely new genetic identity from any that naturally exists in 
the human body.  
The day before the US Supreme Court issued its judgement, Senator Leahy 
wrote to Francis Collins, Director of the NIH to enforce its march-in rights found in 
section 203 of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
680
 Leahy emphasized that a part of Myriad’s 
research was federally funded and, therefore, was required to offer licenses to a 
“responsible applicant or applicants.”681 If Myriad remains unwilling to license its 
cDNA patents, then the NIH can grant the license. Myriad’s sole recourse would be to 
litigate in the Court of Claims. Leahy wrote that the “health needs of the public are not 
reasonably satisfied by the patentee…because many women are not able to afford the 
testing provided by Myriad.”682 Myriad’s continued refusal to license its patents and 
pursuance of law suits against its competitors may have been the motivation for Leahy’s 
letter to Collins. Interestingly, the day after the Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s 
                                               
679 Interview with Trevor Cook, April 20, 2012. Trevor Cook states:  
“Everything holds information in a way. It may mean that perhaps the basis for the inventive step analysis 
is different. It may mean that you need to claim things functionally. But I don’t see that just because 
something has an information-rich quality that you should have some sort of miraculous effect in and of 
itself. The early days of DNA patenting, like EPO, or the HGS type of patenting, people are not actually 
concerned with protecting the DNA itself even though they claim the DNA. They claim the DNA because 
of the information inherent to those claims as a way of seeking to monopolize the proteins to which those 
sequences code it. Thus, you have DNA claims in the EPO patent, DNA claims in the HGS patent. But 
the interest was not in the DNA, the interest was that it was a good way of claiming the protein itself, or 
claiming the protein when produced by recombinant DNA technologies. Because the protein itself was 
already isolated and thus lacked novelty.” With the quotes I think you need to go over them and add 
missing words in square brackets so the meaning is clearer 
680 35 USC § 203 (a)(3)“With respect to any subject invention in which a small business firm or nonprofit 
organization has acquired title under this chapter, the Federal agency under whose funding agreement the 
subject invention was made shall have the right, in accordance with such procedures as are provided in 
regulations promulgated hereunder to require the contractor, an assignee or exclusive licensee of a subject 
invention to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any field of use to a 
responsible applicant or applicants, upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances, and if the 
contractor, assignee, or exclusive licensee refuses such request, to grant such a license itself, if the 
Federal agency determines that such—action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not 
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees.” 
681 35 USC § 203(a)  
682 Leahy, P. Letter to Dr. Francis Collins. July 12, 2013.  http://www.patents4life.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/LeahyGeneTesting.pdf. Accessed October 2, 2013. 
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BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents, the NIH offered BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing on its 
website.
683
  
4.5.2. Impact of AMP v. Myriad 
In the immediate aftermath of the decision, there was a plethora of opinions on 
the decision and the practical impact it would have on innovation in the field of 
biotechnology.
 684
 Whilst it can be argued that the ruling means there is greater liberty 
for research due to the constraint on patentability, others perceive a decrease in 
incentives for investing in tentative and expensive research. There does seem to be some 
agitation experienced by members of the US biotechnology industry. Expectations that 
the ruling will be applied to other molecules and organisms have left some clients in 
biotechnology with feelings of uncertainty. “‘It’s a mess…We had a lot of clients 
saying, ‘What are we going to do?’”685  
Meanwhile, Trevor Cook, a former partner at Bird & Bird in London, viewed 
the decision as damaging to the integrity of the patent system. 
I do think it most unfortunate that yet again the US Supreme Court is looking at issues from the 
point of view of patent eligibility, which has a tendency to result in arbitrary, policy based 
decisions which undermine the predictability provided by accepted and well understood concepts 
in patent law such as novelty, obviousness and sufficiency.  In this particular case this has 
resulted in the frustration of the settled expectations of users of the patent system and serves to 
cast doubt on the patent eligibility of other useful compositions that occur naturally and that have 
long been considered to be patentable, such as novel antibiotics produced by certain 
microorganisms.
686
 
                                               
683 National Institute of Health Genetic Testing Registry. GTR News: Supreme Court Gene Patent 
Decision Immediately Impacts GTR. June 17, 2013. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gtr/gtr_news.cgi?id=8. Accessed July 18, 2013. 
684 Had the US Supreme Court upheld Myriad Genetics’ patents on BRCA1 and BRAC2 genes, the 
company would have continued to hold exclusive rights to the genes even if other companies develop 
improved tests. Greenpeace criticizes Myriad Genetics for prohibiting third parties from performing other 
tests associated with the BRAC1 and BRAC2 genes. The BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests Myriad created do 
not cover newly-found mutations, and approximately 36% of diseases associated with BRCA are affected 
by the mutation, which the Myriad tests do not detect.  In addition, because Myriad prohibits all others 
from performing any type of testing, health centres are not able to use this enhanced test due to fears of 
patent infringement. As a result, owners of gene patents may prohibit others from creating new and 
improved tests. See: Greenpeace, The True Cost of Gene Patents: The Economic and Social 
Consequences of Patenting Genes and Living Organisms. March 2004. www.greenpeace.de. Accessed 
April 7, 2013.  
685 Ledford, Heidi. “Myriad Ruling Causes Confusion: Change to Gene Patents Leaves US Biotech in a 
Lather” in Nature.  498, 281–282 (June 20 2013) www.nature.com. Accessed June 21, 2013. 
686 Interview with Trevor Cook, April 30, 2012. 
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Practically speaking, the case will immediately affect only the businesses who 
offer diagnostic testing for which there is already a patent on a particular gene that is 
linked to a disease. Most respondents engaged in the area of genetic testing viewed the 
case as having only a modest impact on their operations.
687
 On the other hand, 
companies who possess existing patents on isolated DNA sequences may encounter 
some problems. As a result of the decision, there are likely thousands of patents 
covering isolated DNA sequences that may be no longer valid. This can create certain 
risks for individuals and companies with an interest in these patents. For future 
innovators in the area, there may be a tendency to keep information found on valuable 
DNA sequences a secret, as sharing the information with the public may be detrimental 
for their commercial potential. In the past, when a gene was newly discovered, it could 
be submitted to a public database like GenBank. Since isolated DNA could be patented, 
sharing such information was not detrimental to one’s commercial interests. As such, 
companies may opt to keep newly identified genes secret until their commercial 
prospects can be determined, in order for patent applications to be filed for all 
commercially workable and artificially modified forms of the DNA.  
Confusion remains as to the distinction the Supreme Court makes between 
isolated DNA and cDNA in regards to patent eligibility. Although cDNA is 
synthetically produced, it contains identical sequences to naturally occurring DNA. 
While the court seems to espouse the condition that a technical product must possess 
physical characteristics chosen by human effort, the holding that cDNA molecules are 
eligible for patent protection undercuts that rationale, because “the properties of an 
isolated DNA sequence are no less attributable to the technician responsible for 
isolating the sequence than those of cDNA.”688 The Supreme Court appears to 
                                               
687 The various views on the impact of limiting patent protection on isolated genes on future innovation 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
688 Pila, J. “Isolated Human Genes: The Patent Equivalent of a Non-Copyrightable Sound Recording” in 
Law Quarterly Review (forthcoming) 2014 at 4. 
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acknowledge this point,
689
 but insisted that cDNA is patentable subject matter.
690
 As a 
result, there is no clear-cut distinction between what constitutes inherently patentable 
and inherently unpatentable technical subject matter.
691
 Even though isolated DNA is no 
longer eligible for data patentability, the court is continuing the gene patent saga, 
because cDNA continues to be patentable, and as a result, there will be a shift in focus 
and efforts towards getting the cDNA patented, even though the product claims of 
cDNA are considered problematic. Thus, the problems with patenting isolated DNA 
persist with patenting cDNA, whilst industry continues to be able to potentially exclude 
others from an economically viable piece of the human genome in order to 
commercialize on its functions.  
Even though the US Supreme Court held that cDNA is patent eligible, in terms 
of practice, the effects of the case to industry will likely result in a small change in tactic 
in patenting new DNA-derived invention as isolated DNA sequence claims are just one 
of several types of claims that can be in a patent application. Although innovators must 
now avoid claiming DNA which contains a naturally occurring sequence, only a minor 
portion of patents will be absolutely lost. The usefulness of isolated DNA is greatly 
narrow in the context of biotechnology, and its exclusion from patent eligibility should 
not thwart other areas of patenting. Myriad itself announced after the Supreme Court 
decision that its patent portfolio contained around 500 other claims on the BRCA test 
that was untouched by the decision. Moreover, given that the Court’s holding that 
cDNA is patentable subject matter simply maintained the status quo, it is tricky to 
determine any real effect from this specific decision. 
                                               
689 AMP v. Myriad (2013) at 17. 
690 Ibid. “[T]he lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains 
the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a 
result, cDNA is not a ‘product of nature’ and is patent eligible under § 101.” 
691 Pila, J. “Isolated Human Genes: The Patent Equivalent of a Non-Copyrightable Sound Recording” in 
Law Quarterly Review (forthcoming) 2014 at 5. 
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A. Response from the USPTO  
The day following the decision in Myriad, the USPTO issued a statement with 
regards to changes to its examination policy pertaining to nucleic acid-related product 
claims:  
As of today, naturally occurring nucleic acids are not patent eligible merely because they have 
been isolated. Examiners should now reject product claims drawn solely to naturally occurring 
nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether isolated or not, as being ineligible subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C.§101.
692
 
 
Most recently in March 2014, Deputy Commissioner Hirschfield published a 
guidance memorandum pertaining to subject matter eligibility involving laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and natural products in view of recent Supreme Court decisions 
including Myriad.
693
 The Guidance instructs new procedures to address legal changes 
relating to eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. According to the guidelines, a 
natural product is not patentable. There is a set of questions the guidelines ask to find 
out whether something is patentable. The first is whether the claim is directed at one of 
the four statutory categories: process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter. If 
the answer is yes, then the second question is whether the claim involves any judicial 
exceptions: abstract ideas, laws of nature/natural principles, natural phenomena, and 
natural products. If the answer is yes, then one proceeds to the third question: whether 
the claim as a whole recites something significantly different from the judicial 
exceptions. Therefore, based on the guidelines, if a claim involves a judicial exception 
like a natural product, then it can only qualify as eligible subject matter if the claim as a 
whole recites something that is significantly different from the judicial exception.
694
 
                                               
Commissioner for Patents, “Memorandum” United States Patent and Trademark Office, June 13, 2013.  
693 United States Patent and Trademark Office. Memorandum: Guidance For Determining Subject Matter 
Eligibility of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena. March 4, 2014. The 
cases include: Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
106 USPQ2d 1972 (2013), and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012). 
694 United States Patent and Trademark Office. Memorandum: Guidance For Determining Subject Matter 
Eligibility of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena. March 4, 2014 at 3. 
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The Guidelines elaborated that ‘significantly different’ can be demonstrated in 
multiple ways:  
(1) The claim includes elements or steps in addition to the judicial exception that 
practically apply the judicial exception in a significant way, i.e. by adding 
significantly more to the judicial exception 
(2) The claim includes features or steps that demonstrate that the claimed subject 
matter is markedly different from that which exists in nature (and therefore not a 
judicial exception) 
(3) Such differences can be assessed by considering factors that either weigh 
toward eligibility (which are significantly different) or those that that weigh 
against eligibility (not significantly different)
695
 
Factors that weigh against eligibility include claims reciting “something that 
appears to be a natural product that is not markedly different in structure from naturally 
occurring products”696 at a “high level of generality,”697 include additional 
elements/steps that are “well-understood, purely conventional or routine”698 or are 
“insignificant extra solution activity,”699 or “that amount to nothing more than a mere 
field of use.”700 
The guidelines highlight that even if there initially appears to be a difference 
between a recited product and the naturally occurring product, the identified differences 
need to rise to the level of a marked difference in structure:  
Not all differences rise to the level of marked differences, e.g., merely isolating a nucleic acid 
changes its structure (by breaking bonds) but that change does not create a marked difference in 
structure between the nucleic acid and its naturally occurring counterpart. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 
2116-2118 (even though an isolated gene is a non-naturally occurring fragment of chromosomal 
DNA, it is not markedly different from the chromosomal DNA because its nucleotide sequence 
                                               
695 Ibid. 
696 Ibid at 4. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid at 5. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Ibid. 
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has not been changed). Instead, a marked difference must be a significant difference, i.e., more 
than an incidental or trivial difference.
701
 
 
Factors weighing towards eligibility include claims that “include a particular 
machine or transformation of a particular article,” or “add a feature that is more than 
well-understood, purely conventional or routine in the relevant field.”702 In sample cases 
provided in the guidelines, if there is a marked difference between the claim and the 
naturally occurring product, it does not matter that the process for creating the change is 
routine. This point is particularly relevant for cDNA product claims. The guidance 
provides the following example: “cDNA having a nucleotide sequence that is markedly 
different from naturally occurring DNA is eligible subject matter, even though the 
process of making cDNA is routine in the biotechnology art.”703 What seems to be 
essential is for the claims to be drafted in a way that emphasizes the difference between 
the claimed invention and that which naturally exists.  
B. Response to guidelines 
 There has been criticism directed at the scope of the guidelines. First, that the 
USPTO’s reading of the Myriad decision has been incorrectly applied to all natural 
products: 
I think horrified is a minor adjective I would use when I read those USPTO guidelines. It 
occurred to me that I now know how the USPTO is getting rid of its backlog, because that is 
pretty much everything we do at Hopkins. I don’t know how the USPTO got from ‘we are not 
going to patent a particular gene’ to ‘we are not going to patent any natural product.’ I don’t 
know how they went down that slope.704 
Another grievance was a lack of discussion on the factors that should be 
considered in deciding whether something is eligible subject matter. In addition, 
although it may be recognized that the requirements for patent eligibility are made to be 
flexible, there is criticism directed at the multi-step examination stated in the guidance 
as necessary to ascertain something as patent eligible. Finally, there remains confusion 
                                               
701 Ibid. 
702 Ibid at 4. 
703 Ibid at 5. 
704 Quote from Joseph Contrera, Patent counsel, John Hopkins Technology Transfer in “IP Clinic: How is 
Myriad Affecting IP Practitioners?” in Managing Intellectual Property. April 2014, Issue 238 at 83. 
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over the ‘markedly different’ test. “According to the guidelines, if it is not a natural 
product you look at whether it is ‘markedly different’ from the natural product. That’s 
the test. Of course that is clear as mud and will be defined over time in case law.”705 
Therefore, despite the USPTO guidelines published after Myriad, there remain many 
more questions to be answered.  
C. Continued litigation 
After the US Supreme Court decision, Myriad Genetics initiated two lawsuits 
against Ambry Genetics Corporation (filed July 9, 2013) and Gene by Gene Limited 
(filed July 10, 2013). These two entities launched their own BRCA1 and BRCA2 
diagnostic tests after the Supreme Court decision. Myriad maintained that there were 
other patent claims in its portfolio that were unaffected by the decision, and which it 
could assert against its rivals for the diagnostics tests, particularly its cDNA patents. 
Myriad sought a preliminary injunction against both Ambry and Gene by Gene, but 
both organizations countered the allegations by filing antitrust counterclaims against 
Myriad on the grounds that it had exhausted its patents via improper means to 
monopolize the BRCA diagnostic market. The cases were consolidated. However on 
February 6, 2014, Gene by Gene settled with Myriad.
706
 
On March 10, 2014, Judge Robert Shelby of the Federal District Court in Salt 
Lake City denied Myriad Genetics’ request for a preliminary injunction in its lawsuit 
against Ambry Genetics Corporation.
707
 Ambry began offering its own breast cancer 
diagnostic tests for BRCA1 and BRCA2 after the Supreme Court decision in June 2013 
                                               
705  Quote from Sherry Knowles, Principal, Knowles Intellectual Property Strategies in “IP Clinic: How is 
Myriad Affecting IP Practitioners?” in Managing Intellectual Property. April 2014, Issue 238 at 82. 
706 “Gene by Gene Settles Lawsuit Over BRCA Patents” in Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 
News. www.genengnews.com. Accessed February 8, 2014. 
707 University of Utah Research Foundation et al. vs. Ambry Genetics Corporation. United States District 
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at a price of $2,200 compared to Myriad’s $4000.708 Judge Shelby acknowledged that 
Myriad would likely suffer irreparable harm without the injunction because it would not 
be able to maintain the price of its tests, but ruled that it had not established that it was 
likely to succeed on the merits of its argument, which is one of the legal conditions for 
being granted a preliminary injunction. 
 Recently, the Myriad decision was applied to a case involving a claim for 
mammalian products resulting from a somatic cloning method. The US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) declared mammals produced using the method 
which created Dolly the sheep not patent eligible.
709
 The appeals court argued that while 
the somatic method of cloning mammals is patent eligible
710
, the products of such 
processes are not. The patent at issue before the court was US Patent Application No. 
09/225,233, or the ‘233 application, which claimed products of Campbell’s and 
Wilmut’s cloning method, including cattle, sheep, pigs and goats. However, the CAFC 
ruled that although the claimed clones may be called a composition of matter or a 
manufacture, they were not eligible for patenting because they comprised natural 
phenomena and did not possess any markedly different characteristics from those found 
in nature. Therefore, the products of the cloning method were deemed ineligible for 
patent protection because Roslin did not create or alter the genetic information for the 
claimed clones. Referring to Myriad,
711
 Judge Timothy Dyk stated:  
Here, as in Myriad, Roslin ‘did not create or alter any of the genetic information’ of its claimed 
clones, ‘[n]or did [Roslin] create or alter the genetic structure of [the] DNA’ used to make the 
clones. Instead, Roslin’s chief innovation was the preservation of the donor DNA such that the 
clone is an exact copy of the mammal from which the somatic cell was taken. Such a copy is not 
eligible for patent protection.712 
 
                                               
708 Pollack, A. “Patentholder on Breast Cancer Tests Denied Injunction in Lawsuit,” in New York Times. 
March 10, 2014. 
709 In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh) No. 2013-1407 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2014) 
710 Keith Henry Stockman Campbell and Ian Wilmut obtained U.S. Patent No. 7,514,258 for the somatic 
cell nuclear transfer cloning method used to create Dolly the sheep.  
711 Association for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013) 
712 In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh) No. 2013-1407 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2014) at 7-8. 
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The decision seems to be a straightforward application of Myriad, in which the 
Supreme Court specified that Myriad did not “create or alter the genetic structure of 
DNA… [but] found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its 
surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”713 The Federal Circuit 
explained that possessing the same DNA as the donor mammal does not automatically 
result in patent eligibility. However, the Court pointed out that the claims did not 
describe the clones as having any markedly different characteristics from the donor 
animals. Therefore, it seems that the CAFC is reinforcing the principle that patent 
applications in biotechnology must ensure that the claims include the distinction 
between that naturally occurring entity and the claimed invention. 
4.5.3. The EPO approach: limiting gene patents  
In the EPO, the topic of patenting genes is less about eligible subject matter and 
more about the patentability requirements, particularly inventiveness and non-
obviousness. As technology has progressed, identifying human genes using standard 
techniques has become a routine activity and no longer an inventive undertaking. The 
European Office stipulates two cases where the inventive step is present in a genomics 
claim: (i) where a “technical achievement” is attained in identifying the claimed 
sequence, or (ii) a new or unexpected property associated with the discovered gene is 
revealed.
714
 The EPO approach seems to advocate that the threshold for claims to a gene 
patent is higher today merely because the exertion necessary in detecting and classifying 
gene sequences is no longer inventive. 
The EPO granted Myriad Genetics three European patents in 2001 for the 
sequencing of the BRCA1 gene and the mutations practical for the diagnosis of 
                                               
713 AMP v. Myriad (2013) at 12. 
714 The EPO stated that claims directed at a genetic invention will be considered to possess an inventive 
step “if the applicant can demonstrate that obtaining the sequence was in fact a technical achievement or 
that they have discovered a new or unexpected property associated with the gene.” European Patent 
Office, ‘“Myriad/Breast Cancer” Patent Revoked after Public Hearing’, Press Release (Munich), 18 May 
2004.  
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predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer in women.
715
 However, these patents were 
contentious.
716
 In August 2002, several European institutions
717
 challenged Myriad’s 
Patent EP 705 902, which was awarded for the BRCA1 gene for breast and ovarian 
cancer predisposition. The claims included the isolated BRCA1 gene as follows: the 
chemical molecule itself and the corresponding protein, all plausible therapeutic 
treatments like gene therapy and drug screening, and diagnostic kits, using probes or 
primers directed at certain mutations. The main arguments against Patent EP 705 902 
were that the claimed invention lacked novelty, inventive step and industrial application 
and failed to the meet the written description requirement for a person skilled in the art 
to reproduce the invention.
718
 
                                               
715 EP 699 754, granted on January 10, 2001, which is a use patent that asserts rights to the diagnostic use 
of the BRCA1 gene on any type of technique employed. EP 705 903, granted on May 23, 2001, which is 
a product patent and covers a series of 34 specific mutations and acts as a complement to patent EP 699 
754. Finally, EP 705 902 is a product patent which covers all uses of the BRCA1 gene and proteins as a 
chemical product. The claims include its use in diagnostics, therapeutics, and prevention. 
716 Aside from the technical grounds for oppositions to Myriad’s patents, there was inherent policy and 
ethical apprehension maybe reword, sounds odd. The main concern was the restrictions the patents could 
place on medical practice and the monopolization of genetic testing.  France’s Institut Curie released a 
press statement articulating that Myriad’s broad patents would ensure monopoly position that would 
seriously hinder research and public health: 
“Not allowing French and  European laboratories to perform testing or initial family mutation searches 
will lead to a loss of technical and medical expertise which will probably in turn lead to a decrease in 
funding  allocated to such laboratories. The loss of expertise and of funding would not be trivial for basic 
research which is critical for the future of medical genetics. It would therefore not be without 
repercussions either for the development of genuine preventative care for high risk women.” Institut 
Curie, Press Office: Against Myriad Genetics’s [sic] monopoly on tests for predisposition to breast and 
ovarian cancer. September 12, 2001. Paris. This “unacceptable monopoly” raises the question of how to 
balance patent law with health objectives. It cannot be denied that there are significant medical benefits to 
be derived from the creation of diagnostic tests like the BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic kits that Myriad 
created. But there are various views on how the patent system should address such tools, and whether 
they should be protected under the patent system for the sake of promoting greater access to the 
technology in question, including the development of better diagnostic kits and access to testing. 
717 The challengers to the patent included three French medical institutions: Institut Curie, the Gustave 
Roussy Institute and the Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, along with the Belgian Human Genetics 
Society, the Dutch Ministry of Health, the Austrian Ministry of Health, the Swiss Social Democratic 
Party, Greenpeace Germany and Dr. Wilhems (Germany). Institut Curie, Press Release: Breast and 
Ovarian Cancer Predisposition: New European Victory  in the Opposition to American Patents: the Board 
of Appeal of the European Patent Office Rejects the Appeal of Myriad Genetics. October 1, 2007. Paris. 
718 The opposition notices paved the way to the partial revocation of EP 699754 in January 2005, which 
was for a diagnosis method for detecting the BRCA1 gene. The Opposition Division of the EPO partially 
revoked the patent because the original patent application contained errors in the BRCA1 and encoding 
protein sequences. By the time they were corrected, the gene sequences were already found in the public 
domain. Accordingly, the BRCA1 sequence and protein were refused priority as they were incorrectly 
written in the first patent applications in 1994. In March 1995, Myriad amended its claims to include the 
correct sequence. Consequently, the actual priority date for the sequences was March 1995, and on this 
date, isolation of the BRCA1 gene and its complete sequence had already been published.  This meant 
that the primary claim for the registered BRCA1 gene and the protein sequence of March 1995 did not 
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In 2007, the EPO Board of Appeal revoked Myriad’s EP 705 902 in T1213/05 
which comprised of a product claim directed at DNA sequences coding for BRCA1 
coding sequence on the basis that the claims failed to fulfill the traditional criteria of 
patentability. The original patent claim describing the DNA sequences were incorrect as 
there were a total of 15 sequence deviations. After Myriad filed the application, the 
accurate DNA sequences were published before Myriad rectified its errors and filed the 
application describing the correct DNA sequences. As a result, the correct DNA 
sequences were in the public domain before Myriad filed the patent application 
containing the correct sequences. This resulted in a finding of lack of novelty. As a 
result, the claims were narrowed to a few small probes from the BRCA1 gene that was 
properly divulged in the priority document.
719
  
With regards to EP 705903, the Board of Appeal upheld the method claims for 
diagnosing women’s predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer by determining the 
existence of a certain mutation in the BRCA1 gene in T 666/05. The Board of Appeal 
held that the 15 sequence aberrations in the priority document did not have an effect on 
the claimed method of establishing the mutation.
720
  
For the third patent EP 699754, the Board of Appeal in T80/05 upheld the broad 
patent claims on methods for diagnosing predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer 
through the identification of mutations in the BRCA1 gene. The priority document 
correctly pinpointed the BRCA1 reading frame which allowed the labeling of a specific 
group of gene mutations which were not affected by the 15 sequence deviations as 
disclosed in the priority document.
721
   
                                                                                                                                         
comply with the EPC as the invention was not novel by the time the invention was fully disclosed. 
However, the Opposition Division upheld Myriad’s secondary claims directed to the probes and vectors 
of the gene sequence. 
719 See T1213/05. Decision of the Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office. September 27, 2007 
720 T 80/05. Decision of the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office. November 19 
2008. 
721 Ibid. 
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The remaining patent rights Myriad possessed after the three decisions were fair 
and corresponded to a sensible recompense for their contribution to the field. The Board 
of Appeal limited the broad protection on the product patent due to a technicality - the 
loss of priority due to the 15 sequence deviations.  Nevertheless, entitlement to priority 
was not lost on the grounds of sequence deviations in the priority document as the 
sequence deviations did not affect the claimed method. This is why the Board of Appeal 
upheld the patent coverage of the single specific cancer mutation and of the discovery of 
frame shift mutations in the BRCA1 gene. With respect to Myriad’s product claims, 
however, the Board of Appeal maintained that the patent claims had to be restricted due 
to the patent application’s failure to meet the classic patent requirements rather than any 
indication of an alteration in legal approach towards gene inventions. It appears that the 
EPO has managed gene patents reasonably well using the traditional patentability 
criteria, criteria which were applied to Myriad’s patents and resulted in limiting the 
scope of patent protection. 
It may seem that the issue over Myriad’s gene patents in Europe has been 
resolved, yet the widespread discussion of gene inventions and the patent system 
persists. Currently, there remains a consideration of whether the next step should be to 
propose a control on the scope of protection which would entail a patent owner having 
only patent protection over the identified use of a gene.
722
 In other words, third parties 
could identify other uses of a gene and apply for separate patent protection. Little 
guidance is found in Directive 98/44/EC on this matter as it was the product of several 
negotiated compromises and encompasses a high degree of ambiguity, particularly in 
                                               
722 Commission of the European Communities. Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: Development and Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and 
Genetic Engineering. Brussels. July 14, 2005. The Commission reviewed the issue of whether patents 
should be restricted so that only the specific use as disclosed in the patent application can be claimed. The 
Commission noted that Articles 8,9,10 and 11 of Directive 98/44/EC addressed the topic of scope of 
protection, but none addressed the concept of restricting the scope of protection relating to the specific 
use for the concerned gene sequence. Page 3. 
189 
 
key terms defining the scope of protection.
723
 As a result, EU Member States and their 
national courts can interpret and define the scope of protection differently. 
Countries like Germany
724
 and France
725
 have introduced legislation to restrict 
the scope of patent protection on DNA sequences to a specified use. This is known as 
‘purpose-bound’ protection.726 For instance, in Germany, §1a (4) of the German Patent 
Law (PatG) reflects the German Parliament’s implementation of Article 5 of Directive 
98/44/EC:  
[W]hen the invention is a sequence of a gene, the composition of which is identical to the 
composition of a natural sequence of a human gene, the use thereof, for which the industrial 
application is the specification according to paragraph 3 has to be included into the patent 
claim.
727
 
Subsection 4 of §1a is based on the recommendation of the Legal Committee of 
the Bundestag. The German legislator merged the patentability requirement into the 
scope of protection, maintaining that the use described in the application should be 
included in the claim for genes and partial sequences of genes that are also present in 
humans and thereby limit the scope of such use. For such genes and partial sequences of 
genes the absolute protection of the patented invention should therefore be abolished - 
                                               
723 Straus, J. The Scope of Protection Conferred by European Patents on Transgenic Plants and Methods 
for Their Production,” in A. Bakardjieva et al. (eds.) Festschrift for Marianne Levin. Stockholm: 
Norstedts Juridik, 2008 at 647. 
724  §1a(4) of the German Patent Act 
725 Art. L. 613-2-1 (Loi no 2004-800 du 6 août 2004, art. 17) La partie d'une revendication couvrant une 
séquence génique est limitée à la partie de cette séquence directement liée à la fonction spécifique 
concrètement exposée dans la description. Standard>Les droits créés par la délivrance d'un brevet 
incluant une séquence génique ne peuvent être invoqués à l'encontre d'une revendication ultérieure 
portant sur la même séquence si cette revendication satisfait elle-même aux conditions de l'article L. 611-
18 et qu'elle expose une autre application particulière de cette séquence. (English translation: Art. L. 613-
2-1 (Act No. 2004-800 of August 6, 2004, art. 17) The portion of a claim covering a gene sequence is 
limited to the part of this sequence directly related to the specific function disclosed in the description. 
Standard> the rights created by the grant of a patent including a gene sequence cannot be invoked against 
a subsequent claim for the same sequence if the claim itself satisfied the requirements of Article L . 611-
18 and exposes another specific application of this sequence.) 
726 For a discussion on purpose-bound protection for DNA sequences in the EU, see: Krauss, J. and T. 
Takenaka. “A Special Rule for Compound Protection for DNA-Sequences-Impact of the ECJ ‘Monsanto’ 
Decision on Patent Practice” in Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society. Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 
189-206, 2011 and Dutfield, G. “Biotechnology and IPRs in Europe,” in Jensen, A and M. Pugatch (eds.) 
Intellectual Property Frontiers: Expanding the Borders of Discussion. London: Stockholm Network, 2005. 
p.49-50. Similarly: Kock, M. “Purpose-Bound Protection for DNA Sequences: In Through the Back 
Door?” in Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice. Vol. 5, No.7, Pp.495-513. 2010. 
727 §1a(4) of the German Patent Act: Ist Gegenstand der Erfindung eine Sequenz oder Teilsequenz eines 
Gens, deren Aufbau mit dem Aufbau einer natürlichen Sequenz oder Teilsequenz eines menschlichen 
Gens übereinstimmt, so ist deren Verwendung, für die ?gewerbliche Anwendbarkeit nach Absatz 3 
konkret beschrieben ist, in den Patentanspruch aufzunehmen. (Original German text) 
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unlike for animal and plant genes. The report explained that the chosen wording takes 
into account the fact that human genes largely resemble animal and plant genes. 
Otherwise, the limitation of the absolute protection of the patented invention could be 
circumvented by using a matching animal gene in the patent application. Therefore, in 
Germany, patent applications are required to include the use or function for human gene 
sequences and partial sequences as such protection will be limited to the claimed use.
 728
 
4.6. Genes and the patentability requirements 
4.6.1. Attack on Novelty  
One issue that may arise involves the novelty of DNA sequences in the post-
genomic era. In both the US and Europe, inventions must be new.
729
 In a patent claim, 
novelty is assessed against the prior art which existed at the priority date of the patent 
application. The prior art information must include all features of an invention in clear 
and unequivocal terms in order for the contended invention to lack novelty.
730
 It is 
reasonable that at the beginning of the development of a new technology patent 
applications will appear to be extremely innovative, but it is only as the technology 
                                               
728 “Der geltende Absatz 4 ist auf Grund der Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses des 
Bundestages angefügt worden. Für Gene und Teilsequenzen von Genen, die auch beim Menschen 
vorkommen, sollte die in der Anmeldung beschriebene Verwendung in den Patentanspruch aufgenommen 
und dadurch der Schutzumfang auf diese Verwendung beschränkt werden. Für solche Gene und 
Teilsequenzen von Genen sollte damit – anders als für tierische und pflanzliche Gene – der absolute 
Stoffschutz abgeschafft werden. Die gewählte Formulierung berücksichtige die Tatsache, dass 
menschliche Gene weitgehend mit tierischen und pflanzlichen Genen übereinstimmten und die den 
Stoffschutz begrenzende Wirkung der Regelung ansonsten umgangen werden könne, indem ein 
übereinstimmendes etwa tierisches Gen für die Patentierung verwandt werde.” 
Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung -  Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Wirkungen des 
Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Biopatentrichtlinie Bundestags Drucksache 16/12809. (English translation: 
Report of the German Federal Government on the effects of the act to implement the Biotech Directive 
from 29. 04. 2009) Pg. 4. 
729  See 35 USC s 102; Patents Act 1977 (UK) s 2. 
730 It can be argued that patents on gene related inventions are not ‘novel’ since they naturally occur; even 
if the DNA sequence is isolated and purified, for example, critics maintain that this does not fulfil the 
novelty requirement. See Boyle, J. “Enclosing the Genome: What Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could 
Teach Us,” in F. Scott Kieff (ed.) Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project. Boston: 
Elsevier Academic Press, 2003 at 104. 
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develops over time and the techniques become recognizable that an acknowledged 
notion of what should be permitted begins to establish itself.
731
 
In the UK, case law reveals that natural substances that have been isolated for 
the first time and was not known to have existed, does not lack novelty merely because 
it exists in nature. The novelty requirement can be satisfied for inventions covering 
biological materials such as genes and DNA sequences if the claimed invention is 
“isolated for the first time and which had no previously recognised existence.”732 For 
instance, in Generics Ltd v Lundbeck A/S,
733
 the House of Lords reiterated how novelty 
was assessed in relation to chemical inventions.  Lundbeck successfully developed a 
method in isolating the (+) enantiomer from its racemate citalopram. Lundbeck claimed 
to have created a novel method in separating the (+) and (-) enantiomers and subjected 
each to tests, found that the (+) enantiomer had the desired anti-depressant effect, whilst 
the (-) enantiomer had an inhibiting effect. As a result, a more operative anti-depressant 
could be attained through the isolation of the (+) enantiomer of citalopram. Lundbeck 
claimed to be authorized to a patent right over both the process and the product of the 
process. The question in relation to novelty is whether the (+) enantiomer is, for the 
purposes of section 1(1) of the 1977 Act, a new product. 
 Three manufacturers of generic citalopram challenged Lundbeck’s European 
Patent (UK) No. 0347066 (the 'Patent') which is entitled ‘New enantiomers and their 
isolation,’ in relation to escitalopram on the grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness and 
insufficiency.
734
 The question is whether the claim excludes the (+) enantiomer in the 
                                               
731 Cornish, W., David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin. Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks 
and Allied Rights. London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2010 at 935. 
732 Howard Florey Institute’s Application / Relaxin OJEPO 1995, 388 (V 0008/94). The court maintained 
that the existence of a form of relaxin was not known until a cDNA encoding human H2-rekaxin and its 
precurors was isolated.  
733 Generics Ltd v Lundbeck A/S [2009] UKHL 12. 
734 2 particular product claims were alleged to be invalid for lacking novelty. Claim 1 (US Patent number 
4,136,193) is a product claim and claims the enantiomer itself: “(+) -1-(3- dimenthylaminopropyl)-1-(4'-
fluorophenyl)- 1,3-dihydroisobenzofuran-5-carbonitrile . . . and non-toxic addition salts thereof.” The 
second patent claim the appellants attacked for lacking novelty was Claim 3 (US Patent number 
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racemate mixture. The appellants argued that the claims lacked novelty as the racemate 
was already disclosed and the claim extended to the (+) enantiomer. Lundbeck 
maintained that claim 1 was limited to the isolated or pure (+) enantiomer and excludes 
the racemate. The attack on the product claims on lack of novelty failed in the lower 
courts. Writing for the UK Patents Court, Mr. Justice Kitchin rejected the novelty 
challenge.
735
 Adopting the approach to novelty as set out by the House of Lords in 
Synthon v SmithKline Beecham,
736
 where anticipation necessitated prior disclosure and 
enablement, Kitchin J. maintained that the prior art concerning the racemate did not 
disclose its enantiomers.  
The Court of Appeal agreed with this finding in that there had been previously 
no disclosure found in the prior art that enabled an ordinary skilled person to make 
escitalopram.
737
 Lord Hoffmann maintained that the “settled jurisprudence in the 
European Patent Office that disclosure of a racemate does not in itself amount to 
disclosure of each of its enantiomers.”738 Lord Justice Jacob echoed Lord Hoffman’s 
position on novelty in this case, highlighting that the question is that of claim 
construction: whether the claim covers the (+) enantiomer when in the racemate. “In my 
opinion it obviously does not – the patentee was plainly not intending to cover the 
racemate. How much more than 50% of the (+) enantiomer must be present for a 
product to fall within the claim is simply a moot point as far as this case is 
concerned.”739 Therefore, both the UK Patents Court and Court of Appeal found the (+) 
enantiomer to be novel. 
                                                                                                                                         
4,650,884): to a ‘pharmaceutical composition in unit dosage form comprising, [as] an active ingredient, a 
compound as defined in claim 1. 
735 Generics (UK) Ltd v. Lundbeck A/S [2007] RPC 729. Although Kitchin J rejected the novelty and 
obviousness challenges, he declared that the claims of the invention were beyond its technical teaching. 
Therefore, the patent was held to be invalid for insufficiency.  
736 Synthon BV v. Smithkline Beecham plc [2005] UKHL 59 
737 H. Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 311 (Court of Appeal 2008). 
738 Ibid, H17. 
739 Ibid, 50. 
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Although the issue of novelty was not pursued on appeal in the House of Lords, 
it was addressed by Lord Scott, who maintained that it was a worthwhile discussion. 
Lord Scott deemed that the novelty involves the knowledge in separating the (+) and (-) 
enantiomers of citalopram and their respective roles to the anti-depressant quality of 
citalopram. Referencing EPO case law including T 0296/87,
740
 he maintained that 
novelty is not destroyed even if the existence of enantiomers may be palpable from 
assessment of the chemical structure of the racemate of a compound, as it does not 
divulge them in their individualized forms. Lord Scott held that the (+) enantiomer of 
citalopram in its separated form, was not made available to the public prior to the 
priority date. Until then, it was only known as an unseparated part of the racemate that 
made up the citalopram molecule. “It follows, therefore, that the (+) enantiomer was 
“new” for the purposes of section 1(1) (a) of the Act.”741 Therefore, in the area of 
biotechnology inventions, novelty of a known biological product can be ascertained 
provided that the individual element of a compound has not been previously divulged. 
4.6.2. Attack on inventive step/obviousness 
In the US, it is currently expected that novel
742
 genetic information must be non-
obvious.
743
 However, there is the view that the USPTO is lax on its interpretation of 
non-obviousness. In the Europe, inventions need to be differentiated from the prior art, 
which is known as the “inventive step” and is one of the substantial requirements of 
                                               
740 T 0296/87 (Enantiomers) of 30.8.1988 at 6.2. 
741 Generics Ltd v Lundbeck A/S [2009] UKHL 12, Para. 6. 
742 U.S. patent law requires inventions to be novel under 35 U.S.C. §102. A claimed product or process 
can be found to lack novelty if the claimed invention was known or used by the public in the country, 
already patented or described in a printed publication in the US or a foreign country (35 U.S.C. §102 (a)). 
To pass the novelty requirement, the claimed invention is assessed against the prior art. Section 102(b) 
sets the statutory bar for inventions that have been already been published in a printed publication, used 
by the public, or sold for more than a year prior to the patent application date. The main difference 
between these two subsections of §102 is that novelty is independent of the inventor’s acts. However, 
those acts can result in a statutory bar to patentability. 
743 Cornish, W., David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin. Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks 
and Allied Rights. London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2010 at 936. 
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patentability. In the United States, this is known as non-obviousness.
744
 The US 
Supreme Court first addressed non-obviousness in Graham v. John Deere Co.
745
 and 
held that non-obviousness could be established based on three questions of fact: (i) the 
subject matter and scope of the prior art; (ii) the differences between the patent claims 
and the prior art and (iii) the level of ordinary skill possessed by a person from the 
relevant prior art. If a person of ordinary skill in the field who possesses the knowledge 
of the subject area available in the prior art, and examines the patent claims at the time 
the invention was produced and regards it as an obvious step, then the patent application 
would fail the non-obviousness requirement.
746
 
In the US, the requirement of ‘non-obviousness’ has been applied differently 
pertaining to patent claims for DNA sequences. Even if the structure of a protein is 
known, the isolation method of a gene is in the prior art which encodes for the protein, 
the claimed gene sequence may still be non-obvious.
747
 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in In Re Dueul
748
 that “the redundancy of the 
genetic code permits one to hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences 
coding for the protein.”749 The Court articulated its reasoning by explaining that since 
there was nothing in the prior art which indicated the claimed DNA sequence encoded 
the protein, it meant that a person skilled in the art would not know the chemical 
structure of the DNA sequence without further research. “No particular one of these 
                                               
744 35 U.S.C. §103(a) requires that the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are 
such that the claimed invention as a whole would not have been obvious to a person who is skilled in the 
art the time the invention was made. 
745Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
746KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
747 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (2002), 30. 
748 In Re Dueul 51 F 3d 1552 (Fed Cir, 1995), 1558. The patent claims were directed at DNA and cDNA 
molecules that encoded proteins which stimulated cell division. The patent examiner rejected the claims 
on the basis of obviousness. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) combination of prior art reference 
teaching method of gene cloning, together with reference disclosing partial amino acid sequence for a 
protein that stimulated cell division, did not render claims prima facie obvious; (2) conceived method of 
preparing some unidentified DNA does not define it with precision necessary to render it obvious over 
protein it encodes; and (3) patent claims generically encompassing all DNA sequences encoding human 
and bovine proteins to stimulate cell division were not invalidated as obvious. 
749 Ibid. 
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DNAs can be obvious unless there is something in the prior art to lead to the particular 
DNA …Similarly, knowledge of a protein does not give one a conception of a particular 
DNA encoding it…This is so even though one skilled in the art knew that some DNA, 
albeit not in purified and isolated form, did exist.”750 Additionally, the court pointed out 
that the existence of a general method of isolating DNA or cDNA molecules is 
“essentially irrelevant”751 to the issue of whether the claimed molecules are considered 
obvious. This practice results in a lower threshold for the non-obviousness requirement 
for claims encompassing genetic sequences. This approach has been criticized by the 
UK-based Nuffield Council, who condemned the United States for the lower barrier for 
non-obviousness pertaining to genetic inventions.
752
 
Particularly with gene patents, the inventive step is under great, and some 
commentators may say, doubtful inspection.
753
 Especially genetic sequencing, which 
used to require extraordinary financial costs and long periods of time to do, has become 
significantly less difficult, in terms of time and financial resources. Due to the current 
state of sequencing technology, there is a higher threshold for inventive step. A patent 
attorney from GSK acknowledges that inventive step is judged on a case-by-case basis 
based on the prior art on what the skilled person would know, but a basic isolation of a 
simple DNA would not be considered inventive in the present day.  
DNA manipulation has moved on at a phenomenal pace. What we can do now we couldn’t do in 
the lab ten years ago and they didn’t envisage 20 years ago. I think inventive step is always 
judged to the priority date and that’s why it’s fluid. So what you have to do is take the prior art at 
the time. At that priority date you have to take into account the knowledge of the skilled person 
and who that skilled person is. In 1979, the skilled person hadn’t heard about PCR and was 
presented with a patent application and once they saw it, went “Wow.” It must have been the 
most clever thing they had seen. Now, the things we can do with PCR, we can read 
carbohydrates structures off DNA. Inventive step is judged relatively at that time. So yes, you’re 
right, isolating DNA now, you’d be unlikely to get a patent granted for a claim to “We took 
some sequence, we put in a plasmid.” There isn’t anything inventive there. But in a case by case 
                                               
750 Re Dueul 51 F 3d 1552 (Fed Cir, 1995), 1558–1559 
751 Re Dueul 51 F 3d 1552 (Fed Cir, 1995), 1559 
752“[T]the outcome of any complex procedure which could not have been predicted in advance, however 
familiar the procedure, will be judged inventive.” Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting 
DNA (2002), 30. 
753 Straus, J. “Product Patents on Human DNA Sequences: An Obstacle for Implementing the EU Biotech 
Directive?” in F. Scott Kieff (ed.) Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project. Boston: 
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basis, if it has required innovation, or it has overcome a particular problem, or it has gone against 
the teaching in the prior art. If somebody says: “This gene doesn’t do anything, it’s not possible, 
it’s just junk DNA,” and then a group says “Well, we think it does.” They work hard, they have 
to do something innovative to get that sequence, then it may be that particular sequence is 
inventive.  
 
Genetic sequencing has become standardized and technically routine today. The 
increase in patent applications for genetic sequences over the years correlates with the 
swift developments in sequencing complete genomes like the human
754
 and worm.
755
 
However, because the technical progress has been so considerable, the level of 
“inventiveness” must be scrutinized in patents that are directed at DNA sequencing in 
view of the fact that identifying and synthesizing DNA sequences have become a 
standardized routine. 
In the UK, Lord Hoffman in Biogen v Medeva stated that the test for 
obviousness is ‘simply a matter of degree.’756 Sir Robin Jacob maintains that 
obviousness is an inherently ‘woolly’ test because there are various factors to consider 
before one can arrive to a final value judgement about whether an invention is 
obvious.
757
 
4.6.3. Scope of protection 
Aside from the matter of eligibility, another opposition against DNA patents is 
directed at the scope of protection. The question is whether a patent on a DNA sequence 
should warrant absolute protection if future functions are discovered later on. It is a 
scientific fact that many genes code for more than one function.  758  
                                               
754Human Genome Organisation. HUGO Intellectual Property Statement on Patenting of DNA 
Sequences. May 1997. http://www.hugo-international.org/img/ip_sequencedata_1997.pdf. Accessed 
November 14, 2013. 
755Wilson, RK. “How the Worm Was Won. The C. Elegans Genome Sequencing Project” in Trends in 
Genetics. Vol. 15(2):51-58. February 1999. 
756 Biogen v. Medeva, October 31, 1996, [1997] RPC 1 (House of Lords). 
757 Jacob, R. “Woolly Lines in Intellectual Property Law,” in Patents and Technological Progress in a 
Globalized World. Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. (eds.) Berlin: Springer, 2009 at 785. 
758A Canadian report written for the Ontario Government emphasized that overly broad gene patents 
could confer control over genetic information: 
Ontario Report to Premiers, Genetics, Testing and Gene Patenting: Charting New Territory in Healthcare. 
Toronto: Ontario Government, 2002 at 49: “ [T]he effect of fully enforced, broad scope gene patents may 
challenge certain principles of patent law by in effect patenting genetic information rather than simply 
genetic inventions, products or utilities. To remedy this problem, the scope of patents over genetic 
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If a sequence has a second function which was not disclosed in the patent claim 
nor anticipated by the inventor, then it is possible for the second invention to warrant a 
separate patent. This approach is consistent with the purpose of patent law, which is to 
compensate the inventor in exchange for disclosing valuable knowledge of the invention 
to the public. An unexpected result which encompasses an inventive step should not be 
covered by the first patent. If a patent over a genetic sequence includes protection over 
all future functions, then this could hinder innovation.  
A good case to illustrate this issue is the dispute between Amgen and 
Transkaryotic Therapeutics (TKT) over the scope of Amgen’s method patent of 
producing erythropoietin (epo).
759
 Amgen’s patent claim covered the gene sequence and 
biological function and the technique of inserting the gene as an exogenous DNA 
sequence into a host cell which produced significant quantities of epo. TKT created a 
method of producing epo which made use of the DNA sequence, but used the technique 
of ‘gene activation,’ which switched on the relevant DNA sequence in ordinary human 
cells rather than inserting the epo gene into a host cell. The issue was whether TKT 
infringed Amgen’s European patent since TKT made use of the same gene sequence to 
produce epo, or whether TKT’s method of producing epo was a novel way of producing 
the same hormone which does not violate the patent. The House of Lords found that 
Amgen’s original patent claims were limited in scope and as a result, there was no 
infringement. Lord Hoffman argued that Amgen’s patent should be construed narrowly 
to the use as stated in the original claim, where the DNA sequence was used to create 
epo in a host cell, which he says, does not include TKT’s different method. Lord 
                                                                                                                                         
material may need to be more rigorously defined to separate the chemical or structural nature of genetic 
material from its informational content. Patents should only prevent the making, using, selling, and 
importation of genetic material when that material is used as a chemical, but should not unduly limit 
access and use of that particular information content of a naturally occurring sequence, regardless of 
whether the sequence is being used in natural or artificial form.” 
759 Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46 (21 October 2004). Amgen’s UK 
patent 0148605 covered the method of using recombinant DNA technology to create EPO, a hormone that 
is necessary for the production of red blood cells.  
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Hoffman emphasized that Amgen’s patent should not inhibit others from using the basic 
information about the DNA sequence to invent around the patented method in 
developing a new process to produce epo.  
Before considering any of the four objections, it is, as I indicated earlier, necessary to decide the 
nature of the invention which the specification had to enable. In my opinion, it was a way of 
making epo. For the reasons which I gave when discussing infringement, it was not and could 
not be the DNA sequence. It could only be a way (however broadly expressed) of making epo by 
the use of that information.760 
 
Therefore, Lord Hoffman’s statement infers that gene patents like the one 
Amgen possessed are not patents on the DNA sequence itself, but rather its uses. What 
can be derived from this outcome is the emphasis on the informational aspect of a 
genetic sequence, that if a sequence has a second function that was not identified at the 
time of the first patent application, then the second function should warrant individual 
protection. This line of reasoning is in line with the essence of patent protection, which 
is to compensate the inventor in exchange for the disclosed knowledge. 
4.7.  Human embryonic stem cells  
 Human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) are of particular interest because they 
have the capability to differentiate into various cell types in the body.
761
 Pluripotent 
stem cells have the potential to develop into all of the cell types of the body.
762
 
Embryonic stem cells (ESCs) are the primary source of pluripotent stem cells since they 
hypothetically have the potential to differentiate into all possible types of cells and 
tissues.
763
 They have significant medical value, but the way in which they are produced 
is surrounded by controversy based on ethical considerations. One of the methods in 
which they are obtained is from the inner cell mass of blastocysts.
764
 This means in 
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practice, the derivation of embryonic stem cells results in the destruction of blastocysts. 
Most often, the ESCs are obtained from surplus embryos created by in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). Opponents of embryonic research argue that the method of obtaining hESCs is 
ethically immoral as it involves the destruction of a blastocyst, which, according to 
some religions, equates to the destruction of a human being.
765
 On the other hand, 
advocates of embryonic research claim that unused embryos are disposed of and 
destroyed anyway and that it is better that they are used in research. 
4.7.1. The US approach 
Unlike the EU, the US does not have any legal exemptions for hESC patents. 35 
U.S.C. §101 states that four categories are patentable: any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
766
 In 1853 however, exceptions were 
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court that included: laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas.
767
 Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. §101 does not include any exemptions on 
the bases of morality or the ordre public. This means that there are no statutory 
exemptions from patentable subject matter for inventions directed at stem cells. 
 Elsewhere, there are some clauses which may be relevant if hESCs qualify as a 
human organism. In the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), section 2105 
states: “if the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole 
encompasses a human being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 must be made 
indicating that the claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.”768 
Similarly, in 2011, the Leahy Smith Act revised the US patent system, which amended 
35 U.S.C. §101 to include the addition of the following passage: “no patent may issue 
                                               
765 Nisbet, M. “Public Opinion About Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning” in Public Opinion 
Quarterly. Vol.68, No. 1, 2004 at 135. 
766 Title 35 of the United States Code §101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
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767O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853) 
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on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”769 Unless hESCs are 
interpreted in a future court decision as human organisms, any hESC-related invention 
may be ineligible patent subject matter, which could result in apprehension from that 
biotech industry. 
Less than a month after the Myriad, a historic patent on embryonic stem cells 
faced scrutiny. On July 2, 2013, three weeks after the US Supreme Court invalidated 
Myriad Genetics’ patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Consumer Watchdog 
(CW)
770
 filed a brief with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Consumer 
Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.
771
 Appellant CW maintains that 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation’s (WARF) US Patent No. 7,029,913 entitled 
“Primate Embryonic Stem Cells” is invalid. CW’s argument focuses on two main 
topics:  the decision in Myriad and the issue of obviousness. CW maintained that the 
rationale of Myriad should be taken into account in respect to hESCs, which is another 
35 U.S.C. §101 challenge. Rather than isolated genetic sequences, the focus is on 
whether an in vitro culture of human embryonic stem cells is patent eligible. CW 
reasoned: 
As a threshold matter, the claims of the ‘913 patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. §101 for 
claiming subject matter that is not patent eligible. Specifically, the claimed hESC cell culture 
falls within the “product of nature” exception to statutory subject matter… WARF did not create 
or alter the properties inherent in stem cells any more than Myriad created or altered the genetic 
information encoded in the DNA it claimed.772  
 
CW maintained that WARF’s patent claims describe embryonic stem cells that 
are identical to embryonic stem cells inside a human embryo and the accompanying 
properties that are inherent in all embryonic stem cells like the potential to differentiate, 
refrain from differentiation when cultured on a fibroblast feeder layer. Therefore, CW 
argued the claims are directed at products of nature and should be invalidated under 
                                               
769 Section 33(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.  
770 CW is a not-for-profit public charity dedicated to speaking on behalf of taxpayers and consumers in 
special interest-dominated public discourse, government and politics. 
771 Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. 13-1377. U.S. Court of Appeals for 
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772 Ibid at 10-11. 
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section 101. CW’s other point of contention was that WARF’s claims were obvious 
under 35. U.S.C. §103(a) and that identifying human embryonic stem cells was routine 
because human stem cells have the same structural features as mouse embryonic stem 
cells and, as a result, it would have been obvious which cells to select during the stem 
cell derivation process. 
However, on January 17 2014, the USPTO responded to the Federal Circuit 
panel’s request regarding CW’s standing in the case, maintaining that CW did not 
possess actual standing to bring an appeal against CW’s patent.773 On January 27, 2014, 
WARF issued a statement supporting the USPTO’S arguments.774 Despite the USPTO’s 
argument that CW did not have legal standing, CW filed a statement on the same day by 
re-asserting their standing.
775
 
Nevertheless, CW’s challenge reveals how the Supreme Court decision in 
Myriad is altering the landscape of biological patent litigation.
776
 Despite the fact that 
the decision was restricted to isolated gene patents, the Supreme Court did not elaborate 
on whether other isolated natural materials fall under the same restriction of 
unpatentability. Yet the CW argues that stem cells falls under this area, specifically 
targeting WARF’S U.S. patent 7,029,913.  
It is not clear whether this case will have much of an impact on hESC research. 
Compared to the EU, there does not seem to be great alarm over the issue. One possible 
explanation for this seeming lax attitude, at least within the scientific community, is that 
WARF has made their licensing fees and restrictions quite reasonable compared to other 
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cell lines.
777
 Furthermore, with alternative research including induced pluripotent stem 
cells,
778
 any ethical issues can be minimized:  
[M]ost research groups now emphasize or work on only reprogrammed ‘adult’ stem cells, not 
cells derived from embryos. These adult cells, also called induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, 
aren’t as controversial as embryo-derived cells and don’t have the same ethical and legal 
problems. And because they’re lab-engineered, many people say iPS cells are not vulnerable to a 
‘product of nature’ challenge.779 
 
Had the CW’s challenge to WARF’S patent been successful, and the court found 
the claims be for a ‘product of nature’, the ruling could have set another judicial 
precedent on removing patent protection for biological inventions and could lead to 
more extensive invalidation of other biological patents. From a law and economics 
perspective, this could have far-reaching consequences in the field by potentially 
hindering investment for potential investors who do not feel there is sufficient security 
for their investment, which could ultimately result in a general waning in innovation.
780
 
4.7.2. Brüstle v Greenpeace 
On October 18, 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
released a decision which sent shockwaves through the biotech industry, particularly 
worrying for those with a focus on stem cell research. The court held that human 
embryo stem cells were unpatentable subject matter based on reasons related to 
morality. Any invention which requires the destruction of a human embryo was 
considered to be immoral, and therefore unpatentable.
 781
 
In 1999, Oliver Brüstle received a German patent DE 19756864 for an invention 
concerning neural precursor cells, the process for producing isolated and purified neural 
precursor cells from hESCs and the use of neural precursor cells for therapeutic 
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purposes.
782
 His invention involved the use of cells which grew tissue for the purpose of 
treating injured organs for people with diseases like Parkinson’s and dementia.  
Greenpeace e.V. “Greenpeace” challenged the validity of Brüstle’s patent and 
the case went through the German courts and up to the CJEU. Greenpeace challenged 
the German patent that was granted for the process of isolating and purifying neural 
precursor cells, the methods of manufacturing them from embryonic stem cells and the 
use of the neural precursor cells in treating neural deficiencies like Huntington’s 
disease. Greenpeace contested the patent in the German Federal Patent Court, which 
ruled the grant invalid. 
Brüstle then appealed to the German Federal Court of Justice, who then asked 
the CJEU to interpret the concept of “human embryos” and “uses of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes,” and to determine whether exclusion from 
patentability of human embryos covers all stages of life from fertilization. Brüstle 
argued that the Directive did not explicitly define what an embryo encompassed and 
that an “embryo” was something that existed only 14 days after fertilisation. He argued 
                                               
782 Claim 1: Isolated, purified precursor cells with neuronal, or glial properties from embryonic stem cells, 
containing at most about 15% primitive embryonic and non-neutral cells obtainable by the following 
steps: 
Cultivate of E Cells into embryoid bodies, 
Cultivate of the neutral precursor cells to embryoid bodies, 
... 
Claim 5: Cells according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherin the embryonic stem cells were obtained from 
oocytes after nuclear transfer 
Claim 6: Cells according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherin the embryonic stem cells obtained from 
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... 
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the steps of 
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These claims were translated from German to English using the Patent Translate tool powered by the 
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visited December 10, 2014. 
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that since his embryonic stem cells were obtained from five- and six-day old embryos, 
they should not be banned. 
The CJEU ruled that any process that involved the removal of a stem cell from a 
human embryo at the blastocyst stage, requiring the destruction of that embryo, or its 
use as a base material at whatever stage the destruction occurs even if the destruction 
does not form a part of the claimed technical teaching, cannot be patented. The court 
made three main conclusions:  
1. A wide interpretation of ‘embryo’ - “any human ovum must, as soon as 
fertilised, be regarded as a ‘human embryo’ if that fertilisation is such as to 
commence the process of development of a human being” (Para. 53(1)). 
2. Use of human embryos for the purpose of scientific research is excluded from 
patentability because patents confer commercial rights. However, the use of 
human embryos for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes that are applied to the 
human embryo and are useful to it is patentable.  
3. The process, including the prior destruction of a human embryo or its use as a 
base material, is excluded from patentability.  
The CJEU’s decision distinguished between the use of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes and the use of human embryos for 
therapeutic/diagnostic purposes. The CJEU also held that an invention is excluded from 
patent protection if the invention involves the prior destruction of a human embryo. 
This exclusion would also apply to the use of human embryos in scientific research. 
However, inventions that use human embryos for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes for 
the benefit of the human embryo itself are patentable. It is difficult to separate even 
research conducted in universities since applying for a patent already signifies its 
intended industrial or commercial use.  
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After this CJEU ruling, it was up to the German Federal Court to decide on 
whether the original patent was permitted. In November 2012, the German Federal 
Court of Justice maintained that Brüstle’s patent DE19756864 could be upheld in 
amended form.
783
 The court held that in vitro cells derived from blastocysts did not have 
the capability of developing into human beings, and therefore do not constitute as 
human embryos.
784
 This means that cells derived from hESCs can be patented as long as 
they are not harvested through the destruction of human embryos. Specifically, the court 
held that a common disclaimer which excluded the destruction of human embryos could 
be used to render inventions derived from hESCs patentable.  
The CJEU decision was chosen for the case study in the next chapter as it 
provided the chance for participants to express their views and participate in whether 
the distinction by the CJEU of the uses of hESCs is correct and whether morality/ethics 
should be addressed by patent examiners and judges in the event of the granting or 
invalidation of a patent.  
4.8. Comparing the European and US approaches 
A comparison between the European and US contexts reveals that there are 
divergent approaches to the patent protection of human genetic materials. In the US, the 
issue seems to have been settled - it has ceased granting patent claims to isolated genes, 
as affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Myriad, holding isolated genes as ‘products of 
nature’ and no longer eligible for patent protection. This was due to a shift in 
understanding of isolated DNA sequences, as the US Supreme Court finally 
acknowledged the important role of function in a DNA sequence.
785
 It is a strict 
departure from its previous approach, which has been to focus on the chemical structure 
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instead of function in assessing patentable subject matter.
786
 This means DNA 
sequences could be taken as means-plus-function claims under  §112 of the US Patent 
Act to encompass the chemical structure as specified in the claims, in addition to their 
equivalents, provided the other DNA sequences perform the same function through the 
genetic information they carry.  
On the other hand, in Europe, the discussion is likely to continue primarily on 
the patent requirement of inventiveness and the scope of protection, specifically on 
purpose-bound protection for patent claims on genes. The divergence occurred with the 
EU’s enactment of Directive 98/44/EC, requiring EU Member States to adopt 
provisions regarding the patentability of biotech inventions. It is suggested that 
Directive 98/44/EC was designed to acknowledge the quality of DNA sequences as an 
carrier of information, which extended patent protection to include DNA sequences as 
long as the sequence performs a function:  
The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information 
shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 5(1), in which the product in incorporated 
and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its function.787 
 
By focusing on function, it is suggested that there is no difference between an 
isolated DNA sequence and one in its natural form. This means that there is no 
infringement as long as a DNA sequence does not perform the same function as that of 
the patented isolated DNA sequence.
788
 Krauss and Takenaka suggest by focusing on 
the nature of genetic information carrier, patent protection could extend to other 
materials regardless of the chemical structure, maintaining that this expansive protection 
may be too generous compared to what the inventors actually invented and disclosed.
 789
 
Therefore, there is a constant balancing act between the state and inventors, in that an 
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inventor should not be overcompensated with extensive protection, because that would 
be to the detriment of the public good. 
 In the US, there is no equivalent of the Directive 98/44/EC in addressing 
biotech inventions. In addition, the 1952 US Patent Act does not contain any provisions 
that directly address the patentability of biotech inventions. Moreover, although the 
Supreme Court recently abandoned the chemical structural identity approach to isolated 
DNA sequences, it is not likely it will be replaced with the functional approach. “US 
courts historically disfavoured a claim defining an invention by its function.”790 Instead, 
case law has dictated practise and policy matters in this field. As a result, the question 
of whether genes may be protected under the patent legislation must now be answered 
differently in the two jurisdictions, combined with divergent practices gene patenting 
between Europe and the US.  
4.9. Conclusion 
 
The two main areas of debate in biotechnology patents concern DNA sequences 
and inventions derived from hESCs. In the US, the enduring exclusion of patents for 
“laws of nature” or “physical phenomena” and “abstract ideas” asserted in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty
791
 are recognized as the “product of nature” doctrine.792 It is submitted that 
the US’ continuing focus on the product of nature doctrine has largely contributed to the 
ongoing debate around patentable subject matter particularly in the biotechnology field. 
This is not aided by the longstanding convention in patent law that a natural matter can 
be patented as long as it is possible to physically separate it from its natural 
environment. American case law from the 1980s - 2010 adopted the “isolation and 
purification” argument as a way to differentiate isolated and purified DNA sequences 
from their naturally occurring counterparts and hold them patentable matter. This may 
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explain why, until recently, the US legislature and courts’ have refused to accept the 
informational quality of genetic material, for fear of disturbing expectations that 
isolation and purification of naturally occurring materials was sufficient for removing 
them from the ‘product of nature’ category. 
However, it is submitted that the concepts of isolation and purification are 
inadequate. These two concepts are a legal term, an artificial construction designed to 
draw a line between what is and not patentable pertaining to human genetic information. 
The concept of isolation has been adopted by the EPO and the USPTO with a legal 
value. In the United States, this has taken place through case law. In the EU, this was 
developed through the enactment of Directive 98/44/EC.  In respect to the human body, 
in the EU, Article 5 of Directive 98/44/EC is inadequate and outdated with the current 
state of biomedical research. First, the isolation technique is now a standard research 
tool. Second, the broad patent protection in Europe for isolated DNA sequences calls 
into question the balance of interests, which tends to lean towards the interests of 
inventors.
793
 Meanwhile, by precluding isolated genes from patentable subject matter, 
the US has shifted the balance to protect public interests. 
In regards to the patentability of hESCs, their exclusion in Europe is based on 
moral grounds, which a jurisdiction has a right to do. However, this thesis argued that 
the distinction between a therapeutic and commercial use is mistaken, and if Europe 
does not want hESCs to be patented, they should alter or remove Article 6(2) (c) of the 
Directive 98/44/EC, which allows for therapeutic or diagnostic uses that are applied to 
the human embryo to be patentable. Patent offices are not the appropriate arbitrators of 
morality and ethical questions should be decided Parliament policy makers.  
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Chapter 5: Exploring perspectives of patenting human genetic materials within the 
business, legal and civil communities 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Both judiciaries and decision-making bodies in the US and Europe have issued 
judgements holding certain human biological materials as unpatentable subject matter: 
isolated genetic sequences and inventions derived from hESCs.
794
 This has wide 
implications for industry looking to continue research and development in these two 
areas.  In the US, the Supreme Court has issued a judgement which renders isolated 
genes unpatentable on the grounds that the act of “separating that gene from its 
surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”795 The decision was symbolic, 
signalling to industry that there needs to be something more involved than simply 
isolating a gene for a genetic sequence to qualify as an invention. Meanwhile, the CJEU 
ruled that a process which involved the removal of a stem cell from a human embryo at 
the blastocyst stage, thus, requiring the destruction of that embryo, cannot be 
patented.
796
 
While it is known that the industry sector and legal community have various 
concerns about these two rulings, the evidence base is limited. Recognizing this, an 
empirical study was conducted to examine the perspectives of the stakeholders with 
regards to Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. (C-34/10) (2011) and Association for 
Molecular Pathology et al v. United States Patent and Trademark Office et al. (Fed. 
                                               
794 Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. U.S. Supreme Court. June 
13, 2013 and Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. (C-34/10) (2011) 
795Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. U.S. Supreme Court. June 
13, 2013 at 12. 
796 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. (C-34/10) (2011) 
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Cir. 2011).
797
 The aim of this study is to examine the stakeholders’ perspectives with 
regards to the case rulings. 
This chapter presents the results of an empirical study consisting of 43 
interviews/completed surveys undertaken from March to June 2012. The purpose of 
conducting these interviews was to discover at a qualitative level the answer to the 
following question: what are the most important issues for the stakeholders regarding 
the eligible subject matter for patent protection pertaining specifically to isolated 
genetic sequences and inventions derived from hESCs? Moreover, is the patent system 
the appropriate forum in which to address ethical and moral considerations? If not, 
where should they be addressed? 
Interview participants were drawn from 3 sectors of society: legal, scientific 
industry and civil society. As discussed over the course of this chapter, the scientific 
industry may need to consider what the impact of court rulings could be on their own 
practices, particularly whether they believe investment in R&D could continue with the 
knowledge that there are no patents for isolated gene sequences and inventions derived 
from human embryonic stem cells. In this respect, the data provided here can be used to 
inform future studies of how court decisions ruling isolated genes and inventions 
derived from hESCs as ineligible patent subject matter can alter business behaviour. In 
this vein, several recommendations are made in Chapter 6 with respect to the key 
concerns voiced by the interview participants, including whether the patent system is 
appropriate for protecting biotech inventions. 
As discussed below, in terms of its participants the empirical study includes 
stakeholders based in Europe and the US, areas where there is a strong biotechnology 
                                               
797 The interviews were conducted between March and June 2012, prior to the US Supreme Court 
judgement which was released on June 13, 2013. Therefore, participants were asked questions based on 
the Federal Circuit decision: Association For Molecular Pathology et al v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office et al. (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, follow up requests for statements were made after the 
US Supreme Court decision and the participants who responded did not diverge from their previous 
statements. 
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sector that will no doubt be affected by the case rulings. It is also important to make 
clear from the outset that this study does not provide a definitive commentary on the 
impact of the rulings on the business and legal communities in the two jurisdictions. 
The study is limited to a particular time as well as to a limited number of carefully 
selected participants. Nevertheless, this chapter aims to provide a snapshot of the 
various perspectives on the concept of a gene and the commercial use of an embryo 
within the scientific industry, legal communities and civil society sectors between 
March and June 2012, after the Brüstle decision but a year prior to the US Supreme 
Court decision in Myriad in 2013. 
5.2. Stakeholder Analysis 
This chapter will focus on prevailing attitudes of major stakeholders in 
biotechnology inventions by looking at landmark decisions and opinions of specialists 
in law and science in considering whether changes need to be made to the patent 
system, or whether a special set of guidelines is required to protect biotechnology 
developments. A method of considering intellectual property policy development is to 
utilise stakeholder analysis.
798
 This process encompasses the recognition of key 
stakeholders, which include the various interests and institutions with a concern with the 
undertaking of policy. According to R. Edward Freeman, the definition of stakeholder 
analysis consists of “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization objectives.”799 A straightforward stakeholder-derived 
reasoning for patent policy is that patented products require government control to 
                                               
798 For more on stakeholder theory, see: Fletcher, A., et al. "Mapping stakeholder perceptions for a third 
sector organization." in Journal of Intellectual Capital Vol. 4 Iss. 4, pp. 505 – 527, 2003.Mitchell, R. K., 
B. R. Agle, and D.J. Wood. "Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the 
Principle of Who and What really Counts" in Academy of Management Review.  Vol. 22, Iss. 4, pp. 853 
– 888, 1997 and 
Savage, G. T., T. W. Nix, Whitehead and Blair. "Strategies for assessing and managing organizational 
stakeholders," in Academy of Management Executive. Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 61 – 75. (1991). 
799 Freeman, R.E. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston: Pitman, 1984 at 46. 
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establish stability between the competing interests of the main stakeholders in this area: 
(i) inventor, (ii) investor/producer and (iii) others (i.e. NGOs, consumers).
800
   
Defining stakeholder groups 
  Stakeholder analysis involves identifying primary, secondary and key 
stakeholders and assessing their interests.
801
 Once those interests are identified, conflicts 
of interests can be ascertained, and interests can be assessed based on influence and 
importance. 
Primary stakeholders are those individuals whose ongoing involvement is vital to an 
establishment’s survival.802 This group is usually comprised of inventors and investors, 
along with what is known as the public stakeholder group, which consists of the 
governments and communities that arrange the economic and legal infrastructures.
803
 
This primary stakeholder group comprises those who are affected positively or 
negatively by the establishment’s actions. The organization’s survival is dependent on 
its ability to create adequate wealth, value or satisfaction for those belonging to the 
stakeholder groups.
804
 Members of these groups are ultimately affected by legal 
decisions regarding the patentability of biotech inventions in the following case studies. 
The scientific and research community and biotech industry members are primary 
stakeholders in the following case studies.  
Secondary stakeholders are agents who are indirectly affected by an establishment’s 
actions, in that they may influence or be affected by the establishment’s operations.805 
This group may include special interest groups, and groups who have the ability to 
                                               
800 Dutfield, G. and U. Suthersanen. Global Intellectual Property Law. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2008 at 51-52. 
801 Clarkson, M. “A Stakeholder Framework for Anlayzing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance,” in Academy of Management Review. Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 92-117, 1995. 
802 Ibid, 106. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Ibid, 107. 
805 Ibid. 
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activate public judgement in favour of, or in opposition to, an establishment’s 
performance.
806
  
External participants: This group includes individuals who inform the debate with 
their expertise. 
The various stakeholders who participated in the debate include: 
1. Inventors, investors and the scientific and research community: This group 
includes the researchers, inventors, their funding bodies and employers, which 
can include academic institutions and industry bodies. These are primary 
stakeholders. There were a total of 7 participants in this category. 
2. Legal actors: The second group comprises patent attorneys who arrange patent 
applications or prosecute and defend them on a regular basis. It also includes 
judges who make decisions in litigation whilst deciding patent validity and 
interpreting whether the claimed invention meets the requirements of 
patentability. These are external participants. There were 20 interviewees in this 
category. 
3. Civil Society: This group consists of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and ethical actors. It includes advocates working on behalf of NGOs who 
highlight their causes and shed light on the issues, which they may feel the 
system is not addressing sufficiently. In addition, this group consists of the 
individuals who comment on the ethics of patenting human genetic materials, 
many of whom are on ethical committees or are advisors to policy-making 
bodies. These are external participants. There were 10 interviewees in this 
category. 
 
                                               
806 Ibid. 
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An institutional stakeholder map 
 Interests Capacities/Resources Philosophical/jurisprudential 
rhetoric 
Primary stakeholders 
Inventors 
and  
corporate 
investors 
Remuneration 
Access to patented 
inventions/knowledge 
Financial resources Property rights, right to 
equitable remuneration 
Scientific 
community 
Access to patented 
inventions/knowledge 
Scientific know-how Public domain, access to 
knowledge 
Secondary stakeholders 
 
Consumers Access to and 
affordability of 
scientific technology 
Enforceable and state-
sponsored regime to 
protect 
investment/capital 
Buying power Public domain, public 
interest, access to essential 
healthcare 
External  participants 
Legal 
analysts 
Legal certainty Legal compliance Property rights, right to 
equitable remuneration 
Ethical 
analysts 
Represent the ethics of a 
community 
Moral regulation Moral underpinnings in 
conjunction with practical 
ethics 
NGOs Access to information Power to advocate Public domain, public 
interest, access to essential 
healthcare 
 
As a result of the different interests and values each group represents, it is 
difficult to expect all of the stakeholders to possess the same view on questions relating 
to this topic area. The next section will focus on the first case study, in which the 
scientific industry and legal participants’ answers to three questions regarding the patent 
eligibility of isolated genetic sequences, looking at both the US District and Federal 
Circuit rulings pertaining to Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents.807 This will be 
followed by the second case study, which  is centred on the commercial exploitation of 
inventions concerning the uses of human embryos in Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace 
                                               
807 Association for Molecular Pathology et al v. United States Patent and Trademark Office et al (2010) 
and Association for Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and Trademark Office et al (2011) 
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e.V.
808
 Both proponents and opponents of patenting inventions arising from the 
commercial and therapeutic uses of hESCs will be presented. 
The following two cases are selected to demonstrate and deliberate some facets 
and difficulties of patenting human genetic inventions. The core of the dispute is a 
debate over whether patenting human genetic materials should occur at all. Despite the 
fact that thousands of gene sequences have been patented, part of the reason the debate 
persists is because genes are recognized more as programmed information than mere 
chemical substances.
809
 In addition, patents on inventions derived from hESCs are 
another heavily disputed area, which stems from a combination of political, economic 
and legal factors. In Europe, it has encountered opposition from an ethical and political 
standpoint, whilst in the US, there is a challenge based on the notion that a human 
embryo is a ‘product of nature.’ 
There are two main practical issues with gene patenting. First, granting 
companies patents on genes can lead to abusive behaviour.  The case Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (2010) highlighted the issue 
with granting gene patents related to instances of breast cancer to Myriad Genetics, 
which was criticized for monopolizing the industry and engaging in abusive behaviour. 
A UK cancer company uploaded the genetic sequence of BRCA2, one of the genes 
associated with breast cancer, to the Internet. Myriad Genetics downloaded the 
information, and received a patent for the gene.
810
 The second argument against 
patenting genes is that they will hinder research and development, where researchers 
                                               
808Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
809 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics states DNA sequences “are the body’s way of carrying information 
as to how proteins are to be constructed. But this kind of information, it will be said, cannot be properly 
patented. It may be discovered and stored on a database which carries a charge for access; but it is simply 
not eligible for patenting.”  Nuffield Council on Bioethics. The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion 
Paper, at 27. 
810 Myriad Genetics’ behaviour had several effects on how certain countries implemented EU law. For 
instance, France’s rules on gene patenting are stricter, given how Myriad Genetics acted upon receiving 
the patents. 
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need to obtain many licenses from patent holders before a product can be developed, 
and lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons.”811  
5.2.1. Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents 
The debate surrounding whether or not DNA sequences should be patentable has 
largely been centred on one particular set of patents which relates to what has been 
termed the “BRCA1” and “BRCA2” patents owned by Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad). 
Myriad received patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 in the US and the EU and litigated in 
both jurisdictions, although with different outcomes. Myriad obtained patents on the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes after discovering their precise location and sequence, which 
claimed mutations that are associated with increased risk of breast and ovarian cancers. 
Once Myriad determined the genes’ characteristic nucleotide sequence, they were able 
to develop diagnostic tests for the detection of mutations in the genes to assess a 
patient’s cancer risk. These patents gave Myriad the exclusive right to isolate BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes and also the right to synthetically create BRCA cDNA.
812
 Myriad 
was the exclusive provider of BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing.
813
 However, Myriad’s 
patents did not deter some institutions from developing their own tests and in response, 
Myriad sent out cease and desist letters.
814
  
5.2.2. Ethical Objections to Myriad’s Gene Patents 
Aside from the technical grounds (which will be discussed below) for 
oppositions against Myriad’s patents, there was inherent policy and ethical 
                                               
811 Heller, M. and R. Eisenberg. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research,” in Science. Vol. 280, pp. 698-701, 1998 at 3 
812 AMP v Myriad (2013) at 1. 
813 Myriad did license 13 laboratories in the United States to provide single mutation testing, which 
applied in instances where a woman whose test discovered a mutation and her female relatives wanted to 
be tested for the same mutation. Instead of undergoing the full BRCA1 and BRCA2 test, the relatives 
could instead opt to test their gene against the discovered mutation, which was one-tenth of the cost. 
Myriad only licensed this single mutation follow-up testing after a woman had paid for and undergone 
Myriad’s own genetic testing kit. See Gold, R. and J. Carbone, “Myriad Genetics: In the eye of the policy 
storm” in Genetics in Medicine. Vol.12, No.4, S39–S70. April 2010 Supplement. 
814 See La Belle, M. “Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics Case” in California Law Review 
Circuit.Vol.2, November 2011 at 77-78.  
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apprehension. The main concern was the restrictions the patents could place on medical 
practice and the monopolization of genetic testing.  France’s Institut Curie released a 
press statement articulating that Myriad’s broad patents would ensure a monopoly 
position that would seriously hinder research and public health: 
Not allowing French and European laboratories to perform testing or initial family mutation 
searches will lead to a loss of technical and medical expertise which will probably in turn lead to 
a decrease in funding allocated to such laboratories. The loss of expertise and of funding would 
not be trivial for basic research which is critical for the future of medical genetics. It would 
therefore not be without repercussions either for the development of genuine preventative care 
for high risk women.815 
 
This “unacceptable monopoly” raises the question of how to balance patent law 
with health objectives. It cannot be denied that there are significant medical benefits 
with the creation of diagnostic tests like the BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic kits that 
Myriad created. But there is still debate about how the patent system should address 
such tools, and whether they should be protected under the patent system for the sake of 
promoting greater access to the technology in question, including the development of 
better diagnostic kits and access to testing. However, it is difficult to strike the right 
balance. As long as the private sector is the primary body for investing in and 
developing genetic therapeutics, biotech companies will continue to need some level of 
exclusive control over the developed technologies to recoup on their investment.  
5.2.3. The US patent 
A. The District Court’s invalidation of Myriad’s gene product patents: 
In March 2010, Myriad Genetics lost aspects of its patent rights to two breast 
cancer genes after civil rights groups legally challenged the validity of their patents.
 816
 
The American Civil Liberties Union filed the case against Myriad Genetics on behalf of 
many different groups including doctors, scientists, cancer patients, and non-profit 
research groups. The plaintiffs sued to nullify the patents held by Myriad Genetics and 
                                               
815 Institut Curie, Press Office: Against Myriad Genetics’s [sic] monopoly on tests for predisposition to 
breast and ovarian cancer. September 12, 2001. Paris. 
816Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09-cv-4515, 94 
USPQ2d 1683 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010). 
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the University of Utah Research Foundation for two human genes related to breast and 
ovarian cancer. Myriad had prohibited anyone else from performing diagnostic tests and 
conducting research. This case provided the first opportunity to test the legal validity of 
gene patents, which have been subject to controversy since the completion of the 
Human Genome Project, yet the USPTO has continued to grant gene patents. Genomes 
of genetically-engineered organisms have long been rendered patentable because they 
are something new and an invention. Other patents in this case include those for the 
methods of isolating segments of DNA, deemed to be purified genes that are claimed 
not to be found in nature, and methods or processes that make use of DNA segments. 
The claim in the composition patent reads as follows: “An isolated DNA coding 
for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO:2.” 
The key statutory provision applied in the case was section 101 of Title 35 of the 
US Code, which provides as follows: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.” 
Consequently, the court had to determine whether the relevant segments of DNA 
and the processes used to test for them could be classified as a "new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof." In the past, scientific principles, laws of nature, things occurring in nature and 
abstract ideas were deemed to be outside the realm of patentable subject matter.  
In the past, there was an exception to the ‘product of nature’ doctrine if the 
subject matter was purified. In Parke-Davis, it was held that the ban on patenting 
‘products of nature’ did not apply to purified substances that were of practical, 
commercial, and therapeutic value. This ruling established that purified DNA was 
219 
 
eligible for patenting. However, this exception was considered to be inapplicable by 
Judge Sweet, holding that the isolated DNA contained sequences that were found in 
nature, and therefore unpatentable under 35 U.S.C §101.
817
  
Myriad claimed that they had "isolated" and "purified" the DNA segments in 
question, and that these had markedly different characteristics, or were fundamentally 
distinct from, what was found in nature. But Sweet held that the composition patents 
were invalid and the DNA segments were products of nature, and not an ‘invention.’ 
Sweet held that isolated DNA was the same as naturally occurring DNA in cells. 
Indeed, the relationship between a naturally occurring nucleotide sequence and the molecule it 
expresses in a human cell - that is, the relationship between genotype and phenotype, is simply a 
law of nature. The chemical structure of native human genes is a product of nature, and it is no 
less a product of nature when that structure is ‘isolated’ from its natural environment than are 
cotton fibers that have been separated from cotton seeds or coal that has been extracted from the 
earth.
818
 
 
The case established that mere extraction and purification of a naturally-
occurring chemical element or compound would not be patentable (the process for 
doing this might be, but not the extracted and purified substance itself). Myriad argued 
that a purified substance not found in nature in pure form was patentable, but this was 
rejected. 
Thus, the question was whether Myriad had patented something with markedly 
different characteristics from naturally-occurring DNA. On this, it failed. Assessing 
whether the isolated DNA was “markedly different” from its naturally occurring form 
on the basis of its genetic information, Judge Sweet reasoned, “[b]ecause the claimed 
isolated DNA is not markedly different from native DNA as it exists in nature, it 
constitutes unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101.”
819
 As a result, claims for 
isolated DNA are not eligible subject matter for patenting under s.101. Unlike the 
genetically engineered microorganisms in Chakrabarty, the unique chain of chemical 
                                               
817Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,186–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
818 Ibid at 10-11. 
819 Ibid at 135. 
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base pairs that induces a human cell to express a BRCA protein is not a “human-made 
invention.” Nor is the fact that particular natural mutations in that unique chain 
increases a woman’s chance of contracting breast or ovarian cancer.  
In sum, the District Court invalidated Myriad’s two composition of matter gene 
patents on the basis that the patented DNA sequences resembled the equivalent 
naturally-occurring DNA in encoding the same genetic information. “The USPTO and 
the courts, including the Federal Circuit...have uniformly acquiesced. Now a federal 
court has said that, no, genes aren’t just chemicals - precisely because they carry 
information.”820 This approach was not adopted by the Federal Circuit, choosing to 
assess whether the claimed DNA sequences were “markedly different” from their 
natural counterpart on the basis of whether they possessed a distinctive chemical 
identity. The decision was appealed and heard by the Court of Appeal for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) in 2011,
821
 which overturned the District Court’s ruling that the isolated 
gene sequences were invalid.  
B. Federal Circuit decision: isolated genes are eligible for patent protection 
In July 2011, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit restored the law to 
its prior status before the  District Court’s invalidation of Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes in March 2010 and verified the patentability of isolated DNA 
molecules that included short primer and probe sequences, longer DNA sequences and 
cDNA sequences.
822
   
The panel consisted of three judges: Lourie, Moore and Bryson. The majority, 
consisting of Judges Lourie and Moore, held that all isolated DNA was patentable 
subject matter. Bryson dissented, claiming that although cDNA sequences were 
                                               
820 “Federal District Judge in Manhattan Says That Isolated and Purified Genes Are Not Patentable 
Because They Are Products of Nature” in Biotechnology Law Report, 29, 307, Nov 3, 2010 
821Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.Cir. 
2011). 
822Ibid. 
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patentable because they were not found in nature, DNA was not because there were no 
“marked differences” between the isolated DNA and natural DNA found in 
chromosomes. 
 Like the District Court, the Federal Circuit relied on the standard set out by 
Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. In Chakrabarty, a genetically engineered bacterium was 
held to be patentable because it possessed “markedly different characteristics”823 from 
other naturally occurring bacteria. However, in Funk Bros., six bacteria strains with new 
behaviour were held to be unpatentable because none of the bacteria had achieved a new 
use. 
824
 Writing for the majority, Judge Lourie merged these two decisions and wrote 
that the issue was whether the invention had ‘markedly’ different characteristics from 
what exists in nature. 
 Both Judges Lourie and Moore emphasized that Myriad’s claimed cDNA 
sequences did not exist in nature, were created by man and were patentable subject 
matter. In regards to isolated DNA, Judge Lourie maintained that isolated DNA 
sequences were different from naturally occurring DNA because they had different 
chemical structures, and that this chemical difference between the isolated DNA and 
naturally occurring DNA was sufficient to make isolated DNA sequences patentable.  
BRCA 1 and BRCA2 in their isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the 
body, human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a native chromosomal DNA 
imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity from that possessed by native 
DNA.825 
 
In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Lourie utilized the “breaking covalent 
bonds” test: 
Isolated DNA has been cleaved (i.e. Had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed?) or 
synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA molecule. For example, the 
BRCA1 gene in its native state resides on chromosome 17, a DNA molecule of around 80 
million nucleotides. Similarly, BRCA2 in its native state is located on chromosome 13, a DNA 
of approximately 114 million nucleotides. In contrast, isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2, with 
introns, each consist of just 80,000 or so nucleotides...Accordingly, BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their 
isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the body; human intervention in 
                                               
823Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 
824Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-130. 
825Association for Molecular Pathology v US Patent and Trademark Office et al653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) at 42. 
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cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a native chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a 
distinctive chemical identity from that possessed by native DNA.
826
 
 
 Judge Lourie’s employment of the “cleaving covalent bonds test” enabled him to 
come to the conclusion that Myriad’s isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences 
were markedly different from their larger natural state. Yet, this position has been met 
with mixed reactions.
827
 
Although Judge Moore agreed with Judge Lourie that isolated DNA was 
patentable, Moore’s interpretation differed from Lourie’s claim that isolated DNA was 
patentable simply because of its differing chemical structure from naturally occurring 
DNA. In fact, Judge Moore rejected Judge Lourie’s approach: “Although the different 
chemical structure does suggest that claimed DNA is not a product of nature, I do not 
think this difference alone necessarily makes isolated DNA so ‘markedly different.’”828 
In her concurring opinion, Judge Moore focused on the function and informational 
content between natural and isolated DNA sequences. Isolated DNA sequences had to 
have a “significant new utility as compared to nature”829 for them to be patentable.  She 
noted that short, isolated DNA sequences could be useful as primers and probes, which 
could satisfy the “markedly different” test as they were (1) chemically different from 
naturally occurring DNA and (ii) possessed a “different and beneficial utility.”830Judge 
Lourie however, did not address whether the claimed isolated DNA sequences had new 
functions, only their chemical structure. 
                                               
826 Ibid at 17 
827 Interview with Tim Roberts on February 7, 2012: “I would agree with Judge Lourie when he says 
these are chemical compounds having particular sequences. I think where I disagree with him, is where he 
says they’re best described in patents by their structures rather than by their functions. That’s quite 
frequently true. It’s not always true, I don’t feel.  The point of an invention is probably best described by 
structure, usually. But sometimes putting two functions together will produce a novel effect and can be a 
proper way of distinguishing and I would regard that as generally applicable across patents, not 
specifically applicable solely in this area. With DNA, you can produce the same protein, I think, from 
more than one DNA sequence...the novel point of the invention is producing a particular protein and it 
may even be possible to make small changes within that protein without affecting its function. If it’s 
producing a new protein with a particular function, then it may be proper to describe the DNA in terms of 
its function in producing that protein.” 
828Moore concurrence at 14. 
829 Ibid at 7. 
830 Ibid at 14. 
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 Judge Moore considered policy implications of invalidating Myriad’s patents on 
the claimed DNA sequences, emphasizing the impact of disturbing thirty years of patent 
practise and “settled expectations and extensive property rights.”831Moore decided to 
leave it to Congress to decide whether DNA sequences and genes should be patented 
and was not comfortable with having a lower court enlarge the scope of patentability 
exceptions. This concern about retroactive impact can create a “one-way ratchet in 
patent law.”832 
Like Judges Moore and Lourie, Judge Bryson also applied the Chakrabarty test, 
although reaching an entirely different result than his two colleagues. Judge Bryson 
dissented, rejecting the importance of the different chemical structure between isolated 
DNA and its natural counterpart.
833
 He also dismissed the utility of isolated DNA, 
maintaining that the mere fact that DNA was isolated and purified from its natural state 
did not garner it patentability status, writing “there is no magic to a chemical bond that 
requires us to recognize a new product when a chemical bond is altered or broken.”834 
Since Judge Bryson found no significant differences between the isolated form and 
naturally occurring form, he held that isolated DNA was not patentable subject matter. 
The case was appealed and went to the Supreme Court. In 2012, the Supreme Court 
granted writ of certiorari and remanded the case back to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit for further deliberation in light of Mayo v. 
Prometheus.
835
 
                                               
831 Ibid at 19. 
832 Rai, A. “Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development,” 
in Duke Law Journal. Vol. 61, 2012 at 149. 
833 Bryson dissent at 6. 
834 Ibid at 7. 
835Mayo Collaborative Services, DBA Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc. 566 , 132 S.Ct. 1289, 101 USPQ2d 1961 (2012) 
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C. US Supreme Court invalidates gene patents 
The US Supreme Court reversed the Federal Appeal Court’s ruling on June 13, 
2013
836
 and invalidated Myriad Genetics’ product claims for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes on the basis that the patent claims were directed at products of nature. The 
Supreme Court’s approach to the isolation of DNA was that isolating genes from their 
surrounding naturally occurring environment was not enough to warrant a patent: 
“genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under §101 simply 
because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.”837  
The issue was determining whether Myriad’s patent claimed a “new and useful 
composition of matter” according to §101 or naturally occurring phenomena.838 The 
court reiterated the essential purpose of the patent system, which was to strike a balance 
between creating “incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and 
“imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.”839 The 
decision is remarkably similar to the amicus curiae brief submitted by the US 
Department of Justice, on behalf of the US government.
840
 The US government 
acknowledged that the USPTO’s practise of granting patents for isolated genes and 
DNA sequences is wrong as these are still products of nature:  
The district court correctly held, however, that genomic DNA that has merely been isolated from 
the human body, without further alteration or manipulation, is not patent-eligible. Unlike the 
genetically engineered microorganism in Chakrabarty, the unique chain of chemical base pairs 
that induces a human cell to express a BRCA protein is not a human-made invention…The 
chemical structure of native human genes is a product of nature and it is no less a product of 
nature when that structure is ‘isolated’ from its natural environment than are cotton fibres that 
have been separated from cotton seeds or coal that has been extracted from the earth.841 
 
                                               
836AMP v Myriad (2013) 
837Ibid at 18. 
838 Ibid at 11 
839 Ibid. 
840No. 2010-1406.Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, written by the 
Assistant Attorney General in The Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2010). 
841Ibid at 10-11. 
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The Court applied the reasoning in Chakrabarty to the case, holding that the 
scientists in Chakrabarty added four plasmids to the claimed bacterium which resulted 
in its ability to break down crude oil, which was why the bacterium was found to be 
new with markedly different characteristics. In contrast, the Court acknowledged that 
Myriad had found an important and useful gene, but had not created anything, because 
“separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of 
invention.”842 Therefore, the important criterion is that there is a marked difference 
between the claimed product and the naturally occurring one.  
It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The location and order of the nucleotides existed in nature before 
Myriad found them. Nor did Myriad create? or alter the genetic structure of DNA.843  
 
The Court maintained that the value of Myriad’s claims was directed at the 
information contained within the claimed nucleotides rather than at the chemical 
composition itself.  
Nor are Myriad’s claims saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human genome severs 
chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule. Myriad’s claims are 
simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely in any way on the 
chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular section of DNA. Instead, the 
claims understandably focus on the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes.
844
  
 
Perhaps the most striking part of the Supreme Court’s decision was to 
differentiate between isolated DNA and cDNA, holding that a “naturally occurring 
DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been 
isolated, but cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”845 The 
decision echoes sentiments contained in the amici brief pertaining to cDNA molecules, 
maintaining that it is patent eligible subject matter because they are: 
synthetic molecules engineered by scientists to incorporate, in a single contiguous DNA 
segment, only the exons (i.e. protein-coding sequences) of a naturally occurring gene?…such 
molecules do not occur in nature, either in isolation or as contiguous sequences contained within 
                                               
842AMP v. Myriad (2013) at 12. 
843 Ibid at 11-12. 
844 Ibid at 14. 
845 Ibid at 2 
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longer natural molecules, but instead must be synthesized by scientists in the laboratory from 
other genetic materials.846 
The Court chose to emphasize that synthetically engineered products that do not 
naturally exist in the human body are patentable subject matter, which reflects the 
Court’s concern over the impact of the decision on other genetically derived inventions. 
As a result, the focus now shifts from isolated genes to cDNA, which challenges the 
normal gene approach with two questions: whether it naturally occurs in nature, and 
also the question of the utility/industrial application of cDNA. cDNA does not naturally 
exist in the human body, but can be naturally produced through the processes of certain 
retroviruses.
847
 cDNA is also more useful for researchers who seek to study diseases 
associated with a particular gene because it is shorter than natural DNA which makes 
several laboratory operations achievable that could not be done with natural DNA.
848
 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision pertained to isolated and purified products 
generally, it limited the decision to DNA.  
The case highlights the issues associated with how patent law should address 
inventions encompassing informational content. The issue will persist with the growth 
of personalized medicine.
849
 Part of the difficulty with genetically derived inventions 
can be traced to confusion about the nature of genes and the language that is expressing 
the content of genes.
850
 The question that needs to be answered is whether a DNA 
sequence represents one of the building blocks of scientific exploration, and whether a 
patent for a DNA sequence will obstruct scientific exploration by suppressing an 
elementary idea. By declaring isolated DNA sequences as ‘products of nature’ and not 
                                               
846 No. 2010-1406. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, written by 
the Assistant Attorney General in The Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. United States Patent 
and Trademark Office and Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2010) at 15. 
847 Feldman, R. “Whose Body is it Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects of Property and 
Intellectual Property Law” in Stanford Law Review. Vol. 63, 2010-2011 at 1388. 
848 Ibid. 
849 “Personalized medicine is an area of applied research devoted to developing tests that operate on 
biological and clinical data from a patent (e.g., protein levels, genetic mutations, medical history) to 
provide diagnoses, prognoses, and treatment regimens specific to the patient.” Feldman, R. Rethinking 
Patent Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012 at 128. 
850 Ibid at 131. 
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markedly different from their naturally occurring counterparts to be considered a “new 
composition of matter within the context of 35 U.S.C §101,” the decision could have 
significant importance to industry. This is because the courts can be interpreted as 
expanding the natural product exception to patent eligibility whilst simultaneously 
narrowing the areas of biotechnology inventions that can be patented in the country. 
Moreover, the decision enlarges the gap between US patent law and EU patent law.  
5.3. AMP v. Myriad Case Study- Biotech and Legal Stakeholders 
A set of three questions were posed to the scientific industry and legal 
stakeholder participants about the case to discover whether participants agreed with the 
main lines of reasoning adopted by the US judiciary regarding patenting isolated 
genomic sequences. 
1. In March 2010, the District Court invalidated Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 
patents, declaring the isolated gene sequences to be “products of nature.”851 Do 
you agree with this? 
2. Do you think isolating and purifying a naturally occurring gene makes the 
claimed matter ‘markedly different’ from a naturally occurring form? 
3. Judge Sweet held that DNA sequences should not be treated the same as other 
chemicals in regards to patenting because of their “information rich quality.” 
However, Judge Lourie took a different approach, stating: “genes are in fact 
materials having a chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by 
their structures rather than their functions.”  Who is right? 
5.3.1. Is an isolated genomic sequence a product of nature? 
Most respondents from both the biotechnology and legal sectors believed that an 
isolated genomic sequence is a product of nature. 5 out of 7 biotech respondents and 15 
out of 20 legal respondents maintained that District Court Judge Sweet was correct in 
                                               
851The product of nature doctrine is prominent in the distinction between discovery and invention in the 
United States patent case law. 
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maintaining that Myriad’s isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 genomic sequences were 
products of nature.
852
 
 
 
 
 
This line of reasoning is tied to the invention/discovery dichotomy, in that a 
product of nature is seen as a discovery and not an invention.
 853
 The reason for this 
position is that genes already exist in the world and they are not invented per se. 
                                               
852
 Frequencies are shown rather than percentages due to low sample size. 
15 
5 
Legal Stakeholders: Is an isolated gene 
a product of nature? 
Yes 
No 
5 
2 
Biotech stakeholders:  Is an isolated 
gene a product of nature? 
Yes 
No 
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A German-based lawyer argued that merely isolated genetic resources should 
not be eligible for patent protection because they are found in nature and not inventive: 
Genetic resources are normally not invented, they’re just found in nature and should not be 
protected by patents...It’s a way how [sic] genetic resources come into the biosphere, it’s not by 
invention, but by evolution.  
He argued that if companies start patenting those blocks of information, then 
they can extend their intellectual property to whole living beings which are not created 
by an invention, but by evolution. Consequently, he maintains that this can be quite 
detrimental to the medical area for all research and innovation if human gene sequences 
are patented, pointing to the example of the Myriad case: 
The function was known before, and they were simply looking for the DNA structure, which is 
related to the function, so what was surprising in that case? It is like you have a map, and 
treasure is hidden, and you follow this map and then go to the treasure. You did not invent the 
treasure, but you found it. That’s very similar in most cases, [to] patents for human gene 
sequences. I think this judgement goes in the right direction. But from a European perspective, 
you have to take a different argument.  
As illustrated above, there is some difficulty with the idea of a gene as an 
invention since it already exists in nature. The counter-argument to this is of course that 
isolated genes are not found in nature and thus different from naturally occurring genes. 
Lord Hoffman claims:  
Isolated genes are not products of nature. In nature, there are no isolated genes wandering about. 
They’re in people. Its absolute nonsense, isn’t it? Because if you take a gene in nature, one of the 
characteristics of that gene is it’s got a lot of other things attached to it. If you take an isolated 
one, it hasn’t got a lot of the things attached to it. And that is the difference between them. 
They’re not identical. I mean, what of course you can say, and it may be that by now, the method 
of isolating the gene makes it obvious and therefore, the isolated gene although it is patentable, 
fails because there is no inventive step in producing it. But that’s a question of fact. Maybe it is, 
maybe it isn’t. But if it is inventive to find a way of isolating the gene, then I can’t see why it 
shouldn’t be patentable.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
853 When patent applications for products of biotechnology are submitted, and patent offices must 
determine which side of the line the claimed invention falls on, be it a discovery or an invention before an 
application can advance this sentence is not complete/needs rewording. This issue is well demonstrated 
by the following statement: 
“DNA is a polymer which is a natural product, and most, but not all, sequences of interest in DNA are 
present somewhere in nature. It is worth recognizing explicitly that most of what recombinant DNA 
methodology is doing at the present time is taking genes out of one genetic context in nature where, at 
least for our immediate purposes, they are not directly useful to us, and putting them in another genetic 
context where they are more useful. To what extent the Patent Office and the Courts will hold that a pre-
existing sequence of base pairs which has been isolated and amplified by gene splicing methods is a 
"product of nature" and therefore not patentable remains to be determined." Jackson, "Patenting of Genes: 
Ground Rules in ASM, Forum on Patentability of Micro-organisms” 17 (1981) at 25 In: Cooper, I.P., 
"Biotechnology in the Law - 1995 Revision" v. 1 (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan: New York, N.Y., 1995). 
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In a similar vein, a Justin Turner, a UK barrister provided an example of an 
instance where something which naturally existed, when isolated, qualified as an 
invention. He emphasized that antibiotics were an “unexpected” invention and 
warranted patent protection:   
The nature of the patent is you cannot define what people will do. They are always doing the 
unexpected. A patent should be something unexpected. To be able to find a gene that was 
not obvious, that no one else was able to find, and to be able to isolate and produce proteins 
from it, to produce things that treat diseases will do...Look at antibiotics. Antibiotics were 
isolated from soil samples, from Venetian sewers. You take a bug, and it produces an 
antibiotic. I mean, at some point you can say you have not invented anything. But get real; 
at the end of it, you have got a medicine that is stopping people of [sic] dying from 
suffocating sores. Where before, you have not. Of course, you can argue philosophically 
that it is different, it is materially different from a machine that you have built.” 
 
This comment highlight that in the case of gene patents, this issue is whether the 
isolation and purification of the naturally occurring substance is obvious. In other 
words, where a product of nature has been discovered, the issue is rather a question of 
obviousness, rather than whether it is a product of nature. In the case that the gene is 
isolated and an unexpected or non-obvious/inventive practical application has been 
identified that serves a useful function, this strongly points to the justification of a 
patent provided it fulfils the other criteria of an invention. 
In light of this, and the comments made above, it is reasonable to summarize 
that any product of biotechnology which qualifies as an artificial replica of a product 
which occurs in nature faces the question of patent eligible subject matter in the United 
States. 
5.3.2. What is a gene: chemical, information or both? 
The question of “what is a gene” was addressed in Myriad. Both the District and 
Federal Circuit courts addressed the issue in different ways. The District Court placed a 
deep emphasis on the notion of genes as information, which allowed it to come to the 
conclusion that the claimed isolated gene sequences were equivalent to the naturally 
occurring genomic DNA as they encoded the same genetic information, and therefore 
the isolated gene sequence was not “markedly different” and should not be granted a 
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patent. The Federal Circuit, however, adopted a different stance, opting to assess 
whether the claimed isolated DNA sequences were “markedly different” from their 
natural counterparts on the basis of chemical-structural difference rather than their 
informational difference. The interview participants were asked whether they agreed 
with the District Court judge or with the Federal Circuit decision. As will be shown in 
the next section, attitudes are nuanced over whether a gene is a ‘carrier of 
information,’854 a chemical, or both.   
 
 
                                               
854 Rai, A. “Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials” in 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy. Vol. 2, pp. 199-227, 2000. The article discusses the 
relationship between the USPTO and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (what is now known as 
the US Federal Circuit). 
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3 
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Biotech stakeholders: Is a gene a 
chemical, information, or both? 
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Information, 3 
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Legal stakeholders: Is a gene a 
chemical, information, or both? 
Chemical 
Information 
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Several legal interviewees argued that isolated genomic sequences are merely 
chemicals. Julian Cockbain, a UK-based patent attorney remarked: 
They are chemicals, simple as that. They are chemicals that carry information. But they’re 
chemicals. It’s a bit like a computer program on a disk. It’s still a disk, even though it carries 
information.  
  
 Another UK-based patent attorney, Nick Bassil, reiterated this position:  
“Genes are just polymers of chemical compounds.” 
By contrast, UK scientist Tim Hubbard, Head of Informatics at the Wellcome 
Trust Sanger Institute emphasized that it is an isolated gene’s function that is important 
in patenting: 
The position for a patent for a composition of matter must be linked to a function - you have to 
show that it has some novelty, that’s a principle of patenting, isn’t it? Just saying what it does is 
not enough. You have to show an application.  
 
Another argument comes from a GlaxoSmithKline patent attorney, who 
emphasized that it is both: 
I think chemically, a DNA molecule, you can describe it chemically and you can describe the 
sequence of A, G, T, C. You can describe and modify bases and what you have is information. 
The EU has an extra layer of information on that, that if you know what the sequence does and 
what it encodes for and the downstream processes and the subsequent proteins that are involved 
as you go along. So for me, they’re both right. You can describe DNA chemically and you can 
say it is a source of information.
 
 
 
This comment highlights that isolated genomic sequences are chemicals and also 
carriers of information. Similarly, Justin Turner stated that EU law requires that gene 
patents be described by its function in addition to its chemical sequence: 
Particularly under the Biotech Directive, and this is what HGS was all about, that yes, you need 
to describe a gene. Usually, you won’t get a patent unless you describe it by reference to its 
structure, its sequence. You can’t get a patent on a gene unless you also describe its function, its 
industrial application. One has to look at context, but I think they need to be described by their 
structure and their function.  
 
The responses here suggest that it is difficult to articulate exactly what a gene is, 
and how an isolated gene should be assessed in comparison with a naturally occurring 
gene - whether chemically, if there is a functional difference, or both.  
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5.3.3. Gene patents as roadblocks? 
 The question of whether gene patents have impeded research is of legitimate 
concern both in the legal community and in industry. For potential researchers, there 
may be concern that gene patents can obstruct research. However, more than half of the 
respondents said they have not encountered or know of anyone who has encountered 
any obstacles whilst developing gene technologies because of patents. On this issue, 
Yen Choo, founder and executive chairman of Plasticell commented that any blocking 
effect from a patented invention was expected, stating that:  “any genetic research will 
be held up” as a result of patents on genetic sequences.  
 
 
2 
5 
Biotech stakeholders: Has your firm, or do 
you know of any firms developing gene 
technologies encountered any obstacles 
because of patents? 
Yes 
No 
8 
12 
Legal stakeholders: Has your firm, or do 
you know of any firms developing gene 
technologies encountering any obstacles 
because of patents? 
Yes 
No 
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Interestingly, some of the interviewees admitted that they have encountered 
obstacles as a result of patents, but noted that this is a justified effect of and part of the 
nature of the patent system. Justin Turner stated: 
Patents are obstacles all the time. I mean patents form webs of complexity and so yes, 
absolutely. And that’s pretty common, that sort of situation where an early innovator gets broad 
protection and people are always working within that protection. Subsequently, they are nesting 
within each other. And they always have to go to the person next up in line. So I’ve got a case at 
the moment, which is by a way of making antibodies, and manipulate the genes to make an 
antibody, and several patents in this area and that anyone who makes artificial antibody has to 
pay royalties to these people. So I think it’s a real problem, it’s a problem which is justifiable I 
mean, it’s a nature of monopolies. People are going to infringe them. In an ideal world, you can 
negotiate a royalty. And in a non-ideal world, the government may be able to get a compulsory 
license. 
In this vein, Trevor Cook noted that there are various mechanisms in place 
within the EU patent system which allows non-commercial use of patented information 
pertaining to protected genetic sequences: 
In relation to research in the area to the extent research may be divorced from any commercial 
outcome. We have in Europe a very broad experimental use defence. Now I don’t think that 
extends to the use of an established unknown linkage between a gene and a condition, like doing 
tests to people if you know the linkage or condition extends to finding your understanding, 
whether it has a commercial outcome.  
 
Turning to the US, Cook pointed to the Bolar exception which in effect 
narrowed the experimental use defence, but stated that the Merck/Integra
855
 decision 
broadened the defence for downstream and upstream applications. 
 
From the point of view of research, I don’t think in fundamental research in improving 
something, or understanding something, I don’t see patent claims will impede that in whatever 
sense whatsoever. Where they might impede it is in a commercial sense because do you want to 
work in an area which is already patented or where you may be paying tribute to some dominant 
patentee? Then you’ll be doing work to commercialize it anyway. If there’s a significant obstacle 
for the next generation of innovation is probably not having patents. 
 
On this point, there is the view that not granting patents for genetic sequences 
could be more harmful in the long run compared to granting them in the present and 
experiencing some obstacles as a result.  
                                               
855 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). This US Supreme Court decision 
holds that the research exemption or "FDA safe harbor" (§ 271(e) (1) applies to (1) experimentation on 
drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in 
experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA. 
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5.4. Brüstle case study (civil society stakeholders) 
The patenting of particular inventions in the field of the life sciences has raised 
questions of an ethical nature. Stem cell-related technologies have been a primary area 
for condemnation by certain social groups, and the patent system is an easy target 
compared to science itself. Attention is then directed towards patent law to seek answers 
to questions of ethics. It should be remembered that a patent provides the patent holder 
the right to exclude others from practising the invention. Whether a patent is granted or 
not does not determine whether an activity is legal or not. In other words, if a society 
wants to ban a certain type of invention which is perceived to be ethically unsuitable 
from entering the marketplace, then excluding it from patent eligibility is inadequate.
856
  
This section will examine and analyse the various objections to patents directed 
at hESCs and possible defences as well. IVF procedures have been popular and widely 
accepted in several countries as a positive practice in helping women get pregnant. The 
debate arises from deciding what should happen to the spare embryos which remain 
after IVF procedures. 
The case study focused on the CJEU’s decision in Brüstle.857 This case stirred a 
vast amount of discussion about whether inventions related to hESCs should be 
excluded from patentability on the basis of morality considerations. Coordinators of 
multinational European stem cell projects who work with both adult and embryonic 
stem cells wrote a letter to Nature on behalf of 12 signatories in response to the 
recommendation of Yves Bot, 
858
 the Advocate-General the European Court of Justice 
to prohibit patents involving human embryonic stem cells on ethical grounds: 
                                               
856 Directive 98/44/EC is a prime example of a special regulation which the European Parliament enacted 
as a means to answer some of those questions. 
857Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
858 Bot, Yves. Opinion of Advocate General. Case C‑34/10: Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace Ev. 
Delivered on March 10, 2011. It should be noted that the Advocate General’s Opinion is non-binding on 
the European Court of Justice.  As Advocate General, Bot’s role was to propose an independent legal 
solution to the case. 
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We write to express profound concern over this recommendation…Embryonic stem cells are cell 
lines, not embryos. They are derived using surplus in vitro fertilized eggs donated after fertility 
treatment and can be maintained indefinitely. As more than 100 established lines are now 
supplied through national and international cell banks, concern about commercialization of the 
human embryo is misplaced.859 
 
The above quote illustrates that there is debate over what an human embryonic 
stem cell consists of. Whilst the CJEU has treated it as an actual embryo, one can argue 
that it is actually a cell line; the rationale being that since cell lines are eligible patent 
subject matter, embryos should be as well since they are cell lines.  
The following section provides some significant viewpoints from the civil 
society interviewees. 
5.4.1. What is the definition of a “human embryo”? 
Some of the interviewees remarked that the definition of ‘embryo’ is not clear. 
First, there is no definition of an “embryo” in Directive 98/44/EC, which has created 
some uncertainty as to what an embryo is.
860
 The scope of the definition is contingent 
on either a narrow or broad interpretation of embryo. A narrow interpretation of the 
term means that hESCs derived from embryos created by artificial means like IVF are 
not barred by Directive 98/44/EC and are patentable since they are neither intended to 
nor possess the capacity to develop into human beings.
861
 The CJEU in Brüstle adopted 
a broad concept of ‘human embryo’ which rendered all embryos unpatentable no matter 
their source of origin and their future capacities: 
The context and aim of the Directive thus shows that the European Union legislature intended to 
exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could thereby be 
affected. It follows that the concept of ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2) of the 
Directive must be understood in the wide sense.862 
 
                                               
859 Smith, A. “‘No’ to ban on stem-cell patents” in Nature. Vol. 472, April 28, 2011.  
860 See 4.4.4 for more on the Directive 98/44/EC. Directive 98/44/EC states explicitly that patents cannot 
be granted if the claimed subject matter and its commercial exploitation would be contrary to ‘ordre 
public’ or morality. Specifically, the use of human embryos is banned from patenting in Article 6(2) (c): 
“[I]nventions requiring the prior destruction of human embryos or their prior use as base material [are] 
not patentable even if process descriptions do? not refer to use of human embryos.” However, Recital 42 
in the preamble to the Directive makes an exception: if human embryos are used for therapeutic or 
diagnostic purposes, then the patent exclusion no longer applies. 
861 Laurie, G. “Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin,” in European Intellectual Property Review. Vol. 
59, 2004 at 62. 
862Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. Paragraph 34. 
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 One interviewee suggested this interpretation of an embryo is overly broad and 
should apply to a more developed embryo that was not produced from IVF: 
Define an embryo? I think I’d define it as being something where it was sufficiently developed 
that it would amount to an abortion to terminate the pregnancy. Certainly, I would confine it to 
embryos in the body and not sort of in vitro fertilization.  
 
With respect to defining an embryo, one interviewee stated that the CJEU’s 
ruling is scientifically flawed and experts should have been consulted, specifically 
directing his criticism to Yves Bot, who was in charge of looking at the issue and 
determined that a parthenote was ‘capable of commencing the process of development 
of a human being’ based on the available technical information provided to him.863 
 Bot’s views on hESC research was met with spirited dissent from those in 
industry and patients who could benefit from using stem cell technology, as he proposed 
that hESC-based medicine should be prohibited from patents in the name of preserving 
human dignity.
864
 Bot maintained that totipotent cells should be legally classified as 
human embryos because they have the capacity to develop into a complete human 
being, and as a result should be excluded from patentability: 
Science teaches us – and it is now universally accepted, at least in the Member States – that 
development from conception begins with a few cells, which exist in their original state for only 
a few days. These are totipotent cells whose main characteristic is that each of them has the 
capacity to develop into a complete human being. They hold within them the full capacity for 
subsequent division, then for specialisation, which will ultimately lead to the birth of a human 
being. The full capacity for subsequent development is therefore concentrated into one cell. 
Consequently, in my view totipotent cells represent the first stage of the human body which they 
will become. They must therefore be legally categorised as embryos.865 
 
Bot’s recommendation is deemed by another interviewee to be a menace to the 
continued European funding and investment in this area and the subsequent risk to the 
wellbeing of those suffering from illnesses that could be treated with stem cell-based 
medical products.  
The CJEU’s reliance on Bot’s opinion is clear from its account that parthenotes:  
                                               
863 Ibid. 
864 Palmer, Alasdair. "Should the European Court be allowed to dash my hopes of a cure?" in The Daily 
Telegraph. London. April 30, 2011. Print. 
865 Bot, Yves. Opinion of Advocate General. Case C‑34/10: Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace Ev. 
Delivered on March 10, 2011. Paragraph 84 and 85. 
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have not, strictly speaking, been the object of fertilisation, [and,] due to the effect of the 
technique used to obtain them they are, as apparent from the written observations presented to 
the Court, capable of commencing the process of development of a human being, just as an 
embryo created by fertilisation of an ovum can do so.866 
 
From this observation, the CJEU concluded that parthenotes are a type of 
totipotent cell, which have the capacity to develop into a human being. The CJEU 
reliance on Bot’s proposal and definition of the human embryo has been criticized as 
being scientifically flawed. One interviewee maintained: 
The fact that no scientists were even asked for an opinion to a point where he is now defining the 
beginning of life as a pluripotent state which is quite a bizarre definition of life.  What I’m 
amazed about is the European Court of Justice didn’t take any scientific advice on the particular 
issue which the German court asked the European Court to rule on. So I find it startling, if not 
amazed that they could go forward with the decision they’ve made. The issue here with human 
embryonic stem cells is whether you are actually killing a person? And that is where Bot comes 
in: You are killing what is an existing person. But it’s not an existing person; it’s a group of 
cells. 
 
 The decision was criticized by some interviewees based on a lack of scientific 
knowledge on the part of the CJEU, particularly the inadequate quality of the scientific 
information noted in Brüstle. For example, one interviewee noted that the CJEU should 
have been sensitive to the distinction between parthenotes and non-fertilized ova 
derived from somatic-cell nuclear transfer.  
5.4.2. Impact on future innovation 
This ruling is divisive in nature, drawing opinions from both sides of the debate. 
Members from the biotechnology industry have strongly condemned the decision. There 
were two major concerns regarding the impact of the decision. The first one is the 
impact the case will have on the continued European funding and investment in this 
area from both governmental and commercial sources. There is a fear that there are no 
exclusions for inventions regarding hESCs in other biotech-rich jurisdictions like 
Canada and the US, and consequently that the absence of patent protection in the EU 
will mean that the R&D for hESCs will leave the EU and go to jurisdictions where 
hESCs-related inventions are eligible for patentability. A consequence of this could be 
                                               
866 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V., Case C-34/10, decision of 18 October 2011. 
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that European companies are less likely to invest in R&D involving the use of hESCs. If 
pharmaceutical companies need a stable environment where they feel they are likely to 
recoup on their investments, then patents may be the best solution.  
Others maintain that the decision will not likely have any practical effect on 
research and development, as the exclusion of hESCs from being inventions does not 
impinge on their use in the research and development of processes and products using 
hESCs. One interviewee noted, “I am unaware of a single project that has been 
cancelled or suspended as a result of this decision, or the WARF decision in 2008 for 
that matter.” If the very threat of entering litigation for patent infringement does not 
thwart research, what is the point of a patent? This means that the biotech community 
investing in this type of research will have to adopt new business models to recoup on 
their R&D. 
5.4.3. Categorization of ethics pertaining to human embryonic stem cells 
With respect to the debate over inventions derived from hESCs, there are two 
main questions regarding their ethics: whether research on hESCs is acceptable and 
whether inventions derived from hESCs are patentable. The civil society interviewees 
did not object to research on hESCs taking place or to the associated technology as 
such. However, Donald Bruce, managing director of the ethics consultancy Edinethics, 
noted that their use should be limited to necessity: “I would prefer it they were not used 
at all, but if there are no other alternatives, and there is a really good medical case, then 
it would be okay.” This interviewee stressed that there is an obligation to look for 
alternatives such as induced pluripotent cells. As such, there was no overwhelming 
objection to research on hESCs as such from the interviewees. 
Regarding the second issue, although the respondents considered that hESC 
research and the technology itself may be acceptable, many had concerns over the 
patenting of inventions derived from hESCs. Moreover, one member of the EPO 
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Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBOA) compared the patenting of hESCs with the patenting 
of human organ transplantation. 
You can say under very restricted conditions, it is okay that someone donates his kidney to 
someone else. But if there is money involved, which is something we do not want to have at all, 
and it is punished by criminal law. So if you read the general provision here, commercial 
exploitation, you could argue that the commercial thing is that which at the end turns out to be 
the problem. And the technology itself, you may allow to practise. 
 
This statement illustrates a position adopted by other respondents, in that 
research conducted on hESCs should not be primarily for commercial gain, but for the 
benefit of the embryo itself. The legal system permits certain technologies in a restricted 
way under particular conditions, such as not being able to patent that technology. The 
law clearly says that no commercial profit can be made on embryos, despite research 
being allowed.  
The civil society stakeholders, composed of ethical analysts, religious figures 
and representatives from various non-governmental organizations, were asked the 
following set of questions about the case: 
1. Is the use of hESCs for commercial purposes justified? 
2. Is the use of hESCs for therapeutic purposes justified? 
5.4.4. Is the use of hECSs for commercial purposes justified? 
 Three important findings emerged from the interviews. The first is that there is a 
clear divide amongst civil society stakeholders over whether the commercial 
exploitation of hESCs is justified. The definition of “commercial exploitation” is found 
in Article 6(2) (c) of Directive 98/44/EC.
867
 Half of the respondents stated that it is not, 
whilst the other half maintained that it is. For those respondents who maintained that the 
                                               
867 Article 6(2)(c) Directive 98/44/EC: 
1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation. 
2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: 
(a) processes for cloning human beings; 
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; 
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use of hESCs for commercial purposes is justified, one argument for this position is that 
if research on hESCs is permissible, then its commercialization should be permissible as 
well. Roger Brownsword, a retired law professor commented: 
There is no categorical reason for why we shouldn’t use human embryos for research and this 
applies to commercialization of the research, and there is no categorical reason why that 
shouldn’t happen either. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the other half of the civil society interviewees adopted the 
opposite view, stating that research on hESC should not be conducted primarily for 
commercial purposes. Legal academic Margaret Llewelyn argued that inventions 
derived from hESCs should not be banned from patentability, but distinguishes between 
research for research’s sake, or “pure research” and research for the sole purpose of 
commercial gain: 
I am not of the order that believes the human embryo has a special status as such but I do draw 
the line at over instrumentalising the uses of the embryo where that use is primarily for 
commercial gain rather than scientific/medical advancement. 
 
 Llewelyn maintained that it is acceptable to reward subsequent uses which 
might be commercial in application with a patent. Although she acknowledged that 
there is a fine distinction between research and commercial uses, in reality, it is highly 
difficult to separate the two. Based on this argument, it can be said that universities, as 
5 5 
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research-based institutions, which invent a product using hESCs that could be 
commercial, could patent the product because the intention of the first use of the hESCs 
was for research. Yet, any for-profit organization like a pharmaceutical company, which 
has a commercial interest, would not be eligible for patent protection if they produced 
any invention using hESCs because they would be conducting research on hESCs for 
the purpose of finding a commercial application. The assumption that there is a clear 
separation of using hESCs solely for research and using hESCs for research with the 
intention of commercialization is flawed. Additionally, it is difficult to completely 
separate research from commercial purposes because in the field of biotechnology, 
commercial interests are present in educational institutions. 
Financial relationships among industry, scientific investigators, and academic institutions are 
pervasive. About one-fourth of biomedical investigators at academic institutions receive research 
funding from industry.868 
 
 As a result, the entrance of commercial forces into academia further 
complicates the issue in that the research itself may not be perceived as non-
commercially driven. In other words, academic institutions with any funding from 
industry are not entirely free from commercial interests. 
Although these considerations were not distinguished in the Brüstle decision, 
most of the interviewees agreed with the argument that hESCs cannot be patented, 
because they objected to their commercialization. On the whole, they maintained that 
the research is acceptable but that no one should commercially profit from it. Given the 
wide interpretation of “human embryo” adopted by the CJEU, this means that 
inventions which involved the prior destruction of human embryos or their prior use as 
base material, even if no reference is given to their prior destruction or use in the patent 
application, are not patentable.  
                                               
868Bekelman J., Li Y., “Gross C. Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical 
Research: A Systematic Review” in The Journal of the American Medical Association. Vol. 289. 2003 at 
463. 
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5.4.5. Is the use of hESCs for therapeutic purposes justified? 
The majority of the interviewees noted that research involving hESCs for 
therapeutic purposes is justified. Amongst those who agreed that the therapeutic use of 
hESCs is justified, some respondents noted that it was only justified if there is no other 
alternative than using embryonic stem cells.  
 
One UK-based scientist participant was concerned about the meaning of 
‘therapeutic benefit’ for the blastocyst, maintaining that the law is not unclear: 
It’s just completely blurring the lines. They also talk about therapeutic benefit for the blastocyst. 
So again, it gets very confused, so it’s not just therapeutic use as in for any patient who has a 
disease. The actual therapeutic has to benefit the blastocyst which you’ve just killed, which is 
just not going to happen. So it’s completely screwed up. That’s just bad law.  
 
In addition, there were many critical comments directed at the differentiation 
between the commercial and therapeutic use of the blastocyst as stated in Directive 
98/44/EC. On this point, a German interviewee argued that the distinction between 
commercial and therapeutic use is incorrect: 
The distinction between therapy and commercial use is completely absurd because of course 
under Article 53(c) of the EPC; it says therapeutic and diagnostic methods cannot be patented. 
Only commercial purposes can be patented so it takes us nowhere. And of course, there’s always 
some therapeutic purpose behind the issue, and also if you go to the patent office, there’s always 
a commercial purpose. So there is no possibility to have a distinction. 
Article 53(c) of the EPC maintains that European patents shall not be granted for 
methods for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body. However, this provision 
9 
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does not apply to products (in particular substances or compositions) for use in any of 
these methods. Indeed, a method for the treatment of the human embryo is not 
patentable under Article 53(c) EPC. For him, the crucial issue that policy-makers must 
take into account is “what is patentable and what is not.”  
Another reason why the distinction between a “commercial” use and 
“therapeutic” use is difficult is because the two can be interconnected. Organizations are 
unlikely to conduct research solely for the creation of therapies without expecting to 
commercialize it, as argued by an ethical analyst:  
I think if you allow stem cell derivation at all, I can’t see that it makes any sense to say, for 
instance if you can use it for basic research, but you can’t use it commercially. And clearly, any 
development of stem cell therapies would be very, very expensive and it’s not going to happen 
outside of the commercial sector. So if we have stem cells, I can’t see any argument that, and I 
think it would counterproductive to say, “Well, you can’t use them for commercial purposes.” 
 
This comment highlights the fact that even if a society decides that the research 
is beneficial and should continue, it may not endorse the commercialization of that 
research. The distinction is arbitrarily drawn and difficult, and the real question is 
whether the research should continue to exist at all. However, the same interviewee 
argued that as long as the invention is not directed at a frivolous commercial use, and 
the product has serious implications for human welfare, there is very little argument for 
why the commercialization of the invention is forbidden when the research of 
embryonic stem cells is accepted. 
5.5. Core questions regarding patenting human biological materials 
Each of the primary stakeholders (members of the biotech research industry) 
was asked a set of 3 questions. However, for the purposes of developing a broader 
analysis of the issues, legal stakeholders who are well-versed in the field of biotech and 
law also contributed. The purpose was to discover how participants perceived the 
patenting of human biological materials. The key questions explored below include: 
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1. Is there something about the life sciences that raises unique issues that other 
pioneering technologies in the past did not raise? 
2. What specific issues concerning the patenting of human biological materials are 
of concern to you? 
3. Do you think patents will be problematic for the biotech industry in the future? 
5.5.1. Is there something about the life sciences that raises unique issues that other 
pioneering technologies in the past did not raise? 
The purpose of this question was to discover whether the participants perceived 
biotech inventions as the equivalent of a ‘problem child’ for the patent system.869 
Interpretations differed over whether there is an intrinsic quality to this area of research 
that precludes it a priori from the patent system. There were three general approaches to 
this question. First, some of the participants acknowledged that there is something 
exceptional about the life sciences, but there is no need to approach patenting 
differently. The second position is that there is something distinctive about this field and 
something should be done to address this reality, such as the implementation of 
Directive 98/44/EC by the European Parliament and Council. The third type of response 
was that there is nothing inherently special about the life sciences and that the focus 
should not be on ex ante policy questions but on ex post mechanisms. 
A. Biotechnology inventions are unique but should be patented  
The first position is that there is something unique about the life sciences, but 
this uniqueness does not make biotech inventions unsuitable for patenting, just difficult. 
One of the arguments why biotech inventions are unique is that the claimed product can 
self-replicate, as Julian Cockbain noted:  
                                               
869 Burk, D. “Patent Law’s Problem Children: Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context” in 
Patent Law in Global Perspective. R. Okediji and M. Bagley (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014 at 187-212. 
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The problem is with patenting life, the product replicates itself. And hence, you end up with 
patent claims for the product of the product of the product. So you get companies like Monsanto 
claiming seeds and suing people. 
 
That being said, even though biotech inventions are generally seen as different 
from other technologies, several interviewees argued that the patent system can still 
incentivize and protect biotech inventions, notwithstanding the reality of the self-
reproducibility quality of most life science inventions.  
Tim Roberts, a UK based patent attorney, maintained that inventions in 
biotechnology raise different legal issues from other pioneering technologies, but this 
does not mean that they warrant a different approach to patenting, unless one could 
demonstrate that biotech inventions raise different legal issues from other pioneering 
technologies.  
Whether that means we would need to approach patenting differently, I am not sure about. My 
immediate reaction is that it would require to be demonstrated that biotech raises different legal 
issues from other pioneering technologies. At least in the area of patenting I am thinking about. 
 
Despite this, he argued that there are two main concerns. The main issue with 
patenting life science inventions was the subject matter’s ability to replicate. This is 
linked to the second issue, which is the environmental impact if the self-replicating 
entities were ever released outside the lab into the world.   
I mean, there is always the question of releasing things into the environment, particularly 
releasing self-reproducing things into the environment; you do need to think a little carefully 
about this. The inheritability of the thing being loose in the environment and self-replicating 
does raise, I think different legal issues. 
 
Also noting the speculative nature of biotech inventions, a member of the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office maintained that this issue is 
highlighted in biotechnology: 
I would not say it is totally unique, you could imagine also before the arrival of biotech, certain 
inventions which were quite speculative. Maybe the inventor had already an idea, which at the 
end, ten years after he made that invention, was reproducible.  And the key idea was already 
there ten years before, but there was no real way of doing it. You could imagine before the 
arrival of biotech, early inventions also could have a blocking effect on future innovators. But 
nevertheless, as the case law shows, certain problems have really been focused on because of 
biotech inventions. 
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The same interviewee explained that due to the nature of the invention, there are 
actually various stages of the invention and that there is a tendency for there to be 
concerns surrounding patents that are granted for ‘speculative inventions,’ like an 
invention which was filed too early, or a precursor to an invention of greater social 
worth. However, this phenomenon is not particular to the biotechnology industry, but 
can happen in other fields. The European Patent Office acknowledged that 
biotechnology does raise distinguishing issues, but can and should be protected under 
the patent system, albeit with additional specifications.  
Biotechnology inventions have to meet the same criteria as those in any other technical field. But 
given the nature of biotechnology and its socio-political implications, various other rules also 
apply, in particular those of Directive 98/44/EC which were incorporated into the EPC. 
 
Interestingly, a relatively large number of interviewees stated that biotech 
patents raise challenges that can occur in all areas of technology, but for some reason, 
appear habitually in biotechnology. However, they maintained that biotech inventions 
could still be protected under the patent system. 
B. Biotechnology inventions are unique and should be excluded from patent 
protection 
 
The second position is that there is something inherently different about 
biotechnology, which is problematic for the patent system and, as a result, some life 
science developments should be precluded from patent protection. 
Joshua Sarnoff, a US-based law professor, argued that “Patenting DNA (like 
patenting any other product or process that is discovered in nature and only minimally 
altered) raises both deontological and utilitarian ethical concerns. It is also bad social 
policy.” 
 Ideas about ownership towards naturally occurring organisms affect attitudes to 
whether they can be patented - it is argued that they are already owned and no one 
should be able to patent them. Jonathan Wolff, a UK philosophy professor and a 
member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, argued that things that already exist in 
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nature are problematic to patent, noting that patents should only be granted to new 
inventions which are not found in nature: 
It’s like trying to patent gold, who are you to take that for yourself when it already belongs to 
everyone? I think if someone comes up with a completely new invention like an industrial 
process, then it’s perfectly reasonable to say that’s something they’ve added to the world, it 
wouldn’t have existed without them. But the gene sequence would have existed without them. 
All they have done is isolated it and discovered it. 
 
 
Indeed, this position was reiterated by an experienced Germany-based lawyer:  
There are various aspects which are quite specific to biological material like the access to genetic 
resources. Genetic resources are normally not invented; they’re just found in nature and should 
not be protected by patents. If it comes to whole animals, you never invent a whole animal; you 
always introduce a technical trait, so you should not in the end own the whole animal and all the 
following generations. 
 
The same respondent criticized Directive 98/44/EC, which he argued was 
written in favour of industry and fails to address the underlying issues related to the 
nature of the subject matter, and that there should be a balance between the benefits of 
granting patents in the area and the negative effects that could arise.  
And this balancing was not done in the European Patenting Directive 98. For biotechnology, let 
us have innovation come in, and then we have patents, which were? created by biotechnology 
companies and I think this was a very naive approach and very much in favour of a few 
companies. Because the other companies are not having a benefit if seed biological resources are 
patented. Later on, pharmaceutical companies come in and say I am no longer free to use the 
human genome sequence. It was very specific for industry, and the overall approach was quite 
naive and not really being aware of the nature of biology, which is completely different. As 
described in the patent Directive, as soon as you isolate part of the human body, the gene 
sequence and describe a function or commercial purpose, then you have all kinds of attached 
uses are owned by the person who described the gene sequence. And it is simply stupid. 
 
Meanwhile, the question of determining patentable subject matter should 
consider the distinction between the animate vs. inanimate. The importance of this 
consideration was emphasized in the writings of one of the interviewees:  
Despite the hype coming from certain quarters, we are simply not there yet. When we are, the 
engineering analogy presumably will finally fit perfectly, thereby ceasing to be an analogy. 
Synthetic biology will be a form of engineering. Life forms will truly become manufactured 
mechanical devices at least in the artificial environments in which they will be placed…Life is 
different from non-life, and that is relevant for patent law.
870
 
 
                                               
870 Dutfield, G. “‘The Genetic Code is 3.6 Billion Years Old: It’s Time for a Rewrite’ Questioning the 
Metaphors and Analogies of Synthetic Biology and Life Science Patenting” in Annabelle Lever’s (eds.) 
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 
at 21. 
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From the information gathered from the stakeholders, there seem to be a 
consensus that there is something about inventions derived from naturally occurring 
entities that proliferate some issues more when compared to other fields of technology. 
It is plausible to claim that there is something different about the field of biotechnology 
and its subsequent inventions can create difficulties for the patent system.
871
  
C. There is nothing special about the life sciences 
The third response is that there is nothing special about the life sciences and that 
patenting a biotech invention is like patenting any other. A UK-based barrister stated, “I 
do not see the issue of genes as any different to the issue of anything else. I mean, are 
patents good at all? I think that is a big question.” 
In a similar vein, a UK-based solicitor stated outright that there is nothing 
special about the life sciences, and that the focus on the eligibility issues overshadows 
what he argued is the real issue in the area: 
I don’t think there’s anything special about the life sciences in general. Clearly, it attracts a vast 
amount of rhetoric and high degree of academic interest, a high degree of rather naïve academic 
interest because these sort of issues are not actually the main problems that one encounters in 
biotechnology. Normally, there are much more conventional issues you get in patentability such 
as obviousness and sufficiency. 
 
When asked whether there was something unique about the life sciences which 
made them problematic for patenting, Tim Hubbard stated that patents are a mechanism 
designed to protect inventors and their inventions and while a discovery is not an 
invention, he acknowledges that the biotechnology industry wants to have some sort of 
protection. 
I think patents were meant to protect inventors who have invented something. And there really 
isn’t any invention in the discovery of things, it’s not an invention. But the problem is that the 
structure of the industry wants to have some protection. 
 
                                               
871It is not improbable to claim that the courts have recognized this reality and made judicial decisions in 
favour of finding DNA sequences and transgenic organisms patentable. 
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 Another interviewee noted that biotech patents have been granted since the 19
th
 
century and that the patent system is built to address all forms of technology, which is 
reflected in the WTO TRIPS Agreement: 
The patent system inherently deals with so far unknown technology. This is not an expansion of the 
system, but its very nature. Is the question useful towards the background of Article 27 TRIPS, which 
does not distinguish between different technologies?  
 
5.5.2. What specific issues concerning the patenting of human biological materials 
are of concern to you?  
The major issue raised by the participants in regards to patenting human genetic 
material was the scope of protection. The crucial importance of the scope of patent 
claims issue was emphasized by the interviewees, noting that it is a constant problem 
that is always being addressed by the courts and that technically, it is a legal barrier. 
Tim Roberts, a UK-based patent attorney stated that the issue of scope tends to involve 
the grant of overly broad patents rather than overly narrow claims:  
It is possible to get unreasonably broad claims which are a problem from the point of view of 
competitors and other people reasonably entitled to do?, and also a situation where you get a 
claim to exactly what you’ve done, and anybody can get variants of it which produce the same 
advantages, so you don’t get any reward for your invention. There can be a problem in two 
senses, mainly the issue of too broad rather than too narrow. 
 
However, Justin Turner highlighted the fact that the scope of claims is always 
going to be a problem, particularly for DNA claims. In fact, he argued that the major 
pharmaceutical companies would prefer not to own a broad patent due to the associated 
problems that come with the territory: 
Mostly, they don’t like broad patents. ‘Course, they’re schizophrenic when they’ve got one. 
They love it. But all the time, I’m having conversations with drug companies and they’re going 
like, you know, we’ve got some real problems and of course they’re horribly tactical and 
financial. They need to be sensible. 
 
While it can be observed that the scope of patent claims is a persistent problem, 
Turner acknowledged that as DNA technology becomes routine, patents will be 
narrower in scope compared with when gene sequencing first developed: 
The first person ever to sequence a piece of DNA could have asked for a patent claim to any 
DNA ever sequenced, ever, ever, ever. And the first person ever to take a gene and put it in a 
recombinant system and express a protein could have said: “I want a royalty for anyone ever to 
express as a protein again.” They didn’t, they weren’t that ballsy. But it would have been a really 
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interesting debate. It would have made Bill Gates look like a poor person if they had gotten 
patents that broad. 
 
Therefore, it appears that the majority of research/industry and legal 
interviewees were of the opinion that patenting genetic material would not constitute a 
major problem for patent law, with one exception: the breadth of claims.  
5.5.3. Do you think patents will be problematic for the biotech industry in the 
future? 
 
With respect to this question, most of the legal and research/industry 
stakeholders maintained that based on the business model of innovation in 
biotechnology, the patent system is the ideal incentive regime. US attorney Rick 
Henschel stated: “Patents are probably the best proxy out there that there is as an 
incentive to innovate.” He maintained that not having patents could be an obstacle for 
innovation. However, Tim Roberts stated that obtaining patents is a more difficult 
process due to the rapid advances in science which can make inventions more obvious 
and anticipated:  
In the early days, everybody was amazed you could isolate a gene at all. In those circumstances, 
they were ready to accept that the invention lay not in what you’ve done, but in the fact that you 
succeeded in doing it at all. But these days, the technology is much more systematized and 
generally you’re going to have to demonstrate something unexpected and, generally speaking, 
you’re going to have to demonstrate something unexpected about your result. 
  
With respect to the point that patents are problematic, some interviewees 
acknowledged that this may be true, but this does not mean they should not be removed. 
Justin Turner stated:  
It [the patent system] is incredibly sophisticated; it’s been around for hundreds of years. 
Constantly, people are trying to find a balance that is good for innovation and good for freedom 
to operate. The system inherently is checking that it’s in the right place because as I say, GSK 
and Lilly are defendants in patent actions. So yes, of course, they’re problematic, but they’re 
meant to be problematic. 
 
With respect to the fact that there is a constant balance between freedom to 
operate and incentivizing innovation, another interviewee from industry remarked that 
on balance, patents on the whole are not problematic for the biotechnology industry. 
The reason for this is that for practical reasons, investors want patent protection. The 
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same interviewee noted that investors are required and if investors think patents are 
important, they will not invest if they do not believe patent protection is available at the 
end of the process. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Interview data revealed the overall general support of the patent system by the 
primary stakeholders (inventors and companies investing in R&D), accepting that the 
patent system incentivizes the production of inventions that ultimately benefit society at 
a cost of temporal exclusion. They emphasized that the bargain was ‘worthwhile’ and 
necessary given the financial realities of the business model in biotechnology. 
Ultimately, it is a constant balancing test and up to the society and legislature to decide 
whether research in genes and hESCs is worthwhile and necessary through the 
clarification of patent law. Whilst all participants acknowledged the blocking effects of 
patents, the general opinion was that if innovation is to continue in biotechnology, 
patents for human genetic materials were necessary given the high costs required to 
bring a product to market.   
 One issue that was frequently brought up was the scope of the patent claim on 
genes, in which overly broad patents were more of a concern than narrow patent claims.  
The civil society stakeholders were split in regards to the patenting of inventions 
derived from hESCs. Whilst the general attitude towards the research on hESCs was 
positive, there were some negative responses over the patenting a commercial use 
derived from hESCs. Biotech industry members stressed that funding would likely be 
halted in the area as result of the CJEU decision, and admonished the court’s distinction 
between a ‘therapeutic’ and a ‘commercial use,’ holding that there is no clear line. 
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6: Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis set out to explore the patent protection of human genetic materials 
and has identified the nature of a patent right, the reasons and goals for its existence, 
and the role and impact it can impose on innovation in the biotechnology industry. This 
research has also sought to reveal whether granting patents for genetic materials is 
justified, particularly considering the dual nature of DNA sequences. 
The thesis answered four sub-questions: 
(i) Whether gene patents create a de facto tragedy of the anti-commons? 
(ii) Can a temporary exclusive right over human genetic materials be 
justified? 
(iii) How have Europe and the US addressed human genetic materials in 
determining patent eligibility and the scope of protection? 
(iv) Do the current statutory regimes in Europe and the US need to be 
amended in the name of the public interest with regards to human genetic 
inventions?  
6.2. Theoretical Implications  
The findings in the comparative review of the European and the US approach 
towards patenting isolated DNA sequences, combined with stakeholder responses 
provided a practical perspective on the impact of patents on innovation in 
biotechnology. The data corresponds with the theoretical underpinnings of patent law: 
particularly, the notion of the social contract.  
Chapter 2 explored the development of biotechnology and situated modern 
biotechnology products and processes within the patent system along with a brief 
insight into the science of genes and hESCs and their international legal governance. 
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The chapter examined the nature of genetic material and challenged the proposition that 
patent protection on genes will inevitably lead to an tragedy of the anticommons. 
However, the research found that although the nature of genes and inventions can create 
conditions that can lead to the development of an anticommons, there is a lack of 
empirical data that proves the presence of patent thickets in biotechnology. Therefore, 
the answer to the first subquestion: “Whether gene patents create a de facto tragedy of 
the anti-commons” is no, not necessarily given the practical reality of patent holders’ 
willingness to reasonably license with one another. 
 Chapter 3 analysed the theoretical justifications for patents on human genetic 
materials. Patents are put forward as a social contract in which there is a bargain 
between the inventor and society. It maintained that a patent right is a socially 
constructed right to exclude but is limited. With the above analysis as a foundation, this 
study can now answer the second question: Can a temporary exclusive right over human 
genetic materials be justified? This chapter concludes “yes,” that in order for useful 
products and processes to come to market, there needs to be the incentive to innovate 
and develop products. Using the prospect theory, biotechnology requires patents due to 
the realities of the industry development process, which can justify strong patent rights 
over inventions. Inventors and their financial backers require adequate control over the 
invention due to the indefinite route towards commercial development. This could also 
assist in minimizing the anticommons issue (where too many narrow patents are granted 
resulting in too many licenses to create a feasible product). To combat the issue of 
access, a strong research exception can be used to ensure that patented knowledge can 
be accessed and applied in a non-commercial manner and does not interfere with future 
inventors’ ability to patent improvements on the original protected invention.  
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6.3. Empirical Findings 
Chapter 4 assessed how Europe and the US have addressed human genetic 
materials in determining their patent eligibility status and their scope of protection. In 
the US, the ‘product of nature’ principle and the role it plays in §101 patent eligibility 
holds strong. In Europe, the invention/discovery ensures that entities that should not be 
granted exclusive rights are not patented.  
An analysis of Myriad’s BRCA gene patents through a comparative study of 
how Myriad’s gene patents were addressed by both systems, reached the following 
conclusion: Whilst the US opted to abolish the practice of patenting of genes by 
tackling the question of patentable subject matter, Europe engaged in narrowing of 
scope of protection for gene patents. As a result, in the US, isolated genes cannot 
qualify as an ‘invention’ because it is a product of nature. In declaring isolated genes as 
products of nature, the US Supreme Court essentially opened up the field for research as 
there is no longer any need to obtain a license on a patented gene.  
But, for the matter of isolated genes, it is submitted that given that function 
plays a more important role in patentability and infringement for isolated DNA 
sequences and science is rapidly evolving. Thus, treating genes as inventions based on 
just one disclosed function can be viewed as over-generous, especially if routine 
isolating and purification techniques were used to obtain the sequence. Because DNA 
sequences are carriers of information, it is possible that a sequence can code for two 
separate products. Taking this into account, if any patent protection is to be granted by 
the state to incentivize for innovation purposes, it is suggested that purpose bound 
protection is justified. This approach acknowledges that such a discovery may have 
been expensive and difficult, but there may well be more to be discovered, which may 
be even more important and should remain accessible to other researchers. 
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This chapter also revealed that the ongoing uncertainty and ambiguity as to the 
patentability of hESCs in Europe can only be resolved by separating from a semantic 
approach, i.e. by no longer debating about the meaning of the words ‘human embryo’ in 
Rule 28 of Article 53(a) of the EPC
872
 and Article 6(2) (c) of the Directive 98/44/EC,
873
 
but instead by scrutinizing the intrinsic arguments to justify the patentability of hESCs. 
The definition of an embryo will likely be determined on a case by case basis. However, 
the CJEU in Brüstle significantly widened the definition of ‘human embryo’ and 
essentially maintained that the commercial exploitation of inventions derived from the 
destruction of a human embryo is immoral and therefore not patentable. Without the 
promise of a patent, investment will likely be reduced unless institutions can recoup on 
the investment with the promise of patent protection.  
Chapter 5 included empirical data from stakeholder interviews. Despite some 
criticism directed at the patent system, it was upheld as the most ideal system to 
promote innovation in the area. Access to human genetic material and the privatisation 
of inventions derived from these biological materials can coexist harmoniously under 
the patent system. Based on two case studies, human biological materials should not be 
excluded from patentability per se. Specifically, isolated biological materials falls 
within the definition of an ‘invention’ provided there is a technical difference between 
the claimed invention and its naturally occurring counterpart. It also appears that the 
majority of stakeholders are not in favour of abolishing patents for human genetic 
inventions.  
                                               
872 Rule 28-Exceptions to patentability. Under Article 53(a), European patents shall not be granted in 
respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern the following: 
(a)processes for cloning human beings;  
(b)processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings;  
(c)uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; 
Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patent of 5 October 1973. 
Available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma2.html (Accessed July 24, 
2011). 
873 Article 6 (2) (c) of the Directive 98/44/EC specifies that, on the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in 
particular, shall be considered unpatentable: ‘uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes’. 
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Therefore, the answer to the fourth subquestion: “Do the current statutory 
regimes in Europe and the US need to be amended in the name of the public interest 
with regards to human genetic inventions?” is “not necessarily.”874 The patent system is 
still the most suitable mechanism to promote the public interest for the following three 
reasons: 
1. Despite Myriad, which ruled isolated genes ineligible subject matter and 
cDNA eligible subject matter, the decision has not had a detrimental effect 
on scientific inquiry. While isolated DNA is particularly useful for research 
and diagnostic endeavours and no longer patentable, cDNA (which is 
relevant to commercial therapeutic activities), remains eligible. On the 
whole, the result is not doctrinally or scientifically accurate, particularly its 
decision in drawing the distinction between isolated DNA and cDNA. But 
since the US Supreme Court held that cDNA remains eligible subject matter 
for patent protection, Myriad ultimately maintained the status quo.  
2. Despite the ruling in Brüstle and the effect the decision could have on 
research directed to hESCs, there has been no detrimental effect on the 
patent research incentive.  The decision affects hESCs that have been 
granted in EU Member States, yet researchers based in the EU can continue 
to apply for patents outside the EU where comparable limitations do not 
exist. Moreover, the decision may actually speed up hESC related research 
as the research community does not have to worry about infringing patents 
on hESCs.  
                                               
874 It must be emphasized again that intellectual property rights perform a social function and “under no 
circumstances be allowed to benefit the few to the detriment of the many, that on the contrary they are 
closely linked to the interests of society, a fact that ultimately can only contribute to restoring their 
acceptance.” Geiger, C. “The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or how Ethics can Influence 
the Shape and Use of IP Law” in Dinwoodie, G. Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013 at 175-176. 
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3. There is no evidence of a patent hold up in the sense of research deterrence 
caused by the patenting of human genetic material. Empirical studies reveal 
that initial fears over the development of an anticommons and ‘chilling’ 
effect on research have not manifested in practice. One of the strongest 
arguments against patents on human genetic materials is that it can affect 
further innovation due to licensing issues that can obstruct progress and lead 
to an anticommons.
875
 However, industry members are generally optimistic 
about their ability to license with their competitors. As part of the qualitative 
study, a total of 5 out of the 7 interviewees from industry (primary 
stakeholders) maintained they did not: (i) know of a product or process that 
had been kept from the market and (ii) any research that was blocked due to 
patents. This claim was also reflected in the academic literature.
876
 This 
suggests that the patent eligibility of isolated DNA has minimal effect on the 
patent research incentive. Although from a doctrinal perspective, it may 
suggest that more cumulative research would be executed by the wider 
scientific community free from patents, the available evidence suggest that 
gene patents may not be a hindrance in incentivizing initial examination or 
essential in creating practical applications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
875 Heller, M. and R. Eisenberg. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research,” in Science. Vol. 280, 1998. Pp. 698-701. 
876 Epstein, R. “Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material” (University of Chicago Law 
School, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No.152 [2d Ser.], Revised March 2003) at 18. 
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A Draft Manifesto: Policy Guidelines for the US and EPO 
PREFACE 
Conscious of the societal goal of patents to promote innovation and of the social 
value of promoting human welfare. 
Affirming that the promotion of human health is a common concern of humankind. 
Aware of the urgent need to develop scientific and technical capacity to provide 
further therapies. 
Noting the starting point should be in a favour of a regime of strong property rights 
unless there is a clear evidence of necessitating the switch to a regime that requires 
forced purchases.  
Acknowledging that the current patent system is imperfect. 
Emphasizing that the current legal structure, despite its shortcomings, has promoted 
a huge expansion in biotechnology in the past few decades.  
Reaffirming that states have sovereign rights over whether to implement exemptions 
for certain patented inventions. 
 
AIMS: PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC MATERIALS 
Concerned that the human genome possesses a fine number of genes and that 
patenting a genetic sequence could hinder further research and development in the 
field. 
Acknowledging that genetic sequences are not created, but found; even if the 
process used to find the sequence was laborious, time consuming and costly, 
ultimately, the sequence already existed. 
Observing that some human substances should be left in the public domain like 
ESTs and unmodified genetic sequences, whilst others should be governed by patent 
protection. 
Discerning that the special nature of biological inventions does present some 
difficulties for the patent system, but this does not necessitate their removal from 
patent eligibility. 
Noting that the protection of the human genome accords with the broader objectives 
of patent law 
 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. Noting that systematic efforts should be made to ensure that basic information 
about the genome is placed into a public domain database available for public 
use. 
2. Recommending that genetic material that meets the criteria of novelty, non-
obviousness and utility is recognized as patent eligible. 
3. Noting further that the in-built mechanisms within the patent system have an 
important role to play 
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a. Recognizing that there is a real question about the optimal patent scope 
(i.e. patent holder cannot claim future uses to a genetic sequence that was 
not in the original patent claim) 
b. Granting a patent over the claimed use in a genomic invention may be 
the most appropriate solution. (i.e. only for commercialization, but not 
for basic research) 
4. Recommending that patent examiners should assess the utility or industrial 
application requirement more strictly for genomic inventions 
5. Highlighting the necessity for a more stringent test for inventive step  
6. Stating the importance of identifying the function of a genetic sequence in a 
patent claim 
7. Noting that claimed inventions must be sufficiently specific in view of the state 
of the art and must be credible and non-speculative, supported by empirical 
evidence 
 
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION 
8. Patent legislation should include a research and experimental use exception 
which includes the following statement: 
It is not an infringement of a patent to use a patented process or product either: 
(a) Privately and for non-commercial purposes, or 
(b) To study the subject-matter of the patented invention to investigate its 
properties, improve upon it, or create a new product or process. 
 
MORALITY IS A LEGISLATION ISSUE 
9. Noting that morality should be construed narrowly in the EU 
10. Perceiving the need to clarify exactly whether it is the invention or the patenting 
of the invention and its potential commercialization that is immoral. 
11. Observing if the invention is deemed to be immoral, then it should left to 
national legislation to ban it. 
12. Stressing that the patent system is not a regulatory tool. 
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Annex I: Business and Legal Stakeholder Questionnaire 
 
Developing Guidelines for Patenting Biotech: A Comparative Interdisciplinary Study in the EU 
and US 
 
My name is Vivian Mak, and I am a researcher funded by Queen Mary University of 
London. I am conducting research in the area of patents and biotechnology, which involves 
important and influential stakeholders. I am writing to you because you are an important 
authority in this area and my study will benefit from the empiricism you provide.  The research 
conducted here could potentially be used to guide the policy making process. The results will be 
disseminated to the USPTO and EPO to assist in developing guidelines for biotech patents. This 
research is educational and not for profit. Interviewers are free to remain anonymous. If you 
have any concerns about the contents within this questionnaire or with any aspect of the 
interview, please direct them to my supervisor: 
 
Professor Uma Suthersanen 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, University of London 
67-69 Lincoln's Inn Fields 
London WC2A 3JB 
United Kingdom  
 
Purpose of study 
 
Despite the fact that approximately twenty percent of human genes are patented, the 
legal standing of gene patents remains controversial.  In addition, patents granted for genetically 
modified organisms like plants and animals have been challenged in courts and continue to face 
tremendous opposition, particularly from a moral standpoint.  There is also the concern that 
patent claims in this area could impede future research and development in biotechnology and 
the life sciences.  An ideal legal regime would be one that strikes the right balance between 
promoting incentive for future research and encouraging competition. While patent protection 
has expanded to include life forms and genetic information, it remains unclear as to whether the 
current rules can adequately strike this balance. The project intends to inform the debate about 
the extent and influence of the biotechnology industry and civil society in shaping intellectual 
property initiatives. 
 
The research questions include:  
 
 Should the existing patent framework be applied to non-traditional kinds of subject 
matter like: genes, proteins, plants, and animals?  
 Is a special set of guidelines required to address the issue adequately? 
 If so, what should those guidelines include and/or exclude? 
 
Design 
 
Participants will be asked questions on the following case:  Association for Molecular 
Pathology et al v. United States Patent and Trademark Office et al (2011) hereafter referred to 
as “Myriad”. In addition, participants will have the opportunity to articulate what they believe is 
appropriate and necessary in protecting biotechnology inventions.  At the end of the interviews, 
I will prepare a three- page briefing to disseminate the results of the interviews to progress 
knowledge of how different sectors of society respond to this legal issue. 
 
Case: Association for Molecular Pathology et al v. United States Patent and Trademark Office 
et al. (Fed. Cir. 2011)   
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The US Federal Court of Appeal restored the law to its prior status before the  District 
Court’s invalidation of Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in March 2010, in which 
all isolated DNA was deemed to be patentable subject matter once more. Relying on the 
standards set out by Chakrabarty and Funk Bros., the issue was whether the invention had 
‘markedly’ different characteristics from what exists in nature. In regards to cDNA, all three 
judges held that Myriad’s claimed cDNA sequences were patentable as it did not exist in nature 
and created by man. In regards to isolated DNA, the majority held that isolated DNA sequences 
were patentable. Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, emphasized that the chemical difference 
between the isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA was sufficient to make isolated DNA 
sequences patentable. “BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their isolated state are not the same molecules as 
DNA as it exists in the body, human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a 
native chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity from 
that possessed by native DNA” (para.42). However, the dissent held isolated DNA 
unpatentable, arguing that there were no “markedly differences” between the isolated DNA and 
natural DNA found in chromosomes. 
 
Link: <http://www.amp.org/documents/CAFCRulingBRCA_Jul29_2011.pdf> 
 
Introductory questions: 
 
1. Could I ask you to start by briefly explaining the organization and your role in it? 
 
2. To whom is your organization accountable? 
 
3. Have any cases in the past affected your research and development in house?  
 
4. How reliant is your firm on its intellectual property portfolio for attracting investment 
and funding? 
 
5. Do you think patents should be granted for all novel and useful genetic insights? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No, patents should be granted only for artificially prepared genes that possess 
new qualities that are different from natural genes and have a new technical 
application that is not possible with natural genes 
c. No, there should be a blanket exclusion on all gene-related productions 
d. Other 
 
Case study questions: 
 
6. In March 2010, the District Court invalidated Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents, 
declaring the isolated gene sequences to be “products of nature.” Do you agree with 
this? 
 
7. Judge Sweet held that DNA sequences should not be treated the same as other 
chemicals in regards to patenting because of their “information rich quality.” However, 
Judge Lourie took a different approach, stating: “genes are in fact materials having a 
chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents by their structures rather than 
their functions.”  Who is right? 
 
8. Dissenting Judge Bryson wrote: “broad claims to genetic material present a significant 
obstacle to the next generation of innovation in genetic medicine-multiplex tests and 
whole-genome sequencing.” Is your firm or do you know of any firms developing gene 
technologies encountering any obstacles because of patents? 
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Technical questions: 
 
9. Do you think isolating and purifying a naturally occurring gene makes the claimed 
matter ‘markedly different’ from a naturally occurring form? 
 
10. One of the requirements for patentability is that the invention needs to be useful or 
industrially applicable. How is a purified version of a gene ‘useful?’  
 
11. Is the act of identifying genes and isolated sequences from other DNA and cellular 
material an ‘invention’? 
 
12. At what level of human intervention and difference from naturally occurring sequences 
should be required to warrant a patent? 
 
Your views on the impact of patents on the biotech industry: 
 
13. Do you think patents will be problematic for the biotech industry in the future? 
 
14. Do you think patenting DNA is a problem? 
 
a. No, patenting DNA is like patenting any other invention 
b. Problem is with patenting DNA itself 
c. Patenting DNA raises ethical problems 
d. The scope of claims in a DNA patent is the problem 
e. Companies’ behaviour in how they assert their patents is problematic 
f. Other 
        15.  Do you think the patent system is the appropriate mechanism to incentivize biotech 
inventions? 
 
a. Yes 
b. Yes, but patent pools should be encouraged to reduce transaction costs and 
increase access to biomedical knowledge and products 
c. No, a prize/reward system would still encourage investment and provide 
incentive 
d. Other 
 
15. What does the biotech industry need to continue to develop? 
 
Policy and decision-making 
17. Judges have a tendency to defer the difficult questions to the legislature to solve, 
maintaining that it is not their role to make policy decisions. What do you think of this 
approach? 
 
18. Who should be responsible for solving these issues? 
 
a. An ethical committee formed by the government 
b. Judges 
c. Patent office 
d. Parliament 
e. Other 
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Annex II: Civil Society Questionnaire 
 
Developing Guidelines for Patenting Biotech: A Comparative Interdisciplinary Study in the 
E.U., United States and Canada 
 
My name is Vivian Mak, a researcher funded by Queen Mary University of London and 
conducting research in the area of patents and biotechnology that involves important and 
influential stakeholders. I am writing to you because you are an important authority in this area 
and my study will benefit from the empiricism you provide.  The research conducted here could 
potentially be used to guide the policy making process. The results will be disseminated to the 
USPTO, U.K., European and Canadian Patent Offices to assist in developing guidelines for 
biotech patents. This research is educational and not for profit. Interviewers are free to remain 
anonymous. If you have any concerns about the contents within this questionnaire or with any 
aspect of the interview, please direct them to my supervisor: 
 
Professor Uma Suthersanen 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, University of London 
67-69 Lincoln's Inn Fields 
London WC2A 3JB 
United Kingdom  
 
Purpose of study 
 
Despite the fact that approximately twenty percent of human genes are patented, the 
legal standing of gene patents remains controversial.  In addition, patents granted for genetically 
modified organisms like plants and animals have been challenged in courts and remain a 
contentious issue. There is also the concern that patent claims in this area could impede future 
research and development in biotechnology and the life sciences.  An ideal legal regime would 
be one that strikes the right balance between promoting incentive for future research and 
encouraging competition. While patent protection has expanded to include life forms and 
genetic information, it remains unclear as to whether the current rules can adequately strike this 
balance. The project intends to inform the debate about the extent and influence of the 
biotechnology industry and civil society in shaping intellectual property initiatives. 
 
The research questions include:  
 
 Should the existing patent framework be applied to non-traditional kinds of subject 
matter like: genes, proteins, plants, and animals?  
 Is a special set of guidelines required to address the issue adequately? 
 If so, what should those guidelines include and/or exclude? 
 
Design 
 
Participants will be asked questions on the following case: Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace 
e.V. (C-34/10) (2011).  In addition, participants will have the opportunity to articulate what they 
believe is appropriate and necessary in protecting biotechnology inventions.  At the end of the 
interviews, I will prepare a three- page briefing to disseminate the results of the interviews to 
progress knowledge of how different sectors of society respond to this legal issue. 
 
Link: 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0034:EN:HTML> 
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Facts: 
Greenpeace e.V. “Greenpeace” challenged the validity of Mr. Brüstle’s patent 
concerning neural precursor cells, the process for producing neural precursor cells from 
embryonic stem cells, and the use of neural precursor cells for therapeutic use. Brüstle argued 
that the Directive did not explicitly define what an embryo entailed, and that an “embryo” was 
something that existed only 14 days after fertilisation. Furthermore, he argued that since his 
embryonic stem cells were obtained from five and six day old embryos, they should not be 
banned. 
 
Legal basis: 
The 1998 Biotechnology Directive from the European Union (Directive 98/44/EC) 
states explicitly that patents cannot be granted if the claimed subject matter and its commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality. Specifically, the use of human 
embryos is banned from patenting in Article 6(2) (c): 
 
[I]nventions requiring the prior destruction of human embryos or their prior use as base 
material not patentable even if process descriptions does not refer to use of human 
embryos. 
 
However, Recital 42 in the preamble to the Directive makes an exception: if human 
embryos are used for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes, then the patent exclusion no longer 
applies. 
 
Summary of judgment: 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that a process that involved 
the removal of a stem cell from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage, requiring the 
destruction of that embryo, cannot be patented. The Court made three main conclusions.  
 
 Wide interpretation of ‘embryo,’ “any human ovum must, as soon as fertilised, be 
regarded as a ‘human embryo’ if that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of 
development of a human being” (Para. 53(1)). 
 
 Use of human embryos for the purpose of scientific research is excluded from 
patentability because patents confer commercial rights. However, the use of human 
embryos for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes that are applied to the human embryo 
and are useful to it is patentable.  
 
 The process, including the prior destruction of a human embryo or their use as a base 
material is excluded from patentability.  
 
Introductory questions: 
 
1. Could I ask you to start by briefly explaining the NGO and your role in it? 
2. Which are the intellectual property issues that your NGO is active on? 
3. To what extent have individual firms and industry associations acted in response to 
direct dialogue with NGOs? 
4. How might the relationship between multilateral institutions and NGOs be enhanced? 
 
Your NGO’s stance on patenting stem cells  
 
5. Do you think that the use of stem cells for commercial purposes is justified? 
6. What about for therapeutic use? 
7. Should there be a blanket ban on their use? 
8. The CJEU quoted from the preamble to the Directive in its judgement, emphasizing the 
importance of treating human biological material with dignity:  
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[T]he preamble to the Directive states that although it seeks to promote investment in 
the field of biotechnology, use of biological material originating from humans must be 
consistent with regard for fundamental rights and, in particular, the dignity of the person 
(Para. 32). 
 
Do you agree with this? 
 
Your NGO’s stance on patenting genetic information and genetically modified organisms 
 
9. Should patents be granted for all novel genetic insights? 
e. Yes 
f. No, patents should be granted only for artificially prepared genes that possess 
new qualities that are different from natural genes and have a new technical 
application that is not possible with natural genes 
g. No, patents should be granted only where the claimed value derives from 
information-encoding capacity of DNA  
h. No, there should be a blanket exclusion on all gene-related productions 
 
10. Do you agree or disagree that patenting DNA is a problem? 
 
a. No, patenting DNA is like patenting any other invention 
b. Problem is with patenting DNA itself 
c. Patenting DNA raises ethical problems 
d. The scope of claims in a DNA patent is the problem 
e. Companies’ behaviour in how they assert their patents is problematic 
f. Other 
 
11. Some religious figures have suggested that DNA or genes are sacred, and that humans 
should not tamper with them. What is your response to that? 
12. What about genetically modified organisms like plants and animals? 
 
Policy and decision-making 
13. Judges have a tendency to defer the difficult questions to the legislature to solve, 
maintaining that it is not their role to make policy decisions. What do you think of this 
approach? 
 
14. Who should be responsible for solving these issues? 
 
a. An ethical committee formed by the government 
b. Judges 
c. Patent office 
d. Parliament 
e. Other 
 
15. Are patents appropriate for incentivizing biotech inventions?  
 
16. Do you think society will benefit from patents in the end? What are the alternatives? 
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Annex III: Stakeholder Consent Form 
 
 
Guidelines for Patenting Human Genetic Materials: A Comparative Study in the EU and US 
 
 
About this research 
 
 Inform the debate about the extent and influence of the biotechnology industry and civil 
society in shaping intellectual property initiatives. 
 Find out whether any previous judicial decisions or legislation has affected research and 
development in the biotechnology industry. 
 Whether the existing patent framework should be applied to non-traditional kinds of 
subject matter like: genes, proteins, plants, and animals. 
 Whether a special set of guidelines is required to address the issue adequately. 
 If so, what should those guidelines include and/or exclude? 
 
 
What you are asked to do 
 
 Provide basic information about yourself (e.g. your role in the workplace). 
 Allow me to interview you and to tape-record the interview. 
 Allow me to keep this information on an electronic database and analyse it for research 
purposes. 
 Allow me to quote from your interview (anonymously, if you prefer) in reports on my 
study. 
 
If you have any queries, please telephone my supervisor Uma Suthersanen at +44 (0)20 7882 
8100. 
 
If you agree, please sign here: 
 
Name in capitals: __________________________________ 
Signed:__________________________________________ 
Date:____________________________________________ 
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Annex IV: Ethics Approval 
 
  Queen Mary, University of London 
                  Room E16 
      Queen’s Building 
      Mile End Road 
      London 
      E1 4NS 
      
                Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee 
                  Hazel Covill 
                Research Ethics Committee Administrator 
                                                                                                                                 Tel: +44 (0) 20 7882 
2207 
                 Email: 
h.covill@qmul.ac.uk 
c/o Professor Uma Suthersanen 
Room 2.4 – Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary University of London 
67-69 Lincolns Inn Fields 
London    WC2A 3JB    20th October 2011 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Re: QMREC 0640 – Developing Guidelines for Biotech 
Patents.  
 
I can confirm that Ms Vivian Mak has completed a Research 
Ethics Questionnaire with regard to the above research. 
 
The result of which was the conclusion that her proposed work 
does not present any ethical concerns; is extremely low risk; 
and thus does not require the scrutiny of the full Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Yours faithfully 
  
 
 
Ms Hazel Covill 
Research Ethics Committee Administrator 
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Annex V: Table of Interviewed Stakeholders 
 
Sector of Society Institution  Name of Representative  
Legal 
Foley & Lardner LLP  Rick Henschel 
McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & 
Berghoff  
Anonymous 
- Lord Hoffman 
Kilburn & Strode LLP Nick Bassil 
IP Asset LLP Anonymous 
Dehn’s, Patents and Trademarks 
Attorneys 
Julian Cockbain 
The Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents  
Tim Roberts 
University of Edinburgh Shawn Harmon 
Bird & Bird Trevor Cook 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization 
Anonymous 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization 
Anonymous 
World Intellectual Property 
Organization 
Anonymous 
DePaul University College of Law Joshua Sarnoff 
World Trade Organization Anonymous  
European Patent Office  Anonymous 
Schellenberg Wittmer Ducor Phillipe 
Leeds University  Graham Dutfield  
Three New Square Justin Turner 
Hogarth Chambers Anonymous 
Delft University of Technology Anonymous 
 
Biotechnology 
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute John Sulston 
Plasticell Therapeutics Anonymous 
Kings College London Anonymous 
GlaxoSmithKline Anonymous 
University College London Institute 
of Ophthalmology 
Pete Coffey 
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute  Tim Hubbard 
Oxford University Nuffield 
Department of Clinical Medicine 
Anonymous 
 
Civil Society 
Berne Declaration Anonymous 
Evangelist Church of Germany Gudrun Kordecki 
Greenpeace Christoph Then 
University of Sheffield Margaret Llewellyn 
University of Manchester Soren Holm 
Edinethics Ltd. Donald Bruce 
King’s College  Roger Brownsword 
Nuffield Council of Bioethics Anonymous 
University College London  Jo Wolff 
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